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VOLUME 42,  NUMBER 2, SUJ\fMER 2 001 
Reframing Impunity: 
Applying Liberal International Law Theory 
to an Analysis of Amnesty legislation 
\l(!illiam \V. Burke-\Xfhi te 
Over the past two decades, as dictatorships gave way to democracies across 
the globe, countries faced the dilemma of holding former regimes liable for 
human rights abuses while facilitating transitions of power. The goal of po­
litical transition bas come into conflict with the goal of providing account­
ability for past crimes. On the one hand, former dictators are understandably 
loath to leave office if they fear prosecmion for their actions. 1 On the other 
band, national and international interest groups have good reason to demand 
the accountability c1nci resignation of former dictators. Amnesty legislation 
has attempted to solve this dilemma in countries ranging from Chile to 
Croatia, South Africa to Bosnia by immunizing both dictators and regimes 
from criminal and civil liability for past atrocities. 
Amnesty legislation appears to offer attractive transitional expediency, fa­
cilitating non-violem surrender of power by former dictators. Such legisla­
tion has eased recent power transitions, while avoiding recourse co either 
domestic unrest or international political imervention. However, amnesty 
le2:islation rests on moblematic foundations. First, it is often enacted bv self-(.___1 l_ "" 
serving dictators. Second, it may conflict \vith the subject state's domestic 
law or constitution. Third, it often violates a state's international obligations 
co prosecute certain cnn1es and to provide citizens with specific rights of 
redress. 
\l(!hi!e many considered amnesty an over-studied phenomenon in che 
1980s, it has recently taken on renewed importance. The trend coward in­
creased extraterricorial prosecutions under the principle of universal jurisdic­
tion� suucrests that in the years ahead, numerous states mav need to derer-ou ' J 
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mine whether to accord such legislation extraterritorial validity. Moreover, 
as the international community has become more involved in the process of 
post-conflict reconciliation, amnesty bas re-emerged as an important politi­
cal and legal cooP 
Much of the past debate over amnesty legislation has been circumscribed 
by three mental paradigms: retribution, sovereignty, and expediency. Adher­
ents co retributive justice have argued chat amnesty laws are per se invalid 
and chat perpetracors must be punished.4 Supponers of these laws have often 
argued that states have a right to grant amnesty on grounds of state sover­
eignty. Consequentialists have taken a middle ground, finding amnesty valid 
when it leads to expedient political transitions. In light of the renewed im­
portance of amnesty legislation, chis Article seeks co transcend these limita­
tions with a new theoretical approach. By imbuing liberal international law 
theory with cenain normative values, this Anicle construCts a new deon­
cological framework for the analysis of amnesty legislation, which simulta­
neously accepts the potential value of amnesty legislation and respects the 
objective nature of international law. Amnesty legislation does have a place 
in the international system and can be an effective tool for social reconcilia­
tion. For amnesty laws to carry domestic or extraterritorial validity, however, 
they must be narrowly tailored and legitimately enacted. 
This Article expounds a fLmdamemally new view of amnesty legislation 
(and potentially other types of legislation as well). \'{!bile past studies have 
been based on realist models and have assumed that the governments en­
acring such legislation were unified entities, chis Anicle applies liberal in­
ternational law theory to the study of amnesty and, in parcicular, co deter­
minations of the validity and the scope of amnesty legislation. Liberal inter­
national law theory is itself void of normative values. To construct a theo­
retical platform for an analysis in which the preferences of individuals and 
social actors are meaningful variables in determining che validity of an am­
nesty law, chis Article overlays a set of value preferences on the disaggre­
gaced-state model of liberal international law theory. In addition, this Arti­
cle provides textual sources for and analyses of recent, often unstudied, am­
nesty laws in countries including Bosnia, Croatia, Fiji, and Guatemala. 
This Anicle speaks primarily to three audiences: academics, drafters, and 
enforcers. for academics, it seeks to reenergize che debate over extraterrito­
rial validity of domestic laws by providing a new theoretical approach. 
Bridging the often irreconcilable gap between legal academics and political 
sciencists, this Article draws on both bodies of literature and grounds its 
analysis in the methodologies of both fields. For praccicioners tn states con-
.-\:---; [) G l'NOClllL ( 1 99':)). 
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sidering enacting amnesty legislation, chis Article employs comparative 
analysis to assist legal drafters in crafting enforceable laws with extraterritO­
rial validity. For practitioners in states enforcing amnesty legislation, chis 
Article provides a framework for analysis of the validity of such legislation, 
and argues that the judiciary is, in face, capable of making nuanced determi­
nations of legitimacy and scope. 
Pare I of this Article develops the theoretical basis by incorporating cer­
tain normative values into liberal international law theory and applying the 
resultant model in the amnesty context. Legitimacy and scope are presented 
as the two key axes of this model. In Pare II, the axes of legitimacy and scope 
are utilized ro construct a framework analyzing the four categories of am­
nesty legislation: (1) Blanket Amnesty; ( 2 )  Locally Legitimized, Partial Im­
munity; (3) Internationally Legitimized, Partial Immunity; and (4) Inter­
national Constitutional Immunity. Part II goes on tO present a broad survey 
of recent amnesty legislation and, through detailed case studies, to define 
the characteristics of each category of amnesty legislation. 
Part III examines recent domestic and international challenges ro each 
category of amnesty legislation. Cases before both domestic courts and the 
Inter-American Commission are reviewed, and the effects of these judg­
ments are considered. The Conclusion begins to operationalize the frame­
work for determinations of extraterritorial validity developed in this Article, 
demonstrating that judiciaries are capable of applying this framework. 
l. TOWARD A NORiviATIVE REPOSITIONING OF liBERAL INTERNATIONAL 
L'\W THEORY 
liberal internacionallaw theory provides a consistent, comprehensive, and 
conceptual foundation for analyzing an apparently divergent body of am­
nesty legislation. Since the mid-1970s, at least fourteen states on four conti­
nents have declared amnesties and/or enacted laws immunizing past regimes 
from accountability and liability.5 These amnesty laws have ranged from 
cliccacorial decrees co legitimate aces of parliament. In scope, these laws vary 
from encompassing all aces of previous regimes ro covering only a particular 
and imernacionally limited subset of crimes. Some of these laws have imnlu­
nized from prosecution an encire country's population. Ochers have granted 
immunity only to selen groups. A new theoretical approach is therefore 
needed co allow systematic study of chis body of legislation. 
This Anicle takes as its starring point liberal international relations the­
ory as applied co incernmional l aw.c' Anne-Marie Slaughter lirst articulated 
5 Tht l1sr includes r\rgunina. Uruguav, C:hdt, l3razil, Peru. Gu;!ltmaLI. [I Sal,·,1dor. Honduras. 
N;cu·;J.l!Ll<L Hairi . h·"n· CnciSL ;\n,l!oLi. Togo, and Somh r\frica. s,., IZacnu. 'lt/"d nort ,j_ ar 7 .22-20,. 
r1. for a more du:1ikd d<SUISSI<HI ,r l ibcr;JI Ill[(crnarir!llal relar1UI1S rhuH1·, upun ,,.iJich rl11s IrHnna­
rllJII<Ii lc1w rhtorv· IS basL·d, St:t: Andrt:w iv[uravcsd..:, 7;tki11g S,·r;,,;o/y: A Libu·.t! Then;) o/ I!!!U'!Id­
!;,n;.J/ f>olirl<,, S I 1:--;T'r. Oi(l;. 5 I 1. 516-21 (1')97). Ai':DJ(L\\" i\lnJt-1\"C.'IK, THL C:HOI<T f<JJ( [LI(OPE. 
.:.'-i-.:.'7, :i-1 (I')')�) (;IPI'I' iil,!C a v:mam of this rheor1· w ;1 S[Ud\· of Lun>J'can lnte,c:rarioll). 
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ch i s  approach ,  descri bing i t  as "boccom up . . .  rather chan cop d ow n .  "7 Ac­
cord i ng to Jose A lvarez, chis  approach " leaves the real i s e  cri t i q ue to ochers . "s 
I n  Slaugh ter 's words ,  i t  " req u i re[s} us co focus on the precise  i nteractions 
between i nd iv iduals and 's cares . "'<) This theory p resumes that state funct ions 
depend on " i ndiv idual choices . " 1 11 It d isaggregates the s tate i nto its compo­
nent  part s ,  focus ing on i nd iv iduals and organ i zat ions to pred i c t  and i nter­
pret state behavior. 
L iberal i n ternational law t heory alone, however, is but a posi t ive model . I t  
makes pred i c tion s ,  not j udgmen ts . I c  gives u s  cools t o  understand outcomes 
based on i n teract ions between c i t i zens and the s tate, but ic does not provide 
values on which to make normative d i s t i nct i ons between chose i nterac­
c ions . 1 1 Posi t ive t heory has been s ubject co the  cri t i c i sm that i ts u t i l i ty is  
l i m i ted . I t  i s  a pred ictive mechanism of pol i t i cal sc ient ists ,  not a normative 
basi s  upon which c i t izens and courts can make judgments about another 
state's legis lat ion . 
This  Article i ncorporates a set of norms and values i nto l i beral i nterna­
t ional law theory, giving mean i ng and app l i cat ion to a theoretical  construct 
otherwise devoid of values . O nce th i s  is done, l i beral i nternati onal law t he­
ory is  transformed from a pos i tive theory i nto a normative coo l  for judges 
and policymakers . Apply ing th i s  normative, l iberal i n ternational l aw theory 
co the analysis  of am nes ty leg i s lat ion, c h i s  Art ic le proposes two axes of 
analys is-legi t imacy and scope-upon which a framework for determ i n i ng 
che extracerri corial val i d i ty of leg islat ion is b u i l t .  Legit i macy add resses do­
mes t ic  and i n ternational  sources and results of amnesty laws; scope refers to 
the cr imes and i n d ividuals  covered by these laws .  
A l iberal test for leg i t i m acy, based on a d i saggregation of  the s care and an 
evaluation of the s upport of c i t izens and i n terest groups , is part icularly use­
fu l for eva luating amnes ty legis lacion . There are,  admi ttedly, a num ber of 
sicuat ions in ·whi c h  a rea l i s t ,  b i l l i ard-ba l l approach to state act ion may be 
more appropriate. For example, when a legis lature passes,  or an execut ive 
enacts ,  a bi lateral  m i l i tary procurement agreemen t ,  consideration of  rhe 
preferences of the ordinary c itizens may not further understanding of the  
state's behavior. I n  gran t i ng amnesty, however, the  scare cedes part ic ular 
c i t i zen r ights, which  are ens hrined in internacional treaties and domes c i c  
,_ AnrH:c-i\Llril· Slaughrn, A Li/;,·rul Tf>,,ny u(/lltm!tllio'"'l L111·, ')-\ A�r. Soc:·y [;'(·(!. L PRoc. 2-\0, 2-� I 
(_)[)()()) 
0. Jos� E. r\h·artz, Cu11m �;(S!"Ic.>i(.'ml/u 'if H.11c: /.(.\.1''"' Ji'r!iil 1?11',1!1</d, 2-\ Y.�I.E J. l.Yr'l. L ) () ) , _)05 
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l aw, to br ing j ustice to past wrongs . 1 2  Si nce a gram of amnesty entai l s  a re­
l i nquishment  of these c i t izens' r ights ,  d isaggregation of the state and con­
s ideration of the relat ion of those c i t i zens to the state t h roug h  a l i beral 
analys is  of l eg i t imacy is  part i cu larly appropriate.  
A .  Legitimacy 
Determ i nations of the l eg i t imacy of a pol i t ical regime are a lways conuo­
vers ia l . I n  order to avoid the concroversy surroundi ng normative determi na­
t ions of governmental l eg i t imacy, the Westphali an system of c l ass ical  i nter­
national l aw offers a pos i t ive test for the recogni t ion of s tates . States m ust 
have a permanen t  population,  a defined territory, a governm e n t ,  and " the  
capac i ty to encer i nco rel at ions wi th  other states . " 10 C l ass ica l  i n ternational 
law publ i c ists ,  who focus l argely on the  "existence of an effective and i nde­
pendent governmen c , "  have appl ied this pos i t ive test without  exam i n i ng 
characteri st ics  of the government i tself  beyond the question of  mere effec­
t iveness . 1 '� 
L i beral i nternational law theory offers a new lens  through which  to v iew 
government behavior. Liberal scholars exam ine the state from a bottom-up 
perspective to ident ify the "seam of i n d ividual-state interact ion . "15  The pos i­
t ive model  says noth i ng about the natur e  of a l eg i t i mate governmen t .  The 
theory presented in th is  Arti c l e ,  however, f�1shions the pos i t ive model i nco a 
normat ive one by i ncorporati ng normative values into the posi t ive m odel . 
Th i s ,  in  turn, al lows one not merely  co make pred ic tions about the natu re of  
government , but also to  ut i l i ze l i beral imernational law theory co test the  
val id i ty of  amnesty and other types of leg i s lation . T h i s  normative model 
looks not j us t  to the ex i stence of seams of i nt eraction between ind ividuals 
and govern ments ,  but to the very nature of those seams to determ ine how 
t hey compare with these chosen normative val ues . 
The value set that th is  Article overlays on l i beral i nternationa l  l aw t heory 
is  that che "wi l l  of the people is co be the bas is  of the authority of govern-
I .2. Tht·se rights ru Judicial p rocess ,ue guaranrecd tn, i!l!u· c�l/{/, The lnrernational C:oven,ltH on Ctvtl 
and Political Rights, which guarantees that tach Sratc·-Parrv wtll "ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms as herttn recogniz ed at·c noLtted slul l han· an tli'tcuve rtmech- · fntern,Htonal Covenant on 
C:ivtl and Political Rights, Dec. 10, 11)00. cll/tlt'd !Ill'• i\far. 21, 11)70, arr. 2U), ')99 U.N.T.S. 171. 
17'1 \vhtlc crimtnal p rosecurion tn rht Untttd Statts tS an acr of the txecmtve, in some comtntntal 
s1·stems, tndt,·idual rights co prosecution are dlccruatcd throu,;.;h the jJ:niie-(1/J/c system, by which tndt­
nduals lllcll. brin,c: crimtnal clCtions cltrenlv nst the perperr,Hor as a kind of co-prosccuror. See. e .. �., 
Rtchard S. Fraser, Cr,J!!f'amfllt CmiJ!IJa!J;r,fJ(c ri' :1 G111t!c !o ;\1//i:iHtlll L111 l�cj;;riJJ: 1-lnll' the Fru;cb !J,, /1. 
/-loll' \lie Cm1 Fi11J ();;!. rmcl \Vby \V( Sb<!ltld Cc� ;·c < 7 S C1 1.. L. F. IV. S .)9. h 1.) ( 1 990) (d tscuss t n,;.; l he cl tscrc­
tion of tlw French prusccuwr and rhe rtghts of nuims w tile c harges dtrculyJ. 
I ) .  Momc·1·tdeo Convent tun on the Rtghts ctnd Duttcs uf Stcm·s, Dec. 2h, 19 1.). arr. I, -+') Star. )Ill)/, 
l () S U . N .T S . I 9; Jet af.,o LII" BIZCJ\\ I" !.II . P1u I"CI PI I � 01 PU\1 IC: I I"TI 1('.;,\TI(Ji':,\1 LI\V 'IJ-Ti ( 1l)9S) 
l i BIZ0\\'.;/11', 'I!Jira note 1.), ar ')! 
1 5  SLtughter, _�;;j;rc� note l II, ell 2-11: '"" c�icr) ,\lcll·,t,·csJk. ,;;j>u nmc h, at SIS (notli\C: the tlll]-'Ortanct· l\f. 
"rqHeSllllcltl\'C' ttl\[l[UtillflS ,!S 11 .[LlnSflltSSiOn be: It' ln· \\.lllch tht· prcfl'rl'I!CCS and SDCicJl ]'01\LI' o( trtcltvtcllt­
,tJs ctnd ,c:roups an: translated tmo scare i'"ltc'l'. .. I. 
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ment . " 1 6  This  fundamental  value choice l eads to t hree d i fferen t  q uestwns 
upon w h i c h  the consideration of a law 's leg i t i m acy i s  based : (1) D i d  the gov­
ernment superv i s i ng the law's enactment base i ts authority on t h e  w i l l  of the 
people? (2)  Was the process by which the law was passed reflect ive of the 
people  as  the u l t imate source of authori ty! ( 3) Was the process b y  w h i ch the 
l aw was appl ied reflective of the people's w i l l? I n  consider i ng legi t imacy, 
th i s  Artic le  looks to each of t hese t hree quest ions derived fro m  the appl ica­
tion of th i s  fundamental val ue j udgement .  
Resolving the first  of  these q uestions ,  concerning the s tatus of the gov­
ernment enacti ng the legis l at ion,  requ i res a determination of whether the 
government in  q uestion was a democracy. Democracy thus serves as  a "seam " 
to connect individual preferences and governmental  action .  T h rough fai r, 
period i c  elections , government  behavior can be l inked to t h e  collect ive ex­
pression of i ndividual preferences . This transformation fro m  a pos i t ive to 
normative theory is aided by a growing body of i nternational l aw/ i n ternational 
relat ions l i terature emphas i z i ng i nd iv idua l  rights to partic ipate i n  e lectoral 
processes . Thomas Franck,  for example,  recognizes a " right  to democracy, 
. . .  the r ight of people to be consul ted and to partic ipate i n  the  process by 
which  poli t ical values are reconci l ed and choices made . " 1 7  As dem ocracy has 
become a bas ic  norm , govern ments have recognized that the i r  leg i t imacy 
depends upon comp l y i ng w i t h  that normY' The not ion of democratic enti­
t lement 1l)  prov ides a basi s  for t h i s  A rt ic l e's normative value  choice: govern­
ments s hould be cons i dered l eg i t i mate and the ir  legis lat ion ext raterri torial l y  
va l i d  on l y  to the extent that the gove rn m e nt i n  q uestion i s  democrat ic .  
Test i ng the  legit imacy of  the enac t ing government by app l y i ng normative 
l i beral i n ternational law theory l eads to the concl us ion that the  l eg i t imacy 
and power of the state rests sole ly on the actual source of i ts au thori ty : the 
aggregated preferences of i n d i v i d uals with i n  i r .  This rest moves beyond clas­
s ica l  defin i t ions of a state's l egal personal i ty and l eg i t imacy, transferri ng the 
16. U;;n encd Dcd,m;t;u;l u j  Hi!i!ltlll 1?1ghu. G.A. Res . ..! 17 A (I l l), U.N. GAOR, '!d Sess., an. I Lo. at 
71, U.N. Doc. A/N \1) (l l).\NJ; >Cf al•o James Crcl\vford, til/{/ tbc Budy uj llltewatiuJJti/ Lent. 111 
Du!OCJ(c\TIC: GOVU(C-J,\:--JCE ,\C-JD IYITI(['.:,\TICJ'\,1! Ll\\' ')l, ')2 (Gregorv H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eels., 
..! ()()()) 
]7. TH0;\1,\S M. hZ.Ii"C.K, F.\l!(C-JLSS 1'\ hn:lh.HIUC.:.\1 Lw:· .\Nil lc.:STITLTIOC'S S .) ( I  ')') 5). Sec ,dru 
i'vf.N.S. Sc:llers. Scj�tll't!IIJ'III c/1/{1 the Delll•nTtlli( L!!rit/u;lml i!l /;;!cJ'I!:IIi•Jihtl Lall', ')2 A,\1. SueY lc.:r'r L. P1uX .. 
116, 117·-19 ( 19')S); Crawford, .wf'r<� note I Ci, at').' (d,scussll1g "the democratic Jclect"). 
IS. Sec Thomas J\1. Franck, Tbc R1gbt lu Ocil!ocTtlfi( c;,;i'cJ'I!di!Cc, S6 1\i\J. ). ]'\ r'L L '!Cl, -iCi 
( l ')')2) ("(G}overnmems recog nize tlut chu r lc,c:,tllllcJCI' depends "n meeung a 110rmacive expectation of 
the communJt)' of scctccs. Th1s recogn1cion has kd rc> rhe cmngence of ci communJC\' cxpenacicJil: th,n 
chose who sttk the val idat i on of then UlljlOwcnncnt j'CHtll(ly govern Wl[h tht· constJH of the guvtrntd."!: 
,t!JD Cre,c:ory ill. Fox, The Ht,�h;;r, P•;/;rlu!l Pt!U!t!f'rt/i•,JI 111 l!!!cm,t/i()l/til Lru, iii DF,\ICJUZciTIC CU\'l'IZC.:· 
·I'.U: .11'.\l 1:-\TLI('J,\TJ().'\,11. Ll\\, .11'/il'd IWle lel. {I( -\S, S') lt�rgulll,C: thac .. ll'ht·n the will or rlK j't'll]'lt IS 
the has1s ot chc .turlwrJc\· uf government, rtgllllh rktt rhwan che 11ill of che pcuplt: will lack l c,c:JtJ· 
[ITI1 a rcct ! JS[ UICICJLIC tJr' the dt·fllJKTalll t'lllll i clllt'il( ciUCpcs much ur thiS t�rgumt·nc. See 
Bl(,\[1 l\CJTJ-LCOVII(.'\,\IIC.:I.\1 li.!I(;JTI,\1.\() l'l ic.:lll('\1110'\11 L\\\'(I'J')l)) 
I '). Tlwmcts i\1 Frctnck , Fhe Oc·i!IIJeratic· l:!!!i!lcii!UI! . ..!') U 1\ic:Jl L. l\1 \ I .  1-2 ( I  ')')5 ). 
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source of a state's i nternati onal  authori ty to the peopl e .  �0 I n  many ways ,  
however, th is  test  j us t  begs another quest ion :  what  really is  democracy 1 
Defin i t ions of democracy abound .  Joseph Schumperer's c lass i c  procedural 
defin i t ion serves as the bas is  of much democrati zation l i terature . 2 l  While  
th i s  Art ic le  accepts rhe necess i ty of a procedural defi n i ci o n ,  Sch um perer's 
defin i c ion of democracy, sec merely i n  terms of elect ions ,  i s  c learly i n ­
sufficient . 2 2  T h e  mere face  char e lect ions have occurred , even i f  they are free 
and fai r, i s  nor enough co demonstrate t hat the w i l l  of rhe peopl e  i s  the basi s  
of t he  authority of th e  governm e n t .  
T h i s  Artic le  accepts t h e  bas ic  fram ework of proced ural democracy, but 
goes further, scrut i n i z ing a government's con t i n ued respons iveness to the  
wi l l  of i ts c i t i zens . 2 ) Robert Dah l 's defini c ion of de mocracy comes c losest to 
chis  idea,  star i ng chat "a key characterist ic  of democracy i s  the conti nu ing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of i rs  c i t i zens ,  consid­
ered as  pol i t ical  equal s .  "�-4 Accept i ng Dahl 's defin i c ion ,  ch i s  Anicle  first  con­
si ders democracy in terms of free and fair  e lect ions ,  and proceeds to  l ook to 
the ong o ing responsiveness of the governm ent based on the spec i fic pol i t ical  
con text i n  which the amnesty leg is lat ion is  enacted . 
Such determinations of democracy, made eas i ly  when speaking i n  more 
abs tract term s ,  may appear ambiguous in appl i cat ion .  In apply i ng the first 
test of leg i t imacy-whether the enac r i ng governme nc reflects the authority 
of the w i l l  of the people-ch i s  Art ic le  draws lessons from pos i t ive l i beral 
theory, which s uggests that " representation in the l iberal view is not s i mply 
a formal atri b me of scare i nst i tut ions ,  bur  incl udes ocher sta b l e  characteris­
t ics of the pol i t i cal process , formal and i nfo rmal ,  that privi lege part icular 
soc ie tal i nteres rs . c '  This Art ic le  therefore looks closely at the h i s torical back-
20.  Str F o x .  _wpr<� noct· l l:l , c t r  ')ll ( no r i n .� rhar  rht " n t ntrtcmh cun u n· conccpuon of r h e  S rart  h a s  u n ­
cle rgont a subsranr i a l  change : i mc rn a r i o n a l  n o r t o n s  of leg i r i macv a r e  no l onger olw i ous ro rht or ig m o f  
govtrn mems,  bur  ha1-e come ro appro x t mare qll l r t  c l oselv r hose d omts r i c conceprions of popu lar  sover­
e i g n ry " ) .  
2 1 .  JosEPH i\ _  ScH L ,I ! P UT I \ ,  CwrL� I . I S � I ,  SoC J .-I L !SM,  .-1 :\ D  D t: o i OCILICY H)') ( :2d eel . 1 9-4 7 ) ;  ·'"" llfJ,, 
S.-1 .\ I L E L  P I-l c c-: T J i'iCTOi'i . TH I '  Tr-I I JW \V.-w t : :  D I ' .\ I OCJLITJZ,ITJo� 1 0:  T H t-: L1 1T '[\\ T N T J E T H  C t-: N T U RY 7 
( I ')') I )  ( cl c: li n 1 11g cl tmocracl- as base-d on " fa t r, honc-s r ,  clllcl per i od i c t l tu i ons" )  
22 .  1-l u n l l ng ro n  h i mself  ctd m i rs r h ! S ,  n ut t ng c lur " [ r }o  some people d c:m uc racy has or  s h o u !J have 
m u c h  murc swt·tp t tlg and i d c:o l o,c; ica l  con n o w r i o n s .  To r htm . · r ru t: cl emocrclL I. · means liberlt:. e,�c�litf. ji·c�ttr-
;;i;f . .. H u c-;T I :--: c ;TOi'i, ' iifir" nurc  2 1 ,  ar l) . 
2 5 .  Slaughrer, Jlljlra nme I ( ) ,  ar '5 l l . As S l aug h rc:r 1)\l t ms u u r ,  l i beral d cmocrctcv " d e norts some r(Jrm of 
rcpn:stn r a r i vc: govnn mctn sc:cu rL"Ll b1·  rhe  separa r i on of powus, cons u r u r tonal  g uaramees of c i v i l  and 
po l i r i ca l r i gh r s ,  J ur id t ca l equ a l i [ l·, tlnd a fu n c r i on t ng J U d tc 1 a l  wsrem · !d. 
2- i .  Ro i \ J ' Jn ,\ . D.\H L .  PoJ.Y.�I\CI I Y :  P,l lniU I'--IT JCl'-: ;1 :\ D  0 1' l 'OS I T I OI' 1 ( l ')i l ) . T h i s  r\rr i c l t  does nm 
req u i re t har Dah l 's ideal poh-cu-ch 1· ( " rt g i mcs r h ar ha1-e been s u bsrcm r i a l l y  popu Luiztd cllld l i bera l ized , 
r h a r  i s ,  h ig h h- i nclusive and open ro i'u b l i c  cuinesrtn io n " )  bt mu fur a sccuc w be cons iducd a dtmoc­
racr- !d. ar  S_ N ontrhtless ,  c h is 1\ m cl c  con s i d e rs rhc rwu d t mtns ions  Dct h l  deems s i g n d icanr , " p u b l i c  
comesra l l o n  a n d  rhe r i g h r  w pctrr i c q,arc  . . . /J ar 5 I n  d u t r m i n i n g  whc: rhn a S Ltrc- t S  a democracy, rhc-n . 
r h i s  A r r i c k  l ou!-.:s w Dah l 's cuilCL' r l l S  c har c t [ IZL' t l S  l u,·e " u n t lll } 'Cl i rc:cl oppo rc u n t r t cs :  I .  To tor m u Lnt t lll' t r  
p references , .:!
. 
'J(J s t g n t h· r h c t r  p refercnct·s c o  c he t r  td l mv u r i 1.cns  tllld r h c  :C:lJ\'Cr t l l l l CJ t r  h1· t n c l i ,· i d ua l  and 
u d l cc r l \'t:  an ton . �) 'I(, h:llc r hc i r  prc·ftrL· n ces wetghul u l u " l l y  1 11 r h c  CUllc l un u i- r h c .�u,· c: rn m c m . "  !d.  ar  
- ,  
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grou nd of the regime i n  quest ion .  F reedom House democracy scores provide 
add i t ional evidence as w the q ual i ty of democracy in each s tate s mdied 26 
Freedom House scores are not , h owever, taken as defini tive benchmarks . 
These scores only s upplement  and confirm the overa l l  analysi s  developed 
through h istorical  i n q u i ry. \"\7h e n  cons idered in conjuncr ion with an h i s tori­
cal  analys i s ,  however, Freedom House scores al low for rough judgments 
about the stme of democracy. 
The normati ve value t hat the  w i l l  of the people should govern l eads w the 
appl i cat ion of the second rest for l egitimacy-legi t imacy of process . The 
question raised is  whether the  process by wh ich the law was enacred 
reflected the authority of the wi ll of the peop l e .  In order chat an amnesty l aw 
carry legit i macy, the government m ust represent the popular  w i l l , 27  as evi­
denced through free and fai r  e lect ions ,  cmd it m ust enact the  l e g i s l at ion  i n  
q uestion through processes approved by the people .  28 
I n  determ i n i ng whether an amnesty l aw i s  enacted through l egit i mate 
processes , this Article looks w two gu ide l ines proposed by Franck . F i rs t ,  a 
l aw m ust have coherence or  " c reat l i ke cases al i ke . "29  Second ,  it m ust  dem­
onstrate ad herence,  "from i ts hav i ng been made in accordance w i th the proc­
ess estab l ished by the constit ut i o n ,  which is  the u l t i mate ru le  of recog n i -
2 !1 . F IUc HJU.\ 1  1-l O USI: , A illtlir:l Smny o/ Frmlot/1 Colli! II) Su,rcJ I 'J 7l-- .3  lu 1 ')'}l)-0(}. h t t p : //www. 
Crcedomhoust: . ur,c:ir<l t i n.ss ' i nd ex . h r m  ( v i s i n:cl Feb.  26,  2 0 0 1  ) . The scores a re nk<tsu red on a ont> to-sc:ven 
scale.  " w i r h  one represen t i ng rhe h 1g hesr degree of freedom and seven rile lmves r . "  The tirsr n u m ber 
p rese nred rep1·esenrs pul i r i cll  r i g h t s ,  r he second c 1 v i l  ! 1 bt: r r i es .  "Count r ies w hose com b i ned ;l\'(:r;tgL·S t(Jr 
pol 1 r i cd r i g h t s  ;lllcl c i v i l l i ber[ ]es  Ld l between 1 . 0  and 2. 5 ;tre dc:s ignarecl ' free ; '  bet ween .'> . U  and 5 . 5  
·pan· ly  free ; '  and buween 5 5  and 7 . 0  'nor free . ·  lei. For a d i scuss i o n  o f  t hese cHcgor ies ,  see F R E!: I )O,,I 
1-[0L' o; l ·: .  Sit!'/ e) :\ I dbodl)lu.�y. h r r p : /  /www. freed om house .org/ rcsearc hifrC"ewurld!  2 1 ) () ( ) /  m e r  h od ulugy h r m  I 
( v 1 s 1 t td Feb. 2() ,  2 <H l0) .  Desp i te somt: derracrors, Freedom H ouse scores ;trc ofcen used i n  dtmocra c i za c i o n  
l ! tcracure.  s('(', ,·. g. , 1-l u ,..;TIN(;TO N ,  fi!/Jra n ot e  2 1 ' at  l I '  Larrv D iamond.  /.i tbe Third \V{m: Ot t'!'.:- , 7 . ,0, J 
D l . \ 1 .  2 0 ,  2 .'> n. I I .  Courts h;we been ;lb l e  ro re l y  on Freedom H ouse scurcs . Sci'. ex , iVklendtz - f l u res v. 
I . N . S  .. I 65 F..)d ) 5 ,  ''":' _:; ( Memorand u m ,  l)c h  Cir. I ';)';)S) ( no t i ng chac  che I NS had " tol i led co subm i c  r h e  
Frtcdom l l uust report on w h i c h  i t  r t l t e s  l ll W  e v i dence" h 1 nder i ng ;l J Uc! L c i a l  c l uerm 1 n a c i o n  o f  r h e  
pol 1 r ica l  S ] [ U ;l f i n n  1 n  E l  Sal vador)  
2 7 .  Sec <'. g . ,  r\ m y  G u c man n  $:. Den n i s  Thom pson.  Tb£' , \ forrd /'o;mdt�ti•Mi r;( Tmtb CotJ!ii!IUiotl.i. 111 
T!Z UTH v. j USTIC I ' . 2 2 ,  '> 5-.) Cl ( R obc:rr I .  Rocberg $:. Den n i s  Thompson eel s . ,  2 U I J() ) ( not 1 ng r h e  l m pur­
canc<: of rec i procal del i berac ive democracy i n  g i v i ng r r m h  com m 1 s s i o n s  moral  lc:g i c i m acy ) .  
2 0 .  hanck expla i n s  c h i s  second . process-bc1sed rcqll l rc m e n c , scar i ng c h a r  " [ w ) h t n  1 t  i s  asserted c h a c  a 
r u l e  or 1 ts ai'P I I L <lC I Oll 1s l c:g i r i m arL· ,  cwu r h i n,c:s arc i m p h cd : r h a r  t t  i s  a ru le  made o r  a p p l ied  1 11 ;Lccor­
(lanct \\' i c h  a r i ,l dl t  process, and cheref(Jre. chac ir ou,cdlt  ro l'romoce ,-o l un cary com p l 1 a nct bv chose ro 
whum 1 t  I S  ;�cldrt:sstd . . . F I\,\ 'J C : K .  Jitf'rc� note I 7 .  at 2 !1 .  Set ,;!,�,, Ph i l l i p  R .  Tr i m b l e , C/o/;,;/j�,lli,,il. IIIIUI!r i­
il''ihil / ;Willtli•;l!i. i!l!c l tbt f:'ro.i/o/1 o/ Nti!lolltil Sot ti'l'l,l!,lll) dllcl Oeli/IJ(I"d<) .  ') 5 M!U-1 L. R LV. I l)-i - i .  I �J- il)  
( l l)97) 
2 ') .  F !C·I C.: CI .; ,  1 //jlr<� nort· 1 !1 ,  cH _'> S .  Accor d L L \L: ro  Franck,  
[ a }  r u l e- i s  cohert:n c  \\'h t·n 1 t s  appl 1car ion r rears l d-:e cases ;l l d..:t a n d  w h e n  r h c  ru le- rtLnt·s 1 11 a p l· i n c i ­
p l cd hsh ion  co oc h er r u ! t: s  i n  r h c  s a m e  w s r e m  . T h e  l tg i c i m;K\. of ru l c·s to; a ug m t-tH l'd \\·ht'n r h n· 
1 11CIX['Orcltl' p r i n c i p les of gC" n C" ra l ;q> p l l cH ion C nlual  ;lpp i Lc a r i u n  req u i rts n o t  o n l 1· r h ctt l d-.:b are 
t rt"arcd a ! t ke .  
Jd e ll  :i 0 .  i I .  Thh h , r m u l a r i t l l l  I S  S 1 m da r ru rhac  pur  forwcucl h1 ·  C ur m J n n  c tn c l  T h o m l>su n .  \\'ho <lr,L: L I L' c t  
k,c: L t i m,trc am t1c·q,· Ll\\' h u n c  c ha c " c a n n o r  he !Tas< J l l ;l b h· reJ ected lw a l1 \· u r 1 zt:n c"rn l l 1 1 l l t'd rc, dcm ocrac\· 
hl'CILISt' I t  rL'll ll l !'L·S O f l J \· r i l a r  l'<ICh J'USOfl SL·ck Cel'lllS oi- CUOj)l'r<l f i U i l  char  rt'SI1LL'[ a l i  <!S fret' C l i l d  L'l l l la l  C i [I ­
Zt'11.S .  (; u r m a L i n  ,\: Thompso 1 1 ,  'II fir,; n o r c  . �- . ·.t r  ) - . 
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c ion . " 30  While  th i s  Article does not r igidly  appl y  Franck's cr iter ia ,  or any of 
the purely procedural defin itions of democracy, coherence and adherence are 
helpful  in consi dering the leg i t i macy of the enactment process . 
The exploration of leg i t imacy here i n  i s  based largely on the app l ication of 
these fi rst two questions:  was the s tatus of the government reflect ive of the 
popular sovereignty and was the law e nacted through a process reflect ive of 
that sovereignty. I n  addi t ion,  this Art ic le  looks to the th ird q uest ion noted 
above:  was the law appl i ed in a manner reflective of the u l t imate authority  of 
the w i l l  of the people; To resolve th i s  t h i rd q uestion , the Art ic le  looks aga in  
to h i s torical a n d  judic ial sources for evidence of  how a given law was ap­
pl ied .  
The l i beral approach advanced by ch is  Art ic le  has  based dete rminations of 
l eg i t i macy largely on domestic  considerations .  A second level of analysis­
the i nternational perspect ive-is also necessary. A l i beral theory of i nterna­
t ional law takes i n to cons ideration the i nextricable l i n ks between the domes­
t ic  and international contexts.  Li beral t heory depends not onl y  on i ndiv idu­
als in teract i ng with their  own government ,  but  also on i nd i v i d ual s and 
groups i nteract i ng " through governmental  i nst i tutions with the  i nd ividuals 
and g roups of ocher states . " 1 1  Thus ,  the  in teraction between the  c i t i zens of 
one leg i t imate democracy and the ir  government m ay cause that government 
to i nteract with  the government of another s tate enac t i ng an am nesty law, 
e i ther in support of or agai nst t hat l aw. 1 2  In a wor ld  of l i beral s tates , " the 
basel ine assumption i s  that governments w i l l  in teract with one another 
within a web of i nd iv idual and group comacts i n  transnational c iv i l  soc i­
ety. " ' -' \Vhen th i s  A rt icle 's normat ive value judgments are overlaid on  l iberal 
i nt ernational law theory, such widespread and s ignificant i n teract ions wi th in  
th e  t ransnational pol ity become th e  root authori ty of  i mernational law and 
therefore affect the val id i ty of the l aw in question.  The preferences of t hese 
ind iv i duals ,  aniculated through a govern ment ,  shou ld therefore h ave bear­
i ng on the i nternat ional legi t i m acy and extraterri ro rial  val i d i ty of am nesty 
leg i s la t ion . 
The role of internat ional actors and audiences in  the a m ne s t y  process var­
ies .  In some cases , the amnesty law may be universal ly condemned . In such 
instances , the in rernational com munity  may be viewed as hav i ng rejected 
the val id i ty  of the  legis lat ion . In other cases , t here may be no in ternational 
in volvement whatsoever. In these latter cases,  an analysis  of internat ional 
l eg i t imacy i s  unava i l ing ,  and determinations muse  be made sol e ly  on the 
-) ( ) _  f i(;I :'--'C K .  _1/1,/lrii 110Ce l 0 .  ac \ l .  Fran c k  d e ri nes ad here nce broad! ,· < I S  " c he verr i cd n e x u s  bec\\'n:n a 
s i ng it:: pr i man· ru le  of <lbl 1gac l l ln  _ <111d a pnamid of stconchn· ru les ,L:OI'tri \ 1 1\C: r h e  L reaC J ( J n .  i mtrprt: ra-
r ion ,  and appl 1clc ion of suc·h rulb b,- rht com m u n i n·_ . .  /J 
1 1  _ S L! u ,c: h r c· r. 1 /ijl l , /  n < • l e .., , <U 2---i I ,  :: --i  _-; 
l 2 .  Sa. l·.,� . ,  Rohcn I .  R , J r bcr,s , 'J i·11t/r Crll!IJJJiJ.Iiol/.1 . .  u;d t/,c PnJl '!.Uoil r�( Tr;;t/'. dl!d l�C(i!l/(l/It ;rioJ! .  ill 
T1u TH v. _j i SI ICT , .1 11jiu I H! C C  7_ ! ,  etc _) .  I ::  ( n o r i n g  rht· i m j' ( ; r L! IKt < l t '  2-' luha l l zcd CJI· i l  S< J C < n '-· 1 11 .. l't' l l1 -
l ( >rd l n g )  rhc- w o r k  ot' r r u r h  C < > ll'> ll1 i S s l o n s  . .  ) . 
1 _1 .  S i :Ju,c: h rcr. J iljn·,/ nnr c· I 0. cu ) :: S .  
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basi s  of domestic  leg i t i macy. A lternatively, t he amnesty law i n  q ues t ion  m ay 
garner w idespread i nternational  s upport , conferr ing on  i t  some i n ternational 
leg i t i macy. In other cases , the amnesty law may be part of a m ul t i - lateral 
treaty or even sanctioned by a UN Security Counci l  resol u t i o n .  W here am­
nes ty is  conferred by a Secur i ty  Counci l  reso lut ion ,  states may even be ab­
solved of pre-exi s t i ng i n ternational d uties ro prosecute certai n  cr imes . 
Determ i nations of i nternational leg i t i macy can be d i fficu l t .  \X'hat  level of  
i n ternat ional s upport i s  s uffic ient r o  confer leg i t i macy)  How should  cases be 
resolved where an amnesty law has popular s upport in the enacti ng s tate but  
i s  widely condemned i nternational l y )  Do domestic  actors carry greater 
weight  in t he determ i nat ion of leg i t i macy than do actors in the  larger i nter­
national society? Nei ther the posi t i ve l i beral t heory of i nternati o nal  law nor 
th is  Article's normative t ransformat i o n  thereof has yet been appl ied to help 
resolve these q uestions .  This  A rt i c le beg i ns the app l i cation process , conced­
i ng from the start t hat q uesti o ns of leg i t im acy w i l l  not be ful l y  reso lved . 
Such unreso lved q uest ions ,  however, may be i l l u m i nated by t he second axis  
of anal ysis : scope.  
Before turn i ng ro scope, i t  i s  worth pau s i i1g co consider a second potential 
theoretical ground for leg i t i m acy-consequen t i a l  legit i macy. Consequent ial 
leg i t imacy gro unds a l aw 's leg i t i m acy in i ts effects .  Advocates of  th i s  ap­
proach contend t here m ay be a dynamic  relat ionsh ip  between efforts to es­
tabl i sh  a stable democratic  state and leg i t i macy. Accord i ng ro t h i s  teleologi ­
cal argumenr,  i f  a law does , i n  fac t ,  help establ i sh  democracy, i t  shou ld  carry 
leg i t imacy, i ndependent of the fac rors d i scussed above. '-i The goal of  j ust ice 
i n  th is  sense is not reui bucive or  rehab i l i tat i ve ,  but  res torative .  Ques t i ons of 
t he leg i t i macy of a law should focus on " i ts comm itment  to reconc i l ia­
t ion . " -'5 Given the value j udgment that i nd i v i d uals should be the source of 
authority of government ,  a tes t fo r leg i t i macy chat looks to whether a law 
reconci les a soci ety and reasserts t he popular sovere ignty, would seem ap­
peal i ng .  The framework presen ted in ch i s  Art i c l e  leaves room for t h e  c i t i zens 
of s tates enact ing amnest ies to form u late and arr iculace a preference that 
certain cr i rT1 es should ,  i n  order to bci l i cace reconc i l i at i o n ,  be am nes r ied 
rat her chan prosecu ted . However, w here such preferences have not  been ar­
t i cu lated by i nd i v i cl ual s ,  or where chose preferences have not  preva i led i n  
formulat i ng s tate pol icy, cbe c.ld�1U i t  rule s houlcl b e  the t h i n  p reference o f  t he 
transnat i onal pol i cy i n  f�wor of prosecu t ion over am nes ty. Conseq uenti a l i sts  
have g i ven no compel l i ng reason why, absen t  c l ear preferences of i nd ividuals 
.'>-L For an arr i c u l a r i on u f  rh 1 :>  ,· i e 11·. S l: "L"  gtntr: d h· ,-\zan J<IIl Peoplc: ·s O r,!.!an t s;n i o n .  I ')')() ( :') )  BCJ . I\ I 0 !  5 
( C C ) :  i\ L�JnH .-1 i\ [ J :--<0\\·, 13 1:"1 \\' L I ·: c-: VE " l( ; J ' .-I c-:Cic .� c-: l l  Fn t;td V I' '-ii'S::' ( 1 '!:-: S ) :  ,f S rcn: n  Ramer. ;\'uc L), ,,;,n·­
rc�o, ! .  ()/J ;\ !i '" ! lh! ,  07 C ro.  LJ 7 0 7 .  -: _.; _:-.) 8  ( ) ')')') ) t rw r t l l ,!.! a Ctl:hal rcLn i onsh 1 p  ber wttn d e mocran 
;Jfld ;lCC l > L I Il ( c\ h j ] l [ y ) .  
li< "e .  i;; Tl\ l J T I-l  v . .J l SI J U : .  Jltjlra n o r c:  � 7 .  ;H 6 � ,  7 ') .  Des m o n d  Tu r u  C 1 1 1 11 1l k m s  r h :tr res rma r 1 n: J l l S r tcc:  · · i .s 
Cl l t lCt rnc:d nm so . 1\\ C h  he;� l t ll ,!.! .  lu r m o n1 ·  ; �nd rcct· l l n C t kt r l < ;!l ·· F i n ;� ]  Rcpmr of r i l e· Tru ch a n d  l\ t:et l \ 1 -
C I I t a r i o n  C o m m · n .  c h  I ,  9! ) {, ( l l)l) :-: ) ,  <i�c·,/ i l !  K>;s .  ' 1'/' I"J 
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i n  the enacting s tate, amnesty, not p rosecution,  shou ld b e  the defaul t  rule.  
I f, i n  the fut ure, empi rical evi dence emerges or pos i t ive i nternational rela­
t ions theory can demonstrate that am nesty does , i n  fact ,  lead to s table transi ­
t ion,  i t  i s  poss ible that the default  p reference of the transnati onal pol i ty 
could change, and w i th i t  the background rule. Absent such evi dence, how­
ever, rhe current i nternat ional preference i n  favor of prosecut i on prevai l s .  
Even where t he i nd iv iduals  i n  a scare deem amnesty preferable on conse­
q uential  grounds ,  the strong preferences of the transnational pol i ty i n  favor 
of prosecut i ng certai n  hei nous crimes may l i m i t  the freedom of t he national 
pol i cy to amnes ty those crimes . Therefore, th i s  Art icle acknowledges , b u r  
nei ther accept s  nor applies ,  the test o f  teleolog ical leg i t imacy o f  amnesty 
leg i s lation . 
B.  Scope 
This  normative vers ton of l i beral i nternat ional law theory g i ves r i se to 
scope as a second axi s  of analysi s .  Scope cons iders the coverage of amnesty 
leg i s lat ion: who i s  i mmun ized from prosecution and wh ich acts are i m m u ne.  
The word i ng of most amnesty laws g i ves clear textual answers to the q ues­
t ion of scope, and when the text is nor speci fic, one can determine  co whom 
rhe law appl ies ei ther through a cons iderat ion of j ud icial decisions or 
through q uan t i tat i ve data on the law's application . 
Whi le scope i s  trad i t ionally expressed th rough a real i s t ,  s tate-focused 
analys i s ,  chi s  Art icle does nor v iew scope through a real i s t  lens . Rather, i r  
also applies l i beral i n ternational l aw theory t o  the considerat ion o f  scope. As 
noted above, int ernational treat ies and cus com general ly l i m i t  the potenc ial 
scope of amnes ty laws . From a l iberal perspect i ve, these t reat ies represent 
the aggregated preferences of i nd i v i d uals who, acti ng through governments , 
have created a reg ime chat forbi ds certa in acts and proh i b i ts s tates from ei­
ther commi t t ing or faci l i tat ing such acts .  l i beral theory accoun ts for such 
preferences of the i n ternat ional com m un i ty and "assun1es that the pattern of 
i merclependem srate preferences i m poses a b i nd i ng consrra int  on state be­
hav ior. " ;(, 
Those b ind i ng constra i nt s  are referred co here in  as "scope l im i  cat ions" and 
shou ld be concei ved of as part of an i n ternat ional const i t u t ional orclerY 
Such a g lobal order recogn izes an emerg i ng i nternational cri m i nal law re­
g i me, created by i nd iv iduals and c ransnac i onal g roups express ing condemna­
t ion of certai n  cr i mes , wh ich res tr icts the scope of amnesty leg is lat ion . 18 
Cons ider ing these t reat ies as a k i n d  of i nternat i onal  const i tut ion proves 
analyt ically usefu l .  An emergem, treacy-basecl i ncernat ional consc iwtion ans 
l i ke a domest ic consc i cmion, sett i ng a universal ce i l i ng on leg is lat ive and 
) ( J .  )\ [urcl\T S l k ,  ' lt/JJ .• i ! l U l L" G .  ar  5 � 0 .  
_, , .  i\Llrl \Vt l l t: r  has a n , c u Lrrtd r h 1 s  rdc-a 1 n  l1 1 s  r rc·am1L" n r  r n" r h L  
[\ l .-I JU: \Vi · L l . ll ( ,  TH ! C lu s l s  � �  l<o�m·o -'S--.">1 ( \ LJ':JLJ J  
.� s .  s �e. l'.,'-!, . , S L! u�lHl' l" ,  .l'lij} } '( /  J1 U [ t' 1 0 : � l t  S :) ( l .  
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exec utive power and arc iculac i ng the l i nks between t hese l i m i tat ions  and the 
t ransnational pol i cy. >':! As chis  emerg i ng i n cernati onal cons t i t u t i o n  places 
checks and balances i n  the system , i t  "curb[s} the abuse of power" 'i l l or, from 
t he perspective of chis  Article ,  i t  provides an objective test for w hen a n  am­
nesty-enact i ng national legi s lature or executive has exceeded the power re­
tai ned by t he c i t izens of a s tate and thei r national governmenc i n  rel at ion  to 
the i n ternational const i tut ion and the transnational pol i ty. Such res tr ict ions 
serve to l i m i t  t he permi tted scope of amnesty legis lation ,  notwithstand i ng 
t he domestic  leg i t i macy o f  the law. 
This  normative vers ion of l iberal i n ternati onal l aw t heory may be cri­
t i qued on grounds that i t  s ubject iv izes i ncernational  l aw. After al l ,  i n terna­
t i onal law trad i t i onal l y  looks to objective rests ,  such as the exi s tence of a 
defi ned territory, and speaks i n  terms of clear, fin i te obl igat ions .  T h i s  Arc i­
cle 's normative theory ad m i tted ly  raises subject ive quest ions  about the 
qual ity of i n terest representation i n  a particular country. This  m odel , how­
ever, s t i l l  protects the objective nature of in ternational  law. Scope determ i­
nations are object ive by nature and can override s ubjective determ i nations of 
governmencal l egi t imacy. Even i f  an am nesty law bas ful l  domest ic  l egi t i ­
m acy, there may be cri mes for which  a state s impl y  cannot absolve ind ivid­
ual responsi b i l i ty. For example,  the )111 cogem prohib i t ion  o f  ge noc i de-1 1 or  
g rave breaches of t he Geneva Convemi ons-1 2  i mpose cmt dedere cl!tt jlldicare 
(prosecute or extrad i te) req u i rements and woul d i nval i date any domest ic  l aw 
that seeks to gram am nesty  fo r chese crimes .  I n  t hese instances , the  emer­
gent i nternat i onal const i tu t io n  w i l l  force che  rejection of an am nesty on o b ­
jecr ive,  subs tant i ve g rounds . 
This  Artic le 's i nq u i ry i m o  scope addresses the bread th  of a part icular  
g ram of i mm uni ty. Spec i fical ly, the Art ic le  asks whether the scope of the l aw 
L1l ls wi th in  a scare 's perm iss ib le  range of competencies ,  e i ther  as l i n< i ted by 
rhe state's own popu lation t hrough the domestic cons t i t ut i o n  or by the 
transnational pol i ty through the i nternat i onal const i t ut i o n . The ava i l ab i l i ty 
of alternate modes of reco urse for v i c t i m s i n  a parti c ular state i s  also cons id­
e red . H 
Th i s  anal ys i s  of scope seeks boch to gen erate gene ral themes as w t h e  
oerm i ss ib l e  reach o f  anmesty, wh i l e rec m: n i z i nl.': that s uc h  o b l i L:a t i o ns are .1 (_j (__.I ( __ _) 
coumry -spec i fi c  and cleterrn i n ed i n  l arge part by the  pan icular c reaty obl iga-
_) ') .  icl .  cr t 5 _'\ 5 ( r 1 m 1 11 ,� that "a w m l cl o( l i bncd s r cncs could lx conceprucd i zed cts cr r rans ru t i o n ,d pol ­
I t \ · · · ) .  
i l l  M 
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cions chat a state has assumed. Such a country-specific inquiry is beyond the 
reach of chis Article. Suffice ic co say here chat there are certain crimes char 
scares are obligated either co be prepared co prosecuce or to in fac e  prosecuce 
and for which they can not grant amnesty i n  conformity with the emergent 
international conscicucion. '1-1 Such cri mes inc lude genocide, grave breaches of 
che Geneva Conventions, cormre, and crimes against humanity. -1 5 \'\!bile an 
analysis of particular state obligations is saved for future study, the emergent 
international constitution places c lear and objective limits on che scope of 
any scare's amnesty gram. Basic norms of customary and treaty law would 
bar any legislation which sought co gram amnesty in relation co che afore­
mentioned aces, even in che face of overwhelming domestic and interna­
tional support for the amnesty. 
Before applying chis normative liberal international law theory, it is 
worth recasting the conclusions of the preceding section. This theory can be 
seen as an international constitutional system with a federal structure. In 
determining the validity of an amnesty, normative liberal theory defers co 
the preferences of individuals i n  the state enacting the amnesty. A standard 
of presumptive deference is applied co these national policies, subject to the 
limitations of scope created by the international policy and articulated by 
the international conscicucion. \)(!here the preferences of the national policy 
cannot be determined or che state has been "captured" by interests not repre­
sentative of the will of the people as che u ltimate source of authority, che 
ch i n  incernacional consensus in favor of prosecution incervenes to invalidate 
any gram of impunity. 
II .  A rl\'VO-AXES FRAM EWO IZ K  FOI<. ANALYSIS  
By uti l i zing an analytica l  framework conscructed with the axes of legiti­
macy and scope, <lmnescy legislation can be classified into four broad catego­
nes: ( l )  Blanke t Amnesty; ( 2 )  locally legitimized, Parcial Immunity ; 
( 3 )  I nternational ly  Leg it imized, Partial I mmunity; and (4) IncernatiomJ 
Conscicutional I m munity. f\clmitteclly, the boundaries between these catego­
ries are permeab l e .  I n  faet, some legislation may not fie chis model at a l l ,  
while o cher  Lnvs rnay slide be t':veen these categories. Acknowledging i m p re­
cision , c h i s  two-axes framework neve rthe less affords u nd ers tan d i ng as i t  al­
lows for syste mat i c  c l ass i ficat ion of a m n esty leg i slation and cl ecerm i na t i o n  of 
l ocal as we l l  as ime cnat i o n a l va l i clity of amnesty laws. 
· 1 - i .  E l:>t·\l·hcrt· . rhc aurhor has clc,·c· lopc·d L"<tC<.:cc:ur ic:s of scree obl i.>: <H i u n  ru l' rusc:L" l l C l' unt!er r i ll' l 'ri ncip<d 
c i  u n i ,·erscrl J l r r· r:;c l r c r i o n .  Thl' t h ree ClCt).!ur ies  of  s c a re u b l i .>:ar iuns  c:rn strn· as rhc has r s  t( n <Ill arl <r i l·:; r s ol .  
u b l i cc: a r r o n s  nor  r o  .c: r·cuH ; \ ll l l l t· s t l' as we l l \V hcn S C <H t·s l;r<:t· "h! r .� <l r i o l l S  of  " p rcp<l r<tWIT u n r l·t· rs ; r l  J u r i scl r c ­
C I O I J  . .  ( S U r t·s  l l 1lh l bt· a b iL- [U J ' l' < l:>t ( L I [ l' )  ( l r  . . ) J l'<lC! l [ l \T Ll ! l l \t"rS<rJ j u l· i sci t C [ I ( J ! l  . . ( S L l l t·s lll l i S l  J 'r l lSl'U i f t· ) ,  < I l l  
< l l l l llr:S C\ "  \\' ( l lJ lc! b l'  t u t l r i . l ll1t' l l [ ; t i h· i rl ( l llll J 1<l [ i b le .  F l l r  < l  tkLl i iL-cl d t St' L I S S l l ! ll ,  St't' 0. 1 \\'i i l . i : l( c\: \V !:J l [( [( 1 ·: ­
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Charc 1 maps these four  categories graph i ca l ly. B lanket Amnest i e s ,  o n  the  
lower  far right ,  have the widest  scope and the l east leg i t i macy. local ly  le­
g i t im i zed,  Part ial I m m u n i t i es have somewhat greater l eg i t imacy o n  a local 
level and are often character i zed by a more res tr icted scope .  I n ternat i onal ly  
leg i t i m i zed,  Parcial  I m m un i t ies carry leg i t imacy conferred by the  i n terna­
t ional  com m u n i ty and are somewhat l i m i ted i n  scope . F inal l y, I nternat i onal 
Const i tut ional I m m uni ty, i n  the upper left ,  has s ign i ficant i nternat ional 
s upporc ,  often i nc l u d i ng UN i nvolvemem,  and the most res tricted scope . 
Chart 2 p lots examples of am nesty case studies w i th i n  this  framework . A 
more deta i led explorat ion o f  each cacegory fol lows . 
A .  Blanket A llnmty 
B lanket Amnes ty, the first  type of am nesty leg i s lat ion to appear i n  the 
modern i n ternat i onal system , i s  usual l y  enacted through the decrees of out­
go i ng d ictators , with ne i ther domest ic  nor in ternational approva l .  B lanket 
A mnesty, as the name i mp l i es ,  has an extrem ely  broad scope and general l y  
seeks to i m m un i ze a l l  agents o f  t h e  state for any and al l  cri mes they com m i t­
ted d ur i ng a spec i fied period . B lanket A m nesty usual ly does not d i ffere n t i ­
ate between corT1 mon cr imes ,  p o l i t i cal cr imes ,  and i nt ernat ional cr imes ,  nor 
does i t  con s i d er the motives of the cr ime.  This category is  broad and sweep­
i n g ,  often effect ive ly  eras i ng a decade or m ore of abuse, repress i o n ,  and v i o­
lations with the stroke of a pen . Such l eg i sl a t i o n  has been part i c u l ar l y  com­
mon i n  Lat i n  A mer i ca , often enacted long before a negot i ated transfe r  of 
power, h e n ce obv i a t i ng the need to p lacate the most violated d om es t i c i n e e  r­
est g ro ups  who m ig h t eventual l y demand accou n tab i l i ty. These a l l ­
encom pass i ng i m m u n i ty laws appeared i n  th e  lace 1 970s  and early 1 980s ,  
before t h e  i nc ernat i onal com rn un i cy had d eve loped a s i g n i fi cant  p rac t i ce of 
enforc ing i nt ernational cri m i nal l aw ob l igat i ons . Moreove r, enact i ng re­
g i m es were nor c harac ter i zed by the k i n d  of po l i t i c a l  freedoms thar cou ld  
have g i ven the leg i s lat ion domest ic  l eg i t i m acy. l''fot s u rp r i s i ngly, s uc h  a m ­
n es t i es have been w i d e l y  cr i t i c i zed . i h  
The first an d forem ost exa mp l e of  B lan ket A m nesty is  the  C h i l ean l aw of 
Apr i l 1 8 ,  1 97 8  (" c he Ch i l ea n  Law " ) . ' '  App l y i ng che c r i terion of  l eg i t i m acy, 
t h e  Ch i lean law has no d o m e s t i c  l eg i r i m ,Ky. After a tive-year re i g n  marked 
by severe and rec u rrent v i o l at ions  of h u m <H1 r i gh ts and i mernat i o na l  n orm s ,  
c h e  Ch i l ean j uma,  u nder  rhe l ead e rsh ip  o f  Ge n e ra l Augusto P i n ochet  Ug-
----- -- -- ------- ----
-i !) .  Sec. e .g  . . C u r lllcl l l ll  ,,: T h o mpson , .tlljn·" nort· -' ' · ell .�S-YJ k x t• la i n r n ,c: char  · · [Y ] i CC I IllS "( i n J Lh t r c·,. 
s h u u l d  I l l > [  be tX I 't·uc·cl '" t·L I J IWil l t ! t· un r h c r r  d r s:t!c'rt:cllK IH \\" I r h  f 'L I" f 't c i·awrs < > 1 . r n j us r r c c  u r i l c.ss  rhv 
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P Lcm l l f i\ ll1 iH·s r l·. f\ o  . .2 . 1 ::; 1 ( r\ pr. I .'-' .  1 l)I S ) ( C: h r l c- ; [ hnt: r nafrn C : h r lt c t i l  Lm ] .  J 'l r\.\ I I IZ I -
< . . � :-;  \V-sTr : t l .  l-1 1 ,1 1 . 1 �  1\ i c ; HT" .-\ .': n T H I :  · · p o ! I T I <  :-; ! l F ,\ C ! ( I T .\ I I : :<T<: C t- 1 1 1  L D l - l{ J � c ;  P " i ' :-> 1 \ l l ·: c-;T i\Y i . ­
\1 1 i': · .s F t i{s 1 Y1: . 1 tz '· -' 1 I '! ') ) )  
2001 I Reframing lmpmzity 4 8 3  
arte , 18 i ssued a self-serv i ng amnesty decree,  covering a l l  acts comm itted 
s i nce the overthrow of the democrati c  government  of Salvador A llende on 
September 1 1 ,  1 97 3 . ·1 9 Stu d ies s uggest that , d uring th i s  period , more than 
2000 civi l i ans were k i l led and countless more became the v ic t ims  of torture , 
detention,  relocation , and other serious crimes . 5 °  Many of t hese cri mes were 
com m i tted by the Nat ional I ntel l igence Directorate (DINA) to e l i m i nate 
mem bers of the pol i t i cal oppos i t ion . 5 1 Most v ict ims were members of the 
Soc ial i s t  or Com munist Part ies and were targeted for their pol i t i cal v iews . 5 1  
A s ignificant problem w i t h  th i s  l aw i s  that i ts legal basi s  comes from the 
j unta's de facto authori ty. The l aw has no effective l i nk to the C h i l ean people  
and does not represent the ir  preferences .  A fter the d issolut ion of the Chi lean 
DINA in 1 97 7 ,  the P i nochet government i ssued the amnesty law. I t  was 
nei t her passed by a democratical l y  chosen parl iament nor s igned by a demo­
cratically elected head-of-s tate . The Freedom House score for Ch i le  in the 
period of 1 97 7  co 1 97 8  was a 7 ,  5 ,  which translates i nto a " not free"  state.  
W h i l e  its score improved co a 6, 5 in 1 97 8  and 1 97 9 ,  C h i l e  was st i l l  
class i fied as " not free . " 5 1  The s i t uation was one of extreme repression . A s  one 
comm entator puts i t ,  " the keys co [ P inochet 's} success were mass ive repres­
s ion and econom ic innovation . " 5 1 The I nter-American Comm iss ion on H u ­
m a n  Rights [ herei nafter t h e  I nter-American Com m i ss i on} deemed t h e  am­
nesty leg islation an "arbi trary act taken by the m i l i tary reg i m e  . . . .  It is che 
act  t herefore of authorit i es who lacked any leg i t imacy nor righ t ,  since they 
were not elected or appointed in any manner. " 5 5  Nonetheless ,  the j u nta's de 
facco comrol over C h i l e  was such that the am nesty decree was given l egal 
.:iS. For a derai led d iscussion or rhe prusecurion and exr r,1cl i r i o n  of General Pi nocher,  set \Vi l l iam 
Aceves, Li/;crali.rm t!l/{l i lllt"rild!iolhtl /..,g,t! Sd,ofanhijJ: The Pillo(he/ Ct.rf t!l/(1 the tl l orc To1card r 1  U11irenal 
Sy.rh'l/1 o/ Trtll 'lld//IJ/hll Lil l '  Liti.�dlioll, -\ I 1-IA RV. [ t-;·( 1 .  L.J. 1 2') (:! 0 0 0 ) .  
-\ ' ) .  for a d i scuss i o n  of r i l e  h i s ron· or. rht r u l e  of L!w r n  (h i l t and rhe cri mes u nd e r  Gene r.d P i noc hr:: r ,  
s t t  Rc,bert Qll l n n ,  \Viii rbc f.ll!ic o/ { ,, / // E11cf.:' Cbt�llm.�illg Grc!II/J �/ A IIIIIc.ctl thr !Ittllh/11 /?;,r:,/JIJ \ l;ul,;tit!ll.> 
o(i! Prior Cllllr '.l s,'{/ ' I I  odrl, (,� f OIWH .\ ,\ 1 L [� L V. ')0 5 '  9 H I- L 7 ( l ')')4 ) .  
5 0  (0,\ 1 I S I (JN N .\ CI I I N.·\ 1 . D 1 :  Vun M ll  Y R t:CON U I . I .\C I ( J "( ,  l l' FOI<�I E R r:r11c; a p p .  2 ( I  ')')l ).  lrlill.> l<�tul 
111 CCL \ 1 1 S I ( Ji'i N .-ICI Oi'J .-1 1 .  I l l :  \'i iW:I I l  Y R I:C O N C I L J . ICI(J0:,  R U'01n OF T H L  C H I I. I :AN N .-n 1 o :'<:l l .  C:0 \ 1 -
i\ 1 1 SS I O I' 0 0:  T1nn H ,\ N i l  I\ 1 : U r 'J t : I I . I-IT I O '. a p p .  2 ( Ph r l l r p  E .  Berryman rra n s . U .  of l\o r rt [),llllt Prc·ss 
I ')')_) ) .  c"irul iii Q u r n n  . .>llf'r,; n or c  - \ ') .  •n n . 5 .  Set: ,;/r" LOIS I f i : C H T  0 1 ' 1' 1 C 0: H i c l \ l .  Po LITICS 10: C 1 i 1 1 . 1 :  1 2-i-
2 5  ( I ')')_) ) ( nu r i ng rhar wrrurc "·as usecl lw r i le  J U nr a  as a mc·ans ro consul i darc puwn and t lur murcc rhan 
Y.27') ptoplt \\ efe k r l ltd u ndc·r m i l  i ra n· ru le) .  
5 1  0 1' 1' 1 C N H IC 1 ,\ I .  '"fn .t norc: 5 0 .  ar I Y. S  
5 2  Set: Q u l l l l l .  _, ltjn.r rwrc - 1') .  ar  ') 1 5  
) _) .  S,,. Fi( l : i-: I J< l,\1 1- 1 < ! 1 S l ·: .  !11/'l'tl ll i l [ L· 2 h .  
5 -\. " "  P.r u l  \\; D t. rkc  c'- h ,i n  ) .l b l l .  / , ;( J f!j//r f/11// 7 i -, m_,j;ii'I/U/if!I/ JI/c/ Fr. !l/ 1 ! ! /01/ 11/ (/;;1,·. / ').')_} .. . { ') ') 1 ! .  Iii 
Ti l E  :i II\ LJ ; ( ; I  r: H 1 11 D 1 ,\ 1 1  1 1  . iU C : Y  I N  C : 1 1 1 1  1 I .  - \ ( p,l l l l  V. fkt k c· 0.: I dn Jrks i L' eels . . rc·\·. cd. I ')<) 5 ) .  
�, 5 _  1-l nn ws r l l . r  \ Ch r l c- ,  Crsc- 1 ( 1 _ ,<.; \.) _ l n t L r- 1\ rn C. H  1 \ . I S (r .  O L�. snLV ! l ') S  d u e .  - rc-\ ? i  _:> r ,  
I I ;!')(l ) 
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effect 56 and enforced by the Chi lean courts . 5 7  Wit h i n  this  Article 's analyt ical  
framework, however, the law i s  c learly void of domestic leg i t imacy rooted i n  
the  i ndiv idual authori ty o f  Chi lean c i t izens Y' The Chi lean Law also lacks 
any i nternational legi t imacy. 59 
A c lose analysi s  of the text of the Chi lean Law i l l us trates i ts sweepi ng 
breadt h .  The l aw grants am nesty to "a l l  persons who comm i tted , as perpe­
t rators , accomplices or conspirators , c r imina l  offences . . .  between Septem­
ber  1 1 , 1 97 3  and March 1 0 ,  1 97 8 . "60 I t  appl ies to  both  actual perpetrators 
and accomp l ices before and after the fact .  The law does not d iscri m i nate 
based on the motives for the crim e .  It appl ies equally, no matter i f  the 
cnmes were com m itted out of personal animos i ty or in furtherance of  s tate 
pol icy. 
5 6 .  The desuucr ion of represenwr 1ve governmenr  m Ch i le was so complere rhar such l eg i s la r ion  could 
be i m p lemenred wnhour any recou rse ro rhe popular  w i l l .  Cusack observes rhar  ' ' [ r }he v io lcnr  e l i m i na­
t ion  of rhe e lected governmem and rhe reprcsenrar i vcs of  we l l  over a rhnd of rhe popuLuion  meanr rhe 
end of uusr  i n  rhe  sysre m . ·· DAVID F. C uS.>\C: K ,  REVOI .LTION A:'-I D REACTION:  TH E I NT LI<Nc\L DYNA,\I I CS 
OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION I N  CH I LE 97 ( 1 97 7 ) . The amnesry decree of 1 97 7  was passed before 
rhe reforms of  rhe new 1 980 Cons r i ru r ion ,  wh i ch ,  w i rhom redemocmr i z i ng Ch i l e ,  cal l ed for a fu rure  of  
" p rorecred or aurhor i rarian democracy . . . OPPI' N H E I � r .  JII/'W nore 5 0 ,  ar 1 20 .  Nurhcr  o f  rhe  proposed 
reforms of P inocher 's Chacar i l las Speech of  J u l y  1 97 7  (parr i a l l y  e lecred leg is larure ,  evenrual  c i v i l ian ru l e )  
had  been  i mp lemcnred ar rhe  r i me of rhe  amnes ty  decree. Even i f  rhe decree were analyzed i n  l 1gh r  of rht  
new cons r iwr ion ,  i r  lacked leg 1 r imacy, l or r he 1 980 Cons r i rur 10n nse lf  has been characrnized as  "a  fu n­
clamemal ly  u ndemocrat ic  documenr  whose purpose was  ro p ro long P inocher 's ru l e  [and}  severe ]\· 
l i m i r  popubr par r i c ipar ion .  " /d. ar I .'\ 6 .  
5 7 .  I n  one  nureworrhy case, v 1c r i ms'  re lar ives b roughr  su 1 r  m 1\ugusr 1 97 1-i aga ins t  G e neral M a n u e l  
Sepu lveda, D i recror of rhe  D I N A ,  a l l c/,: I IJ_c; v io la r i ons of r\ rr ic le  1 -'1 1 of  rhe  Pena l  Code of  C h i l e ,  re la r i ng 
ru I l legal <lrresrs and d i sappearances.  The courr d ec l r ned J U r i sc! I c r ion , nu r ing char rhe accused was sub jtcr 
co m i l i rary law, a decis ion aftirmed by rhe  Courr uf A ppea l s  of' Sam i a,c;u.  I n  Dtcemhu 1 ')S') , rhe  Sc·cond 
M i l nary Tr i b u n a l  ordered d i srn iss<t! of rht case, purs uant to rhe Ch i l ean Law. H e rmos d la ,  Case I 0.8 L1 , 
1 nrcr-Am C . H . R .  1 5 6 ,  9[ 2-5 ( 1 ')')6) 
5 S. The lack of l eg i r i mare connecuon ( If l aws J>assed by rhe P i nocher governrnenr  I n  rhe lace 1 9' l l s  ru  
rhe popular  wi l l  i s  I ncl i cared furrhcr by rhc  powc:r  brokers of rhe  P i nocher reg i m e ,  rume ly  "cap r r a i i s r s .  
rechnocrars ,  and . . .  r he  rn i l i rary, " rat her t han rhc  sovc:rugn w i l l  of rhe  peop le . Drake & Jaks i c ,  .\lljl!d noel· 
5 4 .  I n  rhe legis lar ive p rocess, rhe m d r rary ti r m l y  re fu sed ru negor iare w i t h  rhe opposi t i on  or rake I mo 
accoum popular senr i menr. !d. A fter rhe 1 97 )  overthrow of rhe A l lende governmem. " [ l } i bera l  dt· m uc­
racy came co an encl . "  C us.� C K ,  111jJrr1 norc So,  ar 7').  The onh e lcnion he ld d ur i ng rhe !are 1 970s  was rhe 
pltbisc i re of 1 97 1-i ,  in which P i nochn's amlwn ry was nom i na l l y  supporrcd . bur  even rh1s meas u re was 
" ro ra l ly  conrro l l ed by rhe govemmenr .  . . Drake & Jaks r c , l!!jlrc! nore 5 1 , ar 5. \Vhde  P i nocher was nm 
o m n i porem,  h i s  power was l i m ned un l v  by rhe m d i rary <Inc! rhc s care I tse l f, i ns r i r u r ions  char ,  rhough 
somewhar respons ive w soci eta l  pressures ,  drd nor speak d i rccr l y for or reprtsem l eg i r i mart pupuLrr 
<lLi thor i ry. See A rruro Valenzuela. Tl't 111 P'JI/ 'er: The Co;n tju/atiri)/ lj O!!t ,\ ft.?JI f\11/c iii TH I' ST!tu;­
G L L  FOR D E I- I OUtM:Y I N  C H I U: ,  .wpra nore 5 1 , at _! 1, 2_! The l ack uf leg i t i macy of rhe am nesty d ecree i s  
ev idenced by rhe  scare's " u nprtcedemed degree of auronom1· fmm mgan r zed c i 1· r l i<lll rme r-es ts and  prc:s­
su rc-s .  · !d. ar 2 .) .  The ner rcsu l r  was t h er e r h e  l) i noch cr rc,c; I nlt' was ab le  w 1mp l emem l [ S l t ,c; I s Lrr r o n  " w r r h  
m i n i ma l  concern f(:;r r h e  reacr i on o l  clf !ccctd g roups . . . I J  Ste t �f,r, CtJ�AC :K ,  ' iijlrc � nort  5 6 , <lC ') -l ,  9 5 . I n  
shon , "c iv i l ian po l r r ical bchav l ( ) r  and parr1· pol i t iCS  . were e ! I m i nared . . . O I'PF N H I ' I \ 1 ,  .\ 1/j!r,J no te S l l .  
a r  I 1 7 . 
5 9 .  \Vh i lt rhc L!rl l ted Suets tincr n c i <r l h· s upporrl'cl tht  Pi nnchu reg J !ll(' ir>r the fi rst fe-w \'Cars clftu r l l l' 
1 LJ 7 .) coup and the C JA  was ac r r 1 c 1 1 1  r i l e  
rhe r n rernariunal  com rll U ll i C)' to r  r hc l'" l r r r cd s 1· s r e n 1  u r  the  <rm ikSfl' l aw 1 11 part J c u Lu C: L : .SAC K ,  ' l!f'rr; 
nurc S 6, at I 2 I .  
G ll. C:h r lca n  La11·, ,� ;;jn ·c� n ot e  1 - .  ,t rt  
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Arti cles 3 and 4 of the Ch i lean law establ i s h  a narrow range of except ions  
ro the amnesty. F i rst ,  Arr ic le  3 exempts some common cr imes including 
robbe ry, drug t rafficking,  and arson fro m  the amnesty, and many cr imes 
against  the s tate such as tax fraud ,  embezzlement of pub l i c  securi t ies ,  and 
s m ugg l i ng . 6 1  The exempti ons h ere are paradoxical s i nce am nesty i s  express ly  
w i thhe ld  for cr imes against the state ,  the very cri m es that a state l ike ly  has 
standi ng ro forg i ve .  The only  i nternational cr imes arguabl y  excluded fro m  
t h e  am nesty are pl under and rape a s  c r i me against  h umanity, de l i neated i n  
t h e  Art ic le  3 exemption a s  " theft" and " rape . "  Other serious i n ternational 
cr i mes , such as genocide, torrure, and cr imes agai nst  humanity  are nor i n­
c luded i n  the exemption and th us are subject to the amnesty g rant . 62 
The C hi lean law is  noteworthy i n  that ,  on i ts face,  i t  does not  d i fferent i ­
ate  between perpetrarors act ing w i t h  s tate authori ty and members of the 
oppos it ion who com m i tted s i m i lar cr i mes .  Rather, i t  appl i es equa l ly  ro  "al l 
persons who . . .  com m i tted c ri m i nal o ffences , " both the majori ty and the 
m i no ri ty. c; :; One comm entator poi n ts out ,  however, that many government 
opponents were unable  to benefi t  from this  l aw as they " had al ready been 
k i l led,  d isappeared,  or [were} in exi le . "6 'i Moreover, the law was appli ed by 
m i l i tary tr ibunals that had j ur i sd ict ion over m ost  cases dur ing this period , 
and were l ike ly  to favor the government ,  the m i l i tary, and the  pol ice .  De­
spi te the release of  several h u n d red persons imprisoned w i thour trial after 
rhe law's entry i nro force ,c;5  i t  i s  fai r  ro say that the B lanket Am nesty appl i ed 
predo m i nant ly  ro government and m i l i wry forces . 6!1 
The scope of the Chi lean Law is further characterist ic  of B l anket A m nesty 
as it d oes not establ i sh  any a!  ttrnare means of red ress for v i c t i m s .  It has no 
provi s ions for an investigatory body ro cons i der the amnest ied aces in a non­
c r i m i nal comext .  Nor does it p rovide a means of  c iv i l redress for v ic t ims  to 
seek pecuniary compensat ion ,  ei ther from the perpetrator or from the state. 
I ns tead , the l aw ful fi l s  the t rue etymolog i ca l  root of amnesty, which , l i k e  
am nes ia ,  derives from t h e  Greek "amnest ia"  or forgetful ness a n d  obl iv ion . 6� 
The goal of a B lanket A m nes ty, and that of rhe Chi l ean j unta,  was ro forger 
rhe c r i mes of the pas t .  It was nor u nt i l  Pres ident Aylwin  came to power i n  
1 990 chat a National ComiTt is s ion on Tru t h  and Reconc i l iat ion was c reated 
ro i nvestigace past abuses _ c;s 
JVIore recent ly, in 1 99 5 , Peru fol lowed Chi le 's example and enaccecl a 
B lanke t  An1 nes ry, forget t ing past auoc i cy. In  response ro escal a t i ng attacks 
{; J 1J ell " ( . ) .  
(, 2 S,·c iJ 
(, ) ld 
(). j _  Qulllll , -'11/'U noce i ') ,  '1c ') I S .  
(, � .  /\ .\ I I : I U C : . \ �  \V. \H . l-1  . . CII/1!':! rHJCL' . j ( , _  CI C i _:; 
( ;- s�'( L ) i a n c  ()rt·n t l i c h c r. :\ (�"1;//1//1·: F/Jc / J/// )  (II Prrn"e(i!h" 1-/;;;;;.u; 
.�l ii!t', \ ( ) 1 )  Y.-1 1 1. LJ 2 5 ) ' .  2 5  j )  n. l 1 ( \ '!') \ ) 
(,:--; _ S,·, I I .�Y :-.: r : r ; _  '"��/"'· ' nucc· 1 _:; ,  "r _) ) .  
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by g uerri l la g roups , such as the Sh i n i ng Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolu ­
t i o nary Movemen t ,  t h e  Peruvian government i n  early 1 98 3  t ransferred the 
counter- i n s urgency operations  fro m the pol i ce ro the m i l i tary. 69 Thereafter, 
Amnesty International  (AI) and other h uman r ights organizat ions  began ro 
receive n umerous compla i nts ,  documenting over 4000 d isappearances and 
5 0 0  extra-j udicial  executions between 1 98 3  and 1 99 2 .70 In order to  prevent  
prosecut ion of t h e  perpetrators o f  these abuses , the  Peruvian Co ngress passed 
the fi rst  of two amnesty laws ( " the F i rs t  Amnesty law " ) ,  law No. 2 64 7 9 ,  o n  
J u ne 1 4, 1 99 5 . 7 1  
The Peruvian legislat i o n  grants w ide-ranging i m m u n i ty. The F i rs t  Am­
nesty law, l i ke that of Chi le ,  grants a B lanket Am nesty. I t  i s ,  h owever, even 
more far reach ing than the Ch i lean law in that it appl ies both " ro common 
or  m i l i tary cr imes , whether w i t h i n  the j urisd ict ion of c iv i l  or  m i l i tary 
courts . "7 2  Al l  crimes rangi ng from murder and rape to robbery and fraud are 
i nc l uded.  The only l i m i tat ion on the grant of amnesty is t hat the  cr imes 
"derived , or iginated fro m,  or [were} a consequence of the fight  aga inst  ter­
ror i sm . . .  between May 1 98 0 "  and J une 1 99 5  n As appl i e d ,  the only 
s i g n i ficant restr ict ion on the am nesty i s  temporal . Art ic le  4 of the  F i rs t  Am­
nesty law further extended the am nesty rerroactively, mandat i ng the "an­
n ul[mem} of all pol ice ,  j ud ic ia l , and c ri m i nal records . . .  [and the} release of 
those pardoned who are current ly  under arrest . " 7 1  
Whi le the scope o f  crimes covered by the F i rst  Am nesty law i s  b roader 
chan that covered by i ts Ch i lean coun terpart,  the Peruvian law is tai l ored ro 
benefit only the m i l i tary reg i me  i n  power \vhen the am nest ied cr imes oc-
G<J.  For a br ief  review of che  h i s con· ( l  che  Sh1 n i ng P<t ch  movemem, see Car l os han Deg regor i , Sbntmg 
Patb d!ld Cot/11/erittJI!IYfll()" SlrCitcg)' SiiiCf rbc r\ rrut o/ ;\ /;itt/(fC! Gl!�ll/cl/1 , itl P l ·: H u  [)) C IU S I S :  D I CTATOI\ S H I P  
Ol\ D L ,\ IOCI\;ICY'  s l '  o 2-0-l (j oseph S .  Tu l c h i  n & Garv B LIIld eel s . '  1 99 5 )  [hece i  ll <lf"cer P uw I N  C IU S IS } .  
7 0 .  A , t :--.: r :STY l :--.:-rT H !'..: .�Tro:--.:.� r . ,  P r: !( c :  A , r ,..; �:sTY L1\\·s CoNsor . r DATE L\ lPCf' ITY FOR 1-! u , tA:.l 
1\ tCHTS VIOUTIO'-'S ( 1 9l)G )  [htrt i nafcer  i\.\ 1 1\ ESTY LI\\"S (Oi'JSO I . I DAIT li\ I I' U :" ITY},  h cc p ://www. web .  
<tm nescy. org ( v i s l [td Ftb . .2 1 . .::' ( ) ( ) I ) ; .�ec ,t!so Deg rego r 1 , .i!;jn d  noct G9,  a c  9 .::' (contend i n,c: c h a c ,  from l 9SS 
u m i l  1 99 1 ,  Peru had the world 's h 1ghest ra ct: o f  d isappearances ) .  
7 1 .  f 1 rsc  A m ncsc y  Law of J u nt l -1 , 1 99 5 ,  No. 2G-'i79 ( 1 995 ) ( Pe r u )  [here i nafter f i rs c  i\ m nescy Law ] ,  
! iwulated i11 A ,\! N ESTY L1ws Coc;SUI . ID .�-rT I.\ ! P U :.l rTY, .i"lljl r:t nott 7 0 .  
7 2 .  F 1 rsc  t\ m nesty Law rt<Jcls 1 11 perr 1 ne m  p<HC :  
Art ic le  I .  Granc  a genera l a m neslv C J >  tht il·! i i J tary,  Po l let or C i v i l 1an personnel  
fornul cump L t i n c ,  J nves c i g a c i o n ,  c r i m i na l  charge ,  rr i ,d .  o r  c u nv i cc i on t( J r  common o r  m i l 1 ran· 
ni mcs.  w hcrhcr u nd e r  che  J U r i sd i c c i o n  o i" chc· c i v i l  or m i l i cary cuurrs ,  i n  n:-Ln i o n  co a l l tH: n cs der i ved 
or ori g i n <ttecl from ,  or a conse:q uenu: of, the tig h c  a,c: a i nst  tc- r m r i s m .  and w h i c h  ma1· have bce:n com ­
m i rrcd t 1 chcr  i nd 1 v i d ua l l y  or by rwo ur more perso ns buwt<:n i\by 1 900 and c he c lare on w h i c h  c h i s  
l aw i s  prom u l gac<:d 
A r t i c l e  5 .  The 1\l i l i cm·, Pul i ce: or ( i ,· J ! Ja n personnel  who (tee a formal co mp l a i m , i tl \"csr ig�t c i u n ,  J U ­
d t u <d p rocess o r  com· i c [ l u n  l ( > r  r h t:  cr i m es o i "  I l \eg,t \ D r uc: Tmi"lick i n g ,  of Terro r i s m  and of Tre-ason 
<IS reg u Ltc c-d b1· Lt\1· N ·' .:' S ,G 5 9 .  i s  txc l u d �:d fru m chc p rm· i s t ons in c h t s  l aw.  
Arc tc lc  G .  T h e  t\·l: ncs  or c r i mes cm·ercd by ch 1.: am ncscy Ll\\· , ,t \ \  ru l 1 ngs i n  l·a,·or of d t: h n J c i ,·e l l· c los-
1 11,!' <l J u c l i c i a l  p rucc.;s .  <lnd <KlJ U I C Lt l s .  a r1.: nor sub jecc w J ll\"eS l l ,L:<l C i o n .  i n q u i n· or s u m man· pron:nl­
t n ,c: s ; a i i J ud i c i< i l  casc·s. \l" hJ.:Chcr l l l\L: O i ng or vxcc u ct d .  rt·nu i n t ng de li n l [ i v t h· c losed . 
!cl. arcs .  I ,  5 .  
- .1 .  IJ a r c .  \ .  
--i ld a rc .  - i .  
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curred . The F i rs t  Amnesty law i s  speci fi cal ly  formulated ro exempt mem ­
bers of the res i s tance from the amnesty, grami ng i mmuni ty  only  ro " the  
M i l i tary, Pol i ce ,  or Civ i l ian personnel .  " 7 5  As such ,  the  amnesty appl ies only  
to  members of the governmem (and their  subordi nates) who e nacced i t .  By  
tai loring the amnesty only  ro  benefit the  governmem, the F irs t  Amnesty 
law nei ther meets the test of coherence nor respects the people  as the source 
of governmemal amhori ty. 
The pol i t i cal c i rcumstances under which  the law was passed further sug­
gest the leg i s lat ion 's lack of domest ic  leg i t imacy. In  the years precedi ng the 
enactmem of the amnesty laws ,  Pres idem Fuj i mori severely curta i led Peru's 
democrati c  pol i ti cal i nst i tut ions . 7 r, The " reforms" of Fuj i mori 's se lf-coup 
s i g n i ficamly underm ined the government 's capabi l i ty co  enact democrat i ­
cal ly  leg i t i mate laws ,  as  congress ional representat ion  was decreased77 and the 
j ud i ci al system emaciated . ' s  Moreover, evidence suggests that the  Peruvian 
congress often , and parti cularly in the case of the amnesty law, fai led ro con­
s ider or debate the leg i s lat ion ,  but rather " rubber s tamp[ed} legis lat ion i n i ­
t i ated b y  t h e  execm ive . " 7�  The m i l i tary was also able ro  wie ld  extensive 
i n fl uence on the pol ic ies of the Fuj i mori govern mem.so 
7 5 .  /c/. a r c . l .  
7 (J .  For exa m p l e ,  o n  A p n l  5 ,  I SJ 9 2 .  the P res i de n c  · · suspended t h e  const J t u t i o n ,  d i ss o lved t h e  Cont' ress 
and the  J Uch c i a ry, p l ;lced several co ng res s i oru l kadt rs u n d er house an·esc ,  a n d  1 m pusecl temporary b u r  
h a rsh censorsh i p  o f  c h c  press . . .  Carol G ra h a m ,  llltrucil!<"liou: Ouii''""<�'Y ill Cri.ri.r cmcl tb� lutenlt!IIf!!MI l?rJ/'''"-''·· 
ill P I ' I{L! 1 '-J  C R ISIS  . .iii/JI"<I nme 69, <\[ I '  5 .  \XIh i le some or che p res i d t n c 's actions boosted h i s  popu Li r i t \', 
crt:<Hi nt' <1 k i n d  of F u 1 i m o r i  persona l i ty c u l c ,  chey d i d  so uucs ide  i n s t i t u t ions of democra t i c  l eg i t i macy . .co·e 
"/. at (, , and l arg e l y  w i t h  che su pport or c h e  rn i l i ra ry. Sur fernando Ruspig l ios 1 ,  De!!Io<ra,y:r B!ud2 Pru.�pe<!. i .  
111 P t' l< U  I <" Clus1s,  .flljii'Cl noce 09. ac  -iO,  .'! .2-:l o . i\l i l i tarv s u pporc ,  howevt-r, was "coup led w J t h  a cons i d c :r­
ablt deg ree or q u ecs t i o n i n g  of the kg l t i macy of democ raC\· by chc m l i i wry, [maki ng) a clemocrac ic  rtg l me 
u nsustai nable . . . /d. ac -i S .  F u j i mori  p roceeded co d r,lfr <1 new cons c i c u c i o n ,  w hich was rac i lied in a nat iona l  
reftrencl u m  in  Ocwbtr l 99."> See C O I . I ·:T'L� A .  YoU :<( ;uzs.  D L U J N STKLCTI '-J G  D t.:. \ I OCI{ACY:  P EIUJ U :--: ­
D L R  P IU' S I D EI"T A I. I \ EI\TU F U_i l \ 1 0 1{ 1  l) ( .2 0 0 ( 1 )  
7 7 .  E lt·cwral c lunges l e J  co " s i g n i lican c l y  l ess uf che Peru v i a n  popu l a t i o n  e n j o y i n g  reprcsc mar i on I ll 
Cong rcss ,  a n d  hence recl uc[cd] t\"t:ll fu r c h e r  r h c  sense of accou ncabi  I i c y  co c he e ltccoracc· . "  YcJL; :"< ;  1: Ro; ,  
Jl!jn·<l nmt 7 6 ,  a c  2 1 . ror example .  1 11 1 990, che C<mg rtss h a d  2- iO  members, ont for each .20,96_) , ·uctr.i . 
Howc-H:r, ac chc  C l llle che  f i rs t  A m nooS t )' L\\v was p<lSStcl i n  I 995 . Congress was compri sed of o n h· l _' ( )  
m e m bers .  w i r h  o n e  reprts e m a c i ,·e f()f each 1 0.2 , 5 _\ 7  vorcrs .  /d. Tht· nee res u l t  w;1s " a  fu rchtr  · d i v i ck be­
r wttn muse  Peruv ians  and che  po l i t i ca l  p rocess,  and s r rcngch[ened}  ;H t i wdts a m o ngst chc  pop u b c JOil  <H ­
I a r,;.; e c h a r  govtrnrntnc dun nm rake I tS  1 n ccrtsrs 1 11 to  '1cco u m . "· IJ 
7:-l. From t\ prd 1 992 co .J u n e  I SJ96, Pe r u  Licked a h i g h  court .  The Con s r i w t 1 ona l  Tr1 b u nal  HSt l f  \\ <lS 
abo l i s h ed Lw che se l f-coup and n u t  rt i n s ca cc:cl u n c i !  I )JSJ{j_ lei. ac .29 Even chtreafcer cht: Tribuna l s c- ffc·c­
t i ventss \l·as l i m i ted . t\ il\· ptl l t inns  f()l' rev iew ot. lc,l! I s l a t l o n  lud w be prtsc med wHhin s 1 x  momhs .  The 
res u l t  was  dft·n i n· l y  cu p roh i b i t  lllL"<lil i ll,t;fu l  J Ud i C i a l  IT\" J CW. IJ Tht Tr 1 b u n a l  a lso factd cons i c ltrah l t· 
p rtssurt.  c h rtcl [ S ,  a n d  1 11 [ l m icl ci t J o n ,  fu rther  res t r 1 n i n g  1 ts trL·L· d u m .  /d. at :) 0 .  A n u mber of lower-co u rt 
j udgc·s 11·cre J ll \ 't:Sugaced or cl J s ll1 1 SSc·d a fr c r  r u l m.l! at' a i n s c  r h t: govc rn m en r .  It!. ;![ .) 1\ .rn .If., o  Frc1nc isco 
�)a�;b l i  & i\lax }-kma nclt:z. ThL" Cri.�i.• o/ (, ut ,·m.Ia,·, , i11 P L H L  1 -..: C:IU:) I :', .' 1/f! '<l n o te 69. ;![ .2 2 ,  _' i .  
' 9 .  Yr > L." -..: c uzs,  .l!rj•r<� nmc· � (j _  a t  .2 :  J ft  Sat'<l S i i  0: :'dc1x. 'il/' � "il ! \ ( l [t:  7 :-; ,  a r  .2 2-.2_) ( a r,t; U l il_l! char  " C ( I l ! ­
,c: r,· ,;s Ius  tc:ntkd w q u i c k k  a p p ro Y c  i c J\I'S p u r  furward h1· r h c  exec U C J \"C h rcm c h ,  S t l ill t C l m ts \l· i r h  l i [ l l t· 
ckb;Ht ; Int i  n.� nmmal p rl lLHi u rc·s ' ' J .  
.'i l l .  S n  E m i q uc· ( ) b ;I n d " .  T/;,· 1-' ,,u "· o /  l'er!i .' .-\ m�cd f- ,,r<n . 1 11 P L IU.' 1 -..: ( IU S I S  . .  1//jn ·,/ note b )l .  ;J t I i l l . 
I I _)- 1 S I I H >t 1 rJ_;.; t h<H Fu J l  muri ·, rc l 1a nee ( I ll cht· i l l  i 1 1  L i n· w l i l l l 'klllc·n c h i s  I '" I Iuts) ,  I 0 5  rig . :-l .  I 
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Freedom House , in i t s  1 994-9 5  and 1 99 5-96 studies ,  rated F u j i mori 's 
Peru a 5 ,  4 (part ia l l y  free) . 8 1  Though s l ight ly  bener than C h i le 's 7 ,  5 rat i ng 
(not  free) ,  Peru's scores are s t i l l  far from the 2 1;2 bench m ark of freedo m .  
Taken col leccivel y, F u j i mo r i 's c u l t  of personal power and h i s  destruct ion  o f  
democrati c  i ns t i tutions have been characteri zed as "a  d i smantl i ng of t h e  ba­
sic i ns t i tut ional  struccures of democrati c  governance , "82 w h i c h ,  t herefo re ,  
deny the am nesty l aw domest ic  l eg i t i macy. 
L i ke i t s  Chi l ean counterpart ,  the F i rs t  Amnesty Law provid es no a l ternate 
means of recourse or i nvest igat i o n .  I n  fact ,  Art i c le 6 of the F i rst  A m nesty 
Law g uarantees absol ute i m m u n i ty by ensuri ng t hat aces covered by the  l aw 
are " not subjecc  co i nvest igat ion [or} i n q u i ry. " 8 )  A l l  l iab i l i ty, both c i v i l  and 
cr im i na l ,  i s  thereby exti n g uished . I ndiv id uals ,  v ic t ims ,  and society at l arge 
were den ied any means of seeking truth ,  reparat ions ,  and col l ect ive hea l i ng 
of nat ional  wounds . 84 
The appl icat i o n  of amnesty i n  Peru demons trates t hat even an emac i ated 
j ud i c iary has found the law trou b l i ng .  I m m ed iately after the F i rs t  Am n esty  
Law came i nto force ,  J uclge A ntonia  Saq u i c iray, i nvest igati ng the  1 99 1  Bar­
rios Altos massacre , rul ed the  F i rs t  A mn esty Law i nappl icabl e  to that case. 
Wh i le the case made i ts way t h rough the j ud ic ial system , the Peruvian Con­
gress passed the Second Amnesty Law, extend i ng che scope of  i m m u n i ty and 
ensur ing the enforcement of the  orig i nal orcler. 8 5  The Second Am nesty Law 
removed the First  Amnesty Law from the real m of j udic ial review.80 \"<<hether 
S I .  F!UT D0,\ 1  H o L.:S f: , illj>rct note  .2() . 
S .! .  Yoc " G E I\S ,  .lllj>rc� n ot e  7 G ,  at I ;  .1ee C//.ro Sa_gast i  & H e rn;mclcz . . utj>rc� note 71) , at .! '  ( <lf,S U l n,s that  
the  " c hecks a n d  ba lances thar art  essenr i a l  ro a v iable and work l n_s democracv are  nor i n  pL1ce i n  Peru , 
;mel rhe prospects fo r i mprov i ng clemucrar i c  ,;,:overnancc: tn Pe-ru <lppL·ar u ncerta in  and prob lt:mar i c " ) ;  .rce 
a/.rn R ospigl tos i ,  _r;;;"·" note- 7 6 ,  ar 4 2  ( no t i ng r u p mori  was '\\· t i l i n g  ro go\·e m w i r hour rhe ' b u rde nsome 
d era i l s ' of the  p;nl i amenr and the j ud iciary" ) .  
:) _) .  Fi rst A m nes t \· Law, wj;rd note  7 1 ,  ar t .  6 .  
s l . i\brrha Mi now describes r h e  1 mporrance of t hese al rc-rn;nive means oC recou rse, not i ng char  " th e  
process uf seek i ng repara t i o n ,  a nd o f  bu dd i ng com m u n t t ies  of su pport w h t l c  spread i n g  k n ow ledge of rht  
v iolar ions  and rhe t r  m ea n tng s i n  pt'opl c's l t vts may be mort v:t l uab l t ,  u l r t marc ly. than an\' spec i ri c  v i c tory 
or offer of remedy. " !v{ J 'JO\\' , .wprrl note _ )4.  ar 9.'> 
0 5 .  See A :- I N ISIY L�\\ s COi'SOJ .ID,\TF h!I' U N ITY, .lilf'r,; note 7 1 1 .  at .2 . 
;';(i_ St·cond A mncsry Law of .J une .!S,  l 99 5 ,  N ° .  2 6 . -i').!  ( 1 99 5 )  ( Pe ru )  (on l i l e  w i t h  H arvard l nt ern;l-
r i onal  Law Journal ) [here i nafter Second A m nes ty Law ] .  Tht' Second A m nesty l .aw reads in parr :  
Art i c le I .  t h e  : tmnesty g r:uHtd by Law Nc .2 6 .4 79 d oes nor cons t i t u t e  an i n r trftrenct 1 11 rhc  
fu ncr ioni n!' of tht' J u d i c i a r:·, n or clot's 1 r  underm i tK the d u n· of r h t· Sr:t tl' to respecr and guarantee 
r h e  fu l l  c n i'orctmenr  of t h ose h u man r t g h rs as recog n i zed h1 ·  :trt i c l t- - 1 - 1  of  t h e  Cuns r 1 t u r ion and by .  
anwn,L: u r h c r  h u m :t l l  r igh ts Trear i e s .  i\ r r i c l e  I ,  Ste t l o n I ,  ot t h t  A m n i e:tn C:onvc·mion  on 1- lunun 
r ig h ts . 
,-\ r r ic le  .1 . ,\ m ( l c  I. or Ltw N ' 26. - 1 7 ')  is to be i n terprt: r ed I l l  t he  sense t h ;n a l l  J u d i C i a l  Bodies ;tre 
under  the o b l t ,t: a t t n n  to apph· r h c  ,�.:enera l  am ntsry w a l l  n·t: n t s  der i ved or o r i ,�.: 1 nated f ro m ,  or a con­
st·quen<:c uf. t h e  h ,L:h t  aga i n s t  t e r ro r i s m ,  whether  c u m l ll l t t ec !  t n d l \' l c l u,d l ,· "r h\· ( \\'O or morL· persons 
bc:t\\·ecn ;-, Lll' I ')SO and J u ne 1 -i .  1 99 5 .  and whether  or n o r  t hL· m i h r<tn·, j'O ! ICt: or  c i v i 1 1 an person1kl 
1 rn p h u t c d .  Etcc a fo rmal  complai n t ,  1 1 1 \'CS t tgat i r l l l .  is s u ll J ccr  w U l lll l ll : t l  p roct·td i i\L: S .  m has he-en 
colW I Utd : :t i l  J U d t l u l  case s .  whc:rher  on,so tng u r  c::-:ecu tcc l ,  rc· I na i n  dc h n t t l \·t·h· c l ust·c l 1 11 ; tccurd;I IKL· 
\\· i rh a rt i e  it- (i or r i t e- a hO\'t: 111l' n t i Ol l t'd Ll\V 
/J <trl S .  I .  " · 
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s uch a non-reviewabl e  law was perm iss ible  under the Peruvian Const i tut ion 
was quest ionable ,87 bm the Peruvian Congress sought to i m bue the  Second 
A m nesty Law w i t h  consti tur ional  leg i t i macy by i nvoking Art ic l e  1 02 ,  Sec­
t i o n  6 of the Const i tmion ,  accordi ng to  which " amnesty . . .  is a r ight  of 
grace . . .  which can only be granted exclus ively by Congress . · · �� Given the 
l ac k  of a const i tut iona l  tr ibunal  to  revi ew the l aw, however, i ts cons t itut ion­
al i ty was l argely academ i c .  The Second Amnesty Law effect ively overturned 
J udge Saquic i ray's rul i ng and extended amnesty to that case .  In add i t i o n ,  
t h e  Second Am nesty Law expanded the temporal scope of  the a mnesty to  
cover crimes com m i t ted between May 1 980 and J une 1 5 ,  1 99 5 ,  but not  
reported unt i l  after J une 1 5 ,  1 99 5 . s9 
The Peruvian Congress seems to have been aware of the problems w i t h  
t h e  scope and l eg i t imacy o f  t h e  F i rs t  A m nesty Law. \'Vh i l e  expandi ng the 
scope of the fi rst l aw, the  second decree seeks to l eg i t i m i ze the  F i rst  Am­
nesty Law and br ing i t  i nto conformi ty with Peru's i nternat ional obl iga­
t ions .  The Second Amnesty Law declares t hat the F i rst A m nesty Lavv "does 
not undermi ne the duty of the s tate to respect and guarantee those h uman 
r ights as recogn i zed by . . .  the  Const itut ion . . .  and h um an r ights trea­
t ies . "9D Whi le  the net res u l t  of the Second Amnesty Law is s t i l l  to expand 
the appl icab i l i ty of the prev ious decree,  a str ict ly  texmal read i ng of the law 
suggests that the fi rst  law should be i nterpreted narrowly as to comply w i t h  
i n ternational h uman r ights obl igat ions .  T h e  contrad ict ions  between t h e  
clear i nten t of the Second Am nesty Law and i ts scr ict  textua l  i n terpretat ion 
h ig h l ight  the tens ions in  the Peruv ian execut ive- j udicial  eq u i poise and cast 
doubts upon the l eg i t imacy of the legi s lat ion . S i nce there have been no 
m eaningfu l  opportunit ies to chal lenge the Peruvian am nesty laws,  however, 
the i nt erpretation of the two laws as app l i ed appears broad . They gram a 
wide- rangi ng amnes ty, are exempt  from j ud ic ia l  review, and l ack m ean i ngful  
i nd icarors of domest ic  l egi t imacy. 
Many ocher s tares in Lat i n  i\. merica and elsewhere have fo l lowed the  
m odel of B lanket Am nesty estab l ished by Chi le  and ut i l i zed by Peru .  A r-
� � - Second r\ m n�sr1· Lctw . .llijlr. r llfJ [ L· :-: () , cUT. ., 
S<). !). �1 n .  _J . 
' ! 11. IJ c t r -r .  I 
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gemi na,Sl l El  Salvador,92 N i caragua,9 1  Sri  lanka,9-4 and U ruguay95 have al l  
passed or enacted B lanket A m nesty i m m un i z i ng pol i t ica l ,  m i l i tary, and po­
l i ce officials for a l l  sig n i ficant cr i mes comm i tted during a set  period .  Whi le  
these laws d i ffered s l ight ly, t hey have a l l  bad  l i tt le ,  i f  any, domest ic  leg i t i -
9 l .  F u l l Scop Law. N o .  2 .1 .492  ( 1 98 6 ) (Arg . )  (on fi l e  w i t h  Harvard fmernat i o n a l  law Journ a l ) ;  Due 
Obed i ence law, No. 2 .3 . 5 2 1  ( 1 987)  (Arg . )  (on file  with Harvard Imernarional law Journal) .  
<)2 .  Law of General A m nesty for the  Conso l i dat i on of Pe<lCe, Decree No.  -186 ( 1 99 1 ) ( E I  Sal) (on fi l e  
wirh  Harvard I nternational  L a w  J o u rnal ) .  I n  pert i ne n t p a r t  th e law reads : 
A r t i cle 1 :  A broad , absolute and u ncond i t i ona l amnesty is g ranted i n  bvor of all c h ose who tn one 
W<lY or a nother part i c i pated in po l i t i cal cr i mes,  c r i m es w i th po l i r ic1 l ram t ficar ions ,  or crt m ts com ­
m ! tred by no less t han twe n ty peop l e , before January l ,  1 99 2 ,  regard l ess of w h e r he r p roceed i ngs 
agai nst t hem for t he perpetra t i on of t hese c r i mes have com menced or nor , o r  whether they have re­
ce tvecl a sen tence as a consequence . . 
,\rr i c l e  .1 : Those who w i l l  not be favored by rht am nesty are: 
(a)  Those who i nd iv i d ua l l y  or· co l lect ive ly  pan i c i pared tn rhe cr i mes typ i fied i n  rhe second i rtm of 
Article 400 of r h e  penal code and carritcl our t h ose cr i mes w i r h  a view ro p ro fi t , wherher or nor rhe 
person i s  serv i ng rime i n  pr i son as a consequen ce : and 
( b) Those who t n d i v id u a l ly or co l lect i ve ly part i c i pated tn rhe c r i mes typ i fi ed in A rt i c l es 220 and 
257 of rhe pena l code and rhost i n c l uded i n  rhe l a w  reg u lat i ng d rug re l arecl acr i v i r i es . 
!d. arrs . l ,  .) . 
') ) .  Law of General A m nesry and Nat ional Reconc i l i a t i o n ,  No. S l  ( l ')90) ( i\: i car ) (on file wtrh  
H arv<trd I nr ernar i onal law J ou rna l ) . The releve n r  passages read · 
Art ic le  I :  A ge neral and uncond t t ional  am nesty is hereby g ranted ro 
I .  A l l  N i carag uans . . .  , who com m i t ted cr i mes against  r h t  p u b l i c  order and rhe t n rernal and ex­
rcrnal sec u r i t y  of the s tare and or her  rclared aces .  
2.  All  c i v i ! t an < tnd m i l i rary N i ca rag uans who may have com m t t r ed i nfra c t i o n s  1 11 ctrry t ng o u r  or 
i n n:sr igar ing c ri m i n<1l acrs  cltscr i bcd i n  r h c  p roceed i ng parag raph . 
,\ melt 2 .  The a m nest)' rc:ferred ro t tl rhe  p reced 1 ng parag raph i n c l udes r h t  per10d fro m J une 1 9 , 
1 ')7 <) up ro tht d art on wh i ch the  c urrent Ll\\' g oes t n w  e ffect .  
lrl a r r s .  l -2 .  
')- ! .  l nclem n i ry Law t(Jr Sc:c u r i r y  Force Perso n n e l ,  No. 2 0  ( I  <)S 2 )  (Sr i  Lank<l) (on li lt w i r h  H arvard 
l nr c: rnct r i onal  Ll\v .J ourna l ) .  The law read s 1 n  par r :  
2 .  No ctc r i o n o r  m her lega l p mceed t ng wl1<1 rsoc-vcr, whc-rher  c i v i l  or c r i m t n<t l . s h a l l  be: t llSt t ru rc:d t n  
<1111' c o u r t  of law fi:>r or on acco u nt o f  or i n  respect of cmv acr ,  m a ttl:r or th i ng , w h u h e r  ltgal o r  o t h ­
erw i se , d o n e  or  p urporred ro be c l o n e:  w i r h a v i ew ro restoring Ltw and urder d u r i ng r h c  per i od 
Aug us t 1 ,  I <) 7 7  ru [ 2 0  1\Iav l <)S 2 } .  i f  clone i n  good fa i t h .  Lw a i\I i n i s rc -r . Depur\· i\ I i n t s rc: r  or person 
hold i ng office u nder or e m p l oye-d i n  any capaci ry wherher  nava l ,  m t l i rary .  a i r  t(Jrct.  po l i ce or c i ,· i l ,  or 
b\· a n y  person acr i ng t n  good fai r h  u n d e r  r h e  aurhor i ry u f  a cl t rtu i on of a lvf i n i s rer , Dqnt rv i"v[ i n , s rcr 
or person ho ld i ng office or so emplovcd <tncl done or pu rporrc:cl ro be: done t tl rhe e:-;cc u r t o n  of h i s  
d u r v  nr for r h c  enforccme m of L l w  a n d  orde r  or for t h e  p u b l i c  saferv u r  urht r\\' ise t n r i t e  p u b l i c  t n ­
cncsr . 
ld c trr . 2 .  
l) ) .  Law N u l l 1 fy i ng rhe Srcuc·s C Lt t m  w P u n i s h  C:crcc1 i n  C n mes,  N · l 5 . S- 1 S  ( l ')S(J )  ( U ru ) ( o n  fi l e  
''' ' t h  I- hr,· a rd l n re rna r io na l L1,,. Juu r tu l ) . T h e  reJ c-,·a n r  porr i on read s : 
A. r r i c l t  1 :  lr i s  reco).: n i zed c ha r  as a conseq ut:tKe of r l t t  l og t c  uf the  t"IT ll t S  stL· m tll t ll.� from rhc· 
clg rt·t· mcnt bnween rhe pu l t r i ct l  parr ies  a n d  r h e:  A mlt:d Forces t il A u ,c: u s r  I 'JS · i cu>cl 1 11 urclcr  r t l  c u m ­
p lc re rht· r rans i r ion ro ful l  co t tsr i ru r ional  urd tr . rhc S c a r e  rc l i ncJ U I Shts rhe cxcru st· of  pcnct !  <Kt i uns 
,,. t r h  rcsptn w c r t mts com m i rrtd u n t i l ;\ [a rch I .  l 'lS S .  b,· m i l t t <HY el m! pul tcc ollt c t a ls  e i t h e r  for 
po l t t i ci l  rcclsuns t l r  in fu l fi l l m e nt uf r h c t r fu nct i ons and t il ubn· , ng o rders from S U !'c r i o rs d u r i ng rhe  
de Ltet l l  pci·tocl . 
,\ r r t c l c  .2 · The: ab"''C A rr t d e  d ues n"r C l lvn:  
b J  n i m ,·s r l ta r  m:n· h<l\ e bu·n com m i r rtd l �n  I'L·t·sunct l c·cotw m i c  ).:<t t n  o r  t i l  bcndi r a r l t i ,·d p<trr l· 
IJ e m .  I 
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macy, n o  i nternati onal l eg i t imacy, and a broad scope,  effect ive ly  barri ng the 
p rosecut ion of government author i t ies for most serious cr imes .  
The Arge n t i ne amnesty represents  a trans i t ion  from B lanker A mnesty to 
Local ly Leg i t i mized ,  Part ial I m m u n it y. Its  scope i s  s t i l l  broad , but it  has 
s ign ificantly greater domestic leg i t imacy. The Argent ine  amnesty leg is lat ion  
was passed in  the  wake of a peri od of tr ials  of the former m i l i tary j u n tas i ni ­
t iated a t  t h e  outset of the A l fo nsfn reg i me,% which u l t imately led to the  
conviction of five of the former j unta  members .97 
The A rgent ine  amnesty cons i s ts of two separate laws : the F u l l  S top Law of 
December 24, 1 9869ei and the Due Obedi ence Law of June 4 ,  1 987 . 99 The 
96.  Immediately after com i ng ro power in 1 98 .) ,  the  A l fonsin governmc:nr revoked the  m d i ra ry 
jun ra·s se lf-amnesty laws and a l l owed rrials agains t  the leaders of the Process of National Reorg a n i za t i o n  
ro com mence. See David P10n -Ber l t n & Ernesro Lopez, ,\ HO!m Oiz ·,dul: Cri.ric. C!et� z ·age. a11d c,,,,ji,ct i11 t!x 
;\ ;:�mtilla A r111y, in TH E NEw i\ 1\GE NTI:\: E D E ,\tOCI\ACY: TH I·: S t : ,\ 1\CH FOR A Succ E S S F U L  FOHI-t U LA 6_) ,  
7 0  (Edward Epste in eel . ,  1 99 2 )  [herei nafter TH E N E\V  A I\G t : N T I N E  D b\IOCRACY} (not i ng that the 
. . democrat i c  government rook the offens ive by ann u l l i ng the m d i t,try's se l f-am nesty' ' ) .  Both Argenti ne 
amnesty laws were passed i n  response to the February 1 4 ,  1 984 , Law N o.  2 _) . 0 4 ')  r har al lowed rhe Su­
preme Counc i l  of r h e  Armed rorces ro h c:ar  cases of  certa in  cr imes com m i t ted by the m i l l t,try. See ROG El\ 
G I<.W I L , \VEESTu:--;c; \V ITI·I T H E  PAsr H u ;\ 1 .-1 :\  RI GHTS A'-:D ST,I B I LITY IN A L ro :-.: s fN · s  A I\G t : i': T I ;-o; ,.\ l i 
( l l)l) 5 )  Under th i s  ear l ier  law, a number of cases were b rough t i n  both c i v i l i an  and m i l i tary courts.  I ll ·  
elud i ng s ign iticam ones b rought b y  rederal  Prosecu ror  J u l i o  C. Srrasscra aga 1ns r  members o f  t h e  fi rs t  
J U n ta of l l)/G .  See id. at 1 5 ;  J tt ahu G,\l{Y \'(/. \'(/y;-..- 1.-\, A l{C I.: "!Tl t--;A :  I I . I .USIO:\:S ,\ :'< D R F .-\ I . ITILS i i-i..:i-85 
( 1 9i-i6) .  ln order to p l acate the m i l i tary, rhe A l fonsln Government i ssued a series of i nstruc t ions ,  IIIJ'Irll< · 
cirme.r a! Fi,,'t!/ Ce11u·rd del Coll.rtj" Sllj>rtlllfJ de lm F!ltr:,u A r111adr1.r, which l 1 m i rc:d th e: l i abi l i ty of subord i ­
nates. Sec LI U I\.1 Tt: D t :SCO, D t : ,\ I OCILICY I N  A ill; E N T r N,\ 1 2 2-2 .'> ( 1 99') ) .  Then:ahcr. some members of  
tht· r\ rgenune j ucl i c i ,lrv r h n:aren tcl w rcs 1gn ,  cbi m 1 ng the  i n s rrucr ions "const r ttHtd a h idden  amnesC\· . . .  
lei. ,tt 1 2 ) .  r\ l fons in then cod 1 fitd chat amnesrv through rhe Ful l  S ro p  Law. S,c ; d.  at  1 2 2-2-� . 
') 7 .  See P 10n-Bnl i n  & Lopez, .r;tj>rc� nort <)() , at  / l l .  Though the  J uchc ian· worked overt ime  a,t; a i n s r  the  
t·xec u r 1 vc's and the rn d iwry's !mp l 1 c i r  1 nsrrucr ions ro c l ear h,1ck cases bdcJre t h e  Fu l l  S rop  Ll\v came 1nw 
e lltcr , manv cases wert nor  bmughr or reso lved i n  r ime .  Sec Tt: D I:sco, !ltjn·" note  9 6 ,  at 1 2 .'\-2- 'i .  
9 8 .  F u l l  S top Law .r11jirt�  note 9 1 .  J n  per t i nem parr the law rtac ls :  
r\ rr iclt 1 :  C r i m i nal  prostc u r ions aga 1ns t  anv person .  based on his  a l leged parr i c i p,u i on , of anv na­
tu re, 1 n  rht cr i mes referred r o  i n  Arr i c le ltJ oC 2 _) . 0..\9 are ext i ngu i shed b1 ·  operat ion of law, u n l ess 
such pc:rson r s  r nd i c red lw a court of com pt re m  j u r i sd ic tion w i t h i n  s i xty calenci<u· days of t he 
dart of pro m u lgar ion of t l 1 1 s  law. 
Under rhe s,tme cond i r ions sha l l be ext l f\l:U i shecl a l l  cr i m i nal prosecu t i ons aga i ns t  any person who 
has pa r r i C ! parcd u p  ro or before Dece-mber l 0 ,  l l).'l .'> 1 n  rht  cumm1ss ion of  C t 1 111es relartcl w rhe usc 
ul· v1o lem means of pol i t ica l  au i on .  
A rt i c l e  5 The l aw  docs n o r  app l y  to c r !m ln,l l prosecu t i ons l( n· t he- c r imes of  change: of c i ,· i l  s ra[ l ! s  
and k 1 dnapp1ng and h i d i ng of m i nors. 
A. r r r ck (i :  Tht except ion  estab l i shed i n  Arr i c l e  l docs nor prt, em rhc h l r ng of a c i v i l  c l a i m .  
IJ. arts .  1 .  ) .  
')':) . Due: Obed ience Law, .r11pra note l) l .  t il ptrr i m:nr P'l rt rl·ads: 
r\ 1T ic lc: l :  l r  is prc:sumtcl . w 1 r lwur proof to rhc com r:trv lx· in,l: adm i [ ( c:cl , r lur  those who ar the r ime  
o l .  rhc per['C: rrar ron of t h e  a c r s  had th e· rctn k  u�· ch 1 c f  officers.  suborcl rnare o ff icers . o fli c i a l s .  and so l ­
d i ers  t i  r h e  't rmed �-orces. po l 1 c e .  and  IXISOn l ( lrcc-s. <t r(· t·xtmpt  from pun 1 shmcn r  l( > r  t he  c r i mes n.-. 
fc. rrnl t l J  1 11 r\ r r i c l c:  I l l ,  t i rsr  parc1praph of Liw i'( , l  2 .) . ( ) . j l) bv \ i rt u c· ot  h av l ll!,: fu l l owc·d orders . l 11 
r h t >SC c·ascs i t  sha l l  he· clcc·mnl h1· opcra r r o n  of Ll \\' r ha r  r h c·sc 11trS< J tlS acred u ndn d u ress .  i n  suhord r ­
!Ll r r on  r o  a supnl l l r  au r lwr i r y  'l llcl �( l l l ow l l\l; orders .  1\· i r lwur luv 1 11:,: t iK pr >ss i b i l l tV , , [· rvs i .' l  r n,t; m 
rd.u s r n.t: w fo l l ow those· orc lns and of o:am 1 11 i ll ,l; rhc· 1 r  Ll\vl'u l nc:ss. 
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former sets a sixty-day s tatute of l i m i tations for t h e  prosecut ion of  any 
c ri mes commi t ced as part of the "d i rty \Var, " effectively prevent ing prosecu­
t ions after that period.  When this proved i nsufficient in  ful ly i m muniz ing 
the past regime,  a second l aw was adopted , establ i sh ing an i rrefmabl e  pre­
s umption that any member o f  the s tate services,  with the excep t ion of  the  
highest-level commanders , acts i n  furtherance of command-orders and  1s not  
i ndependently l iable . 1 00 
The scope of the A rgent ine  laws ,  whi le  s t i l l  sufficiently broad to m eet the  
overal l criteria of the category of B lanket A mnesty, d i ffers fro m  the Peruvian 
and Chil ean l eg i s lat ion .  Art ic le  5 of the Fu l l  Stop Law specifical l y  excl udes 
kid nappi ng and d isappearance of mi nors from the amnesty. 1 0 1 This i s  a 
s ignificant exception g iven the  n umber of d isappearances which  occurred . 1 02 
Furthermore, A rtic le  6 o f  the  Ful l  Stop Law c learly indicates t hat  the  am­
nesty does not preclude c ivi l means of redress . 1 0 1  Yet ,  the laws s t i l l  provide 
sweepi ng immunity for many serious crimes , i nclud i ng m urder, torture ,  and 
some cases of d i sappearances . Moreover, the irrefutable p resumption i n  the  
Due Obedience Law makes many prosecutions imposs ib le  and , as  a resul t ,  
wi dens t h e  effective scope o f  t h e  amnesty. 
The legi t imacy of the A rgen t i ne amnesty laws represents a transit ion 
from B lan ket A mnesty to Locally  Legi t imized , Parc ial I m m u n i ty. U n like the 
grams of am nesty i n  Chi le  and Peru, the A l fonsfn governm e n t  had a demo­
cratic pol i t ical m andate . 1 1 ) 1  The reach and power of democrat ic  voices during 
Alfonsfn 's tenure , however, \Vere q uestionabl e . 1 05 F reedom House rated A r­
gentina a 2 ,  1 i n  i ts 1 98 6-87 stu dy, j ust  bare l y  c l ass ify ing i t  as free .  i O(; I n  
relat ion t o  t h e  passage of t h e  am nesty legis lat ion ,  th i s  score seems to b e  roo 
Arr ic le  2 :  The pres u m p r i on l'Srab l i shed i n  rhe rrC'vious arr ick sha l l  nor app l y  ro cri mes of r'1pe. 
k i d n a p p i n g .  and l 1 1d 1 ng of m 1 nors . change 1 1 1  c i v i l  s rarus ,  and approp r iar ion  o f  i m movab l es r h rough 
ex ron ! l l n .  
lei. a rrs . 1 -.:2 . 
I ( )() !d. arr .  I . 
1 () l .  F u l l  Srop Law, J ll/' l ·a note )J l , a r r .  5 .  
I 0 .:2.  I s r i mares o f  rhe roLd n u mbers of abd ucted or Ill l Ss i ng persons vary from 8960 ro more rhan 
.'i O,UUO.  Su: G ltW I I . ,  mpra noce ')6,  ar  1 .'> .  For  1\ U st·fu l s w d y  of A rg e m i n t  l i rerar ure " narrau ng [rht)  hel l "  
of r ht " [ p ) rocess of (n )ar i onal  ( r korgan i za r i u n  . . .  s c: C'  L I H I .� [V.·I � C ; I' l!ST.A, Voru:s O F  n-I l' S U I\ V I V O H S :  
TI::STL\ I Oi':Y, MoUI\ .--: 1 :'-iC,  el i': !) M F ,\ l ( J!( )' l i':  PosT- D I C'iX['(')[{S i l l l '  r\ 1\ c ; r ·: N T!t'>:r\ I 9 :-1 .)- l )J)J 5 ,  - i-:j ( )  ( R t n zo 
Llmemt r r,ul S . ,  l ')'):-1) .  
I o.:; . F u l l  S w p  L1w, <llj>w nmcc 9 I ,  arr .  G ;  .rcc c�f.,,, l--L�.L� I : I< ,  <ltjnd n <Ht: --i .) .  ar  .) )-5--i ( d i scuss i n g  rhe ;, r­
·"" n r i nt Tru r h  Com m ission ) .  
I 0--1. Stc G ICW I I . ,  ;!tf'r<� nml' ))6, ar ) ,  2 1  l i nd ica[ l ng r h 1n rhe  Onobtr _',0,  1 9:-l _'> elecr ions gavt ,l re­
suund i ng nund,nt· w l\a u l  A l fo n s in w i r h  5 \ . "' �:r uf rlw V< > tt  fur h i s  !Ctd i cd l)arry ) ;  ;cc < tho Edw,trd I p ­
srt l ll ,  /),·iti>Jt'l',!l} iu  ;\ > :�cii!III<i ,  Iii TH r :  i'� l '\\ A r< c ; r: :-; T I N I : D l ·: .vJuU\.-IC.Y, <11jlr:� nmt 96, a r  I , () rbl . 1. . .:2 .  T i l t· 
r\ i fonsin g o v t" rn m t m  was,  atrcr  ,t \ 1 ,  a welcuml:' change fmm r h e  r h 1-ec: m l i r ra r v  J U IHas rhar r u l t:d from 
l\brch l ')i6 u m i l _j u l i· I ') S .? . Stc C ILIV I I . , .>//jlr< l nott· ')(j , ar  .2 .  
I O S  O n e  schuLtr of r h c  Ar,c: c m i nl:' po\ , r i ca l  process p u 1 m s  r u  " r h t· w,·,!knt·ss uf r h t  m a J o r  pol i c ical  par­
r i es and rhe  rt· Lt r i \'l' S l l't· n g r h  ol:  I IEerccsr g roups .  l n s rt·acl of <l).:.S '·e,c: a r i r\c: ( a nd mod era t i ng ) contl , c r i l l,C: 
i n rcrtsr ,c: ruu1 1 cl a i ms_ parr 1 es scr1·e L1 rgeh·  as c: l tc( ( J r,i l n·h 1 <:ks i ·o r  r h r· s r mn,c: l 'trson,l l l r ies  w h o  d o m i nart  
r h t m  and r h c  J 'ol l [ ic : i l  sv :;rem 'ts a ,,· h u ! t  . . . E j'S te l n ,  '11/', ." n o rc I ( ) . j .  a r  1 .> ThE " r·cs u l r l ll_!.: ckmocran· [ 1 n  
r\ r,"!enr i n : t ]  :lj1J'l''"·s bmh poor l v  i ns r i w r innal i z ,:d ,1 1 1 cl l n h cr t· n r h· u n s r, ,hk . . !d :H :; . 
I I H) F IU I : I l0 .\ 1  H r ) I . < L .  ,;;/'' · '  r w r t· ,:' (i 
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generous . A fter 1 98 5 ,  t h e  Argen t i ne democracy began t o  unravel . T h e  A l ­
fonsfn government declared a " war economy" and launched t h e  Austral  Plan ,  
which  made the president the "central domi nant focus of the pol i t i cal sys­
tem . " 1 07 In th i s  comext ,  the passage of the Due Obedience Law is the mo­
ment when " P res i dent Al fonsfn lost h i s  declared pos i t i o n  as guarantor of the 
break wi t h  the past by reneg i ng on h i s  publ ic ly  g iven word not to y ie ld  to 
m i l i tary pressure . " 1 08 The s ig n i ficant defeat of the A l fonsfn reg ime in the  
elections of September 6 ,  1 987 , soon after the laws passed , creates more 
doubt about  the leg i t i macy of the amnesty leg i slat i on . 1 09 Moreover, the 
sweep i ng presumption of the D ue Obedi ence Law was more a response to  
threats by the m i l i tary authori ti es ,  angered by previous conv ic t ion s ,  than a 
reflect ion of the  authority of the  people 's w i l l . 1 1 0  
B .  Locally Legitimized. Partial Immunity 
Local ly  Leg i t i m ized , Partial I m mu n i ty is characterized by a s ig n i ficam i n ­
crease i n  leg i t i macy and a marked reduct ion  i n  scope . I n  terms o f  scope, th is  
category of am nesty excludes from the gram of  i mmunity  both common 
cri mes and crimes com mi ned for personal motives . The Argent ine  am nesty, 
d i scussed above. does not ,  therefore, q ual i fy. Local ly Leg i t i m ized,  Part ia l  
I m m u n i ty must also a l low for some mean i ngful ad j ud i cat i o n  of the am­
nesty's scope. 1 1 1  The existence of an alternate means of redress for v ict ims , 
I 0 7 .  i\l arcelo Cavaro z z 1  0:. l\·!arL1 G ross i ,  ;\ rgelllill(' P.HI!rl l!!lder ;\ ((;;1/J/11: !-"mill Dullo,·rafic l?eilll "tii!Joll I!; 
Pol!! �c"cd Di!dille ami H)j'I!J"IIIjl< �tioll . i11 T! I I ·: N 1 :w ;\ 1 \C 1: NT! N L D t: ,\ !OCIC-\CY, .111j1ra n o re 9 6 ,  ar I 7 .'J , I 0 0 .  
I O S .  Marcel o  Cwarozzi  & Oscar Lan d i ,  p,,firiwl Pt�rtm 1111tler r\ lj;;"-'/" rn1d J\ l we111: Tbe r:_jj�os o/  Srare 
Sbri11ki11g am/ thi! Du ·dlllatioil o/ DwJoO"tffic" PoliricJ, ill TH E N E\\' ARGEI'T!l\: 1' D I: :- IOCI(ACY, Jlljlr" nme 96,  
ar  :2 0 _7 ,  2 1 2 . I n  so doi r\L; - A l lo n s ln brukt r h e  i m p l i ed pact  wirh rhe A r�tnr 1 ne c r r i ze nr\· upon w h ich h i s  
l e g 1 r i macy de pe nded . " T h 1 s  pace was d t h nt"d, tor r h e  mosr p a r r ,  b y  r h e  des i re ch a r r h t  r ra u m a r i c  pasr ol-­
c r i s i s  and pol 1 r ica l  v i olence nm reoc c u r, as wel l  as by the  reva l u i ng of 1 nd i ,· idual  r i g h rs and l i bt r r i es . "  ld 
ar .2 0 1l .  T h i s  per i od a lso marked a sreacly cl ec l 1 n c in rhe p u b l i c  cred i bi l i rv of p o l i r i c ians  1 n  A rgenr i na from 
5 1 '/( cred i bi l i ry rar i ng bdurc t he passage of rhe clm nesry laws ro a m ere .'J O 'i( creJ i b i l i ry rar r ng i n  .Apr i l 
l 9S8 a fttr  r h e  rwo laws had been passed and r h l' rac r r  pace broke n .  See Ed ward C .  Epsre i n ,  Colldmi>JII­
TI>e 1'\eu ·  ri iXellfille DtJIIocran : Tbe Sum !>  ji!l· a Sl!cce.ujiJ! For111llia , i11 TH r :  N i :\V A I{G F NTI:-.: E D r ·: ,\ I OCIL\CY, 
111jira nore 96, ar  .2 4 -'1 ,  2 5 I rbl I ( ) .2 
I 09 .  See G H .-\V J L ,  .I!Jjird note  <)(i _ ar 2 1  ( nm i n,c: r h t  Pe ro n i srs · su ccess 1 11 t hese e k c r i o n s ) .  
1 1 0 .  This  coercive p ress u re ,  ma; n l v  from t h e  m i l 1 tan·. I S  e\·icl t: ncecl by a series of o p e n  relw l l 1ons .  r n ­
c l ud i ng "Opera t i o n  D i g n 1 C\·," w p mres r _  i11/!:r alic�, r h e  t r i a l s r h t n  t a k i tl;j p lace before r h e  tnacrmtm o f  
r he D u e  Obed ience Law. O n e  com rl l c n r : l r o r  descr i bes " t h e  C<lll paign aga i n s t  r h e  L1w" a s  " w i l d ,  borh ;H 
h o m e and a b road , res u l t i n ,c: ; n  e n ormous po l r r i cal  cos rs  for r h e  ,A, l f( m s l n ·s ,s on· rn m en r .
" 
Car l os S. l\: 1 no,  
Tbe Dllt)" ''' P1111isb Pt1.11 A /;1!.\e_< o/ Hl!il!dl! l?igbts P11r l llfn Cmte.\"t: The Ca.\£' 'lj" ,-\ ;:�ellfiii,J ,  1 ( ) ( )  Y,-\ 1 . 1 ·: L_J . 
2 6 1 9 , :2 6 2 S-_'J () ( l l)9 l ) : ,,·c al-' " G ICW I I . ,  <llf> ril nore 96.  ar 1 7 : Epst e i n .  Jltj>u n or c:  1 0-i. ar _'i (rt l-e r r r ng ro 
r h e  !\-Jay 1 9S9 r i o r s ) :  P i on - B n l r n  & L6pe z ,  Jl!f!u nore  96 .  c1r 6 � ;  Tl! J I :�c:u, J !if'rt! m m· l)h,  ar 1 2 7 Fm a 
d isc uss i ! l n  of th e- cunnec r i o n  amon,c: r i l L" F u l l  Stop Law, rht  m i l i rary rn·o l rs ,  and rht Due Obed i ence La\\', 
sec id. , ar 1 .2 _)-::!h .  
I l l  Con rras r ,  fur c·�cr m p l t ,  r l 1 L· Sw1rh  A h- i c<J n Tru r h  ancl R ccunc r l 1 a r i on C:o m m : s s i o n 's e�re n s i ,· t· s r cr r u ­
ror\' c1u r lwr i r y  and i !l\·ts r i,c:cl r i ,·c· po wers , Ste re�r  <lCCo m p a n \· r n,c: n o rts 1 .2 0-1 .::' 5 .  w i r h  rhc  r\ r,c:t: m r nc 
l JuL· O bed ience- L;-,w, "·h 1c l r  ser an l [ rc· fu Lib lc  J'resu m p r ion rh < J r  cr i m es wnt l'ol r r i ca l  and c�rrrr:d om 
l"' ll l-sucrnr rn m i l r ra ry mdns . Su· J!if>r<t re:-:r  accumparw i n,c: n ores ;J�- 1 0 .::' 
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through c ivi l cases or ocher forms of reparations  further demonst rates the  
more l i mi ted scope of am nest ies  i n  ch is  category. 1 I .:?  
O n  the axi s  of leg i t i macy, Local ly  Leg i t i mized , Parcial  I m m u n i ty carries 
s upport from a more s i g n i ficant domes t i c  const i tuency chan  does B lanket 
Amnesty. For an amnesty co  fie i n  chis  category, the government  must ,  ac 
leas e in part , respect the authority of the w i l l  of che peop l e ,  oft e n  t hrough 
e ither a popularly e lected government or a nat i onal  referendum . 
The most promi nent  example of a Locally Leg i t i m ized,  Partial  I m m u n i ty 
i s  South Africa. South A fri ca's Truth and Reconc i l iat i o n  Ace  [ herei nafter 
Reconci l iat ion Ace} estab l i shed an i ndependent quas i - j ud i c ial body w i t h  t he 
power to gram amnesty for pol i t i cal  crimes . 1 1 "  The am nesty granted by the 
Truch and Reconc i l iat ion  Commiss ion i s  gro u nded in s trong domes t i c  legal 
authority, and the Comm iss ion  i tself was amhorized by a popularly elected 
dem ocratic govern ment .  The South A frican I n terim Const i tution of 1 99 3  
req ui res chat "amnesty shal l  be granted i n  respecc o f  aces ,  o mi s s i o ns and of­
fences associated w i t h  pol i t i cal  ob ject ives and com m itted i n  che course of 
the confl icts  of the pas t . " 1  1 4  It  speci fically summons the  legis lature to pass a 
law that provi des fo r such an amnesty and creates a t r i b u na l  for adj ud ica­
t ion . Th i s  manclace was ful fi l led i n  J u l y  26, 1 995 , when the Par l iament  
passed the  " P romot ion  of Nati onal Unity  and Reconc i l iat ion Ace"  1 1 5  as part 
of the I merim Const i tut i o n .  The amnesty provi s ion  in che I n terim Consc i cu­
c ion was eventual l y  transformed i nt o  the ProiTlOt ion of Nat i onal  Uni ty and 
Reconci l iat ion Act ,  which  was passed by a de moc rac ica l l y  e l ec ted par l ia­
m e n c 1 l h  and s igned b y  P res i de n t  L',Telson Mande la ,  whose personal h i s tory as 
a v i ctim of the apartheid reg i me  gave h i m  unique cred i b i l i ty to i ns t i tute an 
am nesty. The process of d eveloping the  Truth and Reco n c i l iac ion Com m i s­
s ion  i nvolved extensive consultat i on with  i n d i v iduals ,  com m un i ty groups ,  
and pol i t ical part i es ,  culm i nating in  forty-seven hearings across South A fri ca 
i n  1 996 . 1 1 7 T h i s  com b i nat ion of strong grass roots involve rT1 e n c  and supporr 
1 1 2 .  Many srarcs rhar  tn acred l3 1anku I\m nts t its a l s o  ueart:d r r m h  com m i ss i ons . These com m i s s i o n s ,  
lwwcvt:r, a l though s ucctssfu i a t  doc u m e m i ng some a b u s t s  suffcrL"d , d i l l  not p n "· i ck m e a n i ngfu l  red rtss 
and n.:parauons fur \' l c r i m s .  S"" .�t!ler< �llr 1-LIY \: EJ( ,  .1/tf'rd n o t e  ·U . at  I ( 1 7 -o').  
I I .> .  As n u m erous a u t h ors have considered thl' Somh A frican Tru th and Rccunc i l i a c iun Com m i ssion 
[hcrc i n;li'tn rhe Com m 1 s s i o n ]  1 11 extt l lS 1 'Ct  deta i l ,  t h i s  ,\rc i c l c  w d l  not prov i d e  a cum prr·hens ive r rt·at­
m e m .  1\.ctc h n. i t  l ooks a t  how the C:u m n l l S S l u n  !"i r s  1 nc u  t h 1 s  r\ r t i c l e "s fra m e w o r k .  1 :ur  dera i kd ana l y s i s  o f  
t h t  h i stoncd back,c: ruu n d  ;ln d  work o i '  r h e  C:o m m 1 ss i u n .  :itT gtn er;d h· S .  r\ Fi( .  TH r:TH ,1 :--J J.) 1\ i :CO:--J U I . I .� ­
TIU,\: C:o \ 1 ,\ l · '; ,  Ti( LTH ,\ \: D R IT! J :-J CI I . I .�TIOC-i Co,\ l .\ 1 · �  O F  SoLTH A F IU C : .� ii. I YOin ( I ')')') ) :  S .  A FIL 
Ti( L: 'i ' H  ,\1, 1 1  F.. � : c :oc.:u i .LH I C J f\  C:o,\ L \ I . N .  SouTH A I · IW >I\ H L '. I.I \: S I' I IZ I T' ,1 :-.; O iZ -1 1. i\fi . : , I O I Il C J I '  T H I 
Ti( L T H  ,1 \: ll  lZ L U J:.- U I . I ATI C Jf\ C:o , I :, I I S � I O :"<  ( 2 1 ) ( 1 1 1 1 :  ,\ u: :\ B r J IZ.-1 1 :\ 1 : ,  r\ CoL  :-.: T I(Y L \: .\ I .�S K L D :  SnVJI-1 
A l· luc� ·,  THL .. TH .. I .'< IJ R I :Co\:ULL�T IO\: Co, f ,\ l f :;s!O\: ( 200 1 1: i...: F.\: \: LTH C: I I IZ J .�TI I .  Ti l L  Sor·n 1 A. Ffl. r ­
<.-1 .\: TIWTI I C:l.l .\ 1 ,\ l hS I U .'; ( 2 0 0 0 ) :  A LLY RL 'SS L L L .  Ti l L  Ti: t T H  � \: 1) R H .O\: (  l l . I .Yi l <  )\: C:O.\L\ l i S S I O \: .  
L J : r d S I  . . c�r r c H ,  P 1( C 1<J SS. A � l l L V,\ L L: ,IT I C 1 :.- O l '  L\I P  ..I C T  i i ';J') tl ;: D i : .\ 1 . 1 �-; c ,  \V I T I ! . 1 . 1 1 1 . P. I .ST: Ti'. L TI I  .\ �: l l  
1\ u :o \: U I .L \T I <  1 �  1 '-'  So LTH r\ 1· 1( 1 (..-\ ( r\ l e:\ Bura l l ll' <:r ;d . cck .  1 ') ') -,  ) .  
I J . j  S. r\ F i( 1 \: TI · H I .\ 1  C :O'SI'. ( A n  .2 0 0 .  1 99.'\ 1 . Nott 1 o 1 u i  l J n ] [ l' ;uld t\ ,·c onc i l � ;n i , Jn  l)ru,· , s i u n .  
1 1 5 Pwnl< l t i l l l l  uf �'i a t i u n a l  U n H1· ; end Rr·cu n c i l � e1 t l l > l l  ,-\ n .  i'J o . . ; .. j ( I 'N 5 1  1 :; .  r\ l r. !  [ h r: rc· 1 1Ufrcr Tru c h  
""'! l\L·Co l lC I I "' t i u n  t\cr ] .  h r t p : / , w \1'\v. t r u r h . ur," . !." ( v i S i t <:d r'l f ' r. -' I . .' I  i l l  I 1 .  
I I (, .  Scl' ,\ l i \:U\\ . ilt/'1'.1 norc· .1-J ,  a t  5 .1 :  H ,\Y\: 1 : 1{ .  .> ttjl! 'd l lU(t' 1 .1 .  ; \ t  . j  I .  
I I - St-� !JL· rc:r A SL-he�· cr a l , :LI.Irr.'Yiil.'!_ filtiih!if Ni,'-!,hl.' /\ /;;;.' : .' :  Tri!tli (__ ,,;;; :;;/.l.li, ,J/_1 . ; :;J tbt \ crlllt ��/ /\ i;;� 
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from leg i t i m  ate domestic amhori t ies  s uggests a greater degree of l ocal le­
g i t i m acy than that found i n  B lanket A mnesty. The Freedom House scores 
support ch i s  assessment ,  g ivi ng South Africa a 1 ,  2 ( free) i n  i ts 1 996-97 
smdy. 1 1 :-: The South African amnesty is a l so noteworthy for i ts coherence . 
The amnesty appl i es equall y  to cr im es of apartheid and ant i -aparthe id ,  
crim es by  the govern ment ,  and crimes by ordinary c i t i zens . 1 1  ':! 
Analyzi ng the Truth and Recon c i l iat ion Com miss ion and i ts u nderlying 
legis lat ive framework, which  sets forth the Commiss ion 's dut ies and obl iga­
t ions ,  reveals the more l i m i ted scope of the i m m u n i ty. The Reconc i l iat ion  
Ac t  created t he  Com m iss i o n ,  the  funct ions of which  i nc l ude faci l i tat ing i n ­
q u i ry i nto "gross v iolat ions of h uman rights , "  " the ident i ty of . . .  persons 
. . .  i nvolved i n  s uch violations , "  and the " accountab i l i ty . . .  for any such 
violation . " 1 10 The Reconci l iation Act created a Com m ittee on H uman Rights 
Violat ions ,  to w h i c h  i t  granted a clear i nvest igative mandate . 1 1 1  l i kewise ,  a 
Com mittee on Amnesty wi th  both i nvest igative and adj ud i cat ive po\vers 
was created . 1 2 2 
The Recon c i l iat ion Act provi des funct ional  gu ide l i nes for the Co m m i ttee 
on Am nes ty, ensuring srr icc  substantive and temporal l i m i ts on the scope of 
amnesty. Crim es m ust  be " associ ated w i t h  a pol i t i cal object ive " '  and comm i e­
ted between March 1 960 and December 1 99 3 .  I nd iv iduals  see k i ng am nesty 
m use  apply to the Comm i ttee on Am nesty, w h i c h ,  in t urn ,  decides based on 
a case-by-case i n q u i ry whether the cri m e  was com mi tted in furtherance of  a 
pol i t ical object ive . 1 2 '  The Com m ittee on  Am nesty mus e  exc l ude  any acts 
co m m i t ted for personal gai n or om of personal m al i ce . 1 -' i \Y/h i le t h i s  l i m i ta­
t ion m ay exc lude common cr imes or personal cr imes ,  i c does al low the 
Comm i ttee on Am nesty co grant a m nesty, even for gross v io lat ions  of h u man 
r igh ts and of imernat ional  h un1ani tarian law l i nked to po l i t i cal  ob jec t ives . 1 2 5 
1/e.,l ) .  I ')  \VH !TT! Eil L. R 1:v ) .2 5  . .1. 2 9  ( l ')LJ7) ;  H ,W :\ Eil ,  .>!if'ra nor<: - H ,  ar -i I ;  1\ [ 1 '-iO\\ ,  >itf'rtt nore  -' -i . ar 5 5  
( !l J J [ I Il_C: · · r ht· \·a l ut o (  r h t  [ ' I"IKL"SS u f  p u b l i C  d c l i lx-rar i CJrJ i n  c rea r i n,t; lt,t; J l l llU(\"  i "m  r h e  undnr ,tl--: i n g " " ) .  
I I  S .  See F IUT ilCJ.\ f  H < l U � I : .  Jltjl! "d n m c  ]. (, _  A fttr  r h c  r ra n S J r i o n  of puw<er ru  r h e  A fr i c a n  N a r Jo iLl i  Con-
,li i"L"SS ( t\NC J ,t;un:rnmtm. Soll [h  Afr,ca·s FrL"tdo m  !-!oust score i m p rmTd from '' 5 .-l w a l ,J. .  Set iJ 
l l ') .  Sec. e. g. , Tru r h  '"1d Rcconc i l � <H I Oil A c e ,  .1 11j'r" nore 1 1 5 : M i :---i <  J\\ · . ' ''/'�"  i" l ( ) [ l' _1 -1 . 
1 ..2 0 .  Tru r h  and RL"cu n c i k l r i u n  1\n .  ' 11/'1",1 nme I 1 5 , ac ch . .2 .  arr .  cj _  
1 ..2 1  ld. ac c h . 1 . a r r . l .2 . 
1 ..2 .2 .  The Com m iss i o n  cuns i s r <:d o( s ixrcen m embers.  mosr of w h o m  arc- ·· re LH i ··:c l \· 1 111 pa rr i a l fi ,!.! U res .. 
from acadc· m i a  ·.u1d r i ll"  h u ma n  r i�h rs Ul !ll lll l l il l l)", a nwn,t; u r h c:r  areas. Sec Schc,- cr :d . . . i"llf'rJ ll l J C <:: 1 1 7 .  ar 
- �  _2 () _ 
1 .2 _1 .  I n  m a k 1 11p chi s c lcrnnl l n, lt l < >l l .  rht: Co m m 1 r rec- on f\nHlt·sry s h o u l d  look ru r h e  il l l l l l \"t·. comc�: r ,  
i"ac rua l  nar tm: .  o b j c c r i \'tc :md colll l l l ,uld ''u r l l l l c 1 r1 ·  ot" rht a n .  Src Tru rh ''ncl R ,·C O I K i kl r l o i l  r\n .  >!!/''"<� nore 
I I  '5 .  a r  t h .  -i . ,  a r r .  2 1 1 .  
1 .2  I See id ' 1[  c h .  i ,  a r r .  _l ( l( ) ) ( i I 
1 .! '5  ' ] ( ,  dare more c han -! 'S i lO app l icar 1ons  for a m n esc\· h :l \·c bc·en iikJ :1 1 1d  l l l l ll l <:"ruus a ll l llt"S r i t:s 
,� Ltn rc d ,  n Ltny  tn rc l a r i l l l l  ru :\c r i u u :-i  �1 nd S )· -� r c nl �H J C  c r i n1 es a[-.:;I J ns c  h u n1 � 1 ! l  ! t i--L .. I n  u ! H: rc-Lr�· ! J r  c. tsc fu r 
c·c-:am r 'k .  E u,t: em· De· I...: ock ''- " S  � l": l l l [L·d a il l l kS l l  for c o u n r s  u l· ''";a u l r ,  , thd u C l i J ' Il .  'l l l c l  m u rdn .\, , [),. f\," fi 
C , r. i!!!ul ;\ ti!!h >l ) .  Tl(l..T I I .-1 '-." 1 >  Jl. I -: < .< > :" C I I . i .-IT I I > :.; Co:'- l .\ 1 · �; P R l>-" !I. L! . I '  .. \S I '.:'. _l u ;lt" .2 . .2 t H J I I .  h r r p :  \nnv. 
t l·u r h . < l l",t; . za m d 1 a. p r i mk - x . h un l  ( \  I S > rul 1\ h r. l l l .  _) ( )( ) I ) . 
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S i g n i ficant to the South A frican example i s  the mandatory confess i o n  re­
q u i rement . 1 26 Appl icants must  make " fu l l  d i sc losure of al l  relevant fact s "  to  
the Com m i ttee on A mnesty before i t  beg i ns to consider amnesty. 1 27 T h i s  
mandatory confess ion process e nsures t hat,  a t  a m i n i mum,  a record o f  past 
atroc i t ies i s  kept . 1 28 S ignificant ly, d i sc losure requ i rements may p rovi de a 
b u i l t - i n  structural l i m i t  o n  the amnesty's scope, s i nce o n l y  cr imes 
specifical ly confessed are i ncluded.  The potent ial  humi l iat ion  from p u b l i c  
adm iss ions o f  personal culpab i l i ty may d i scourage i nd ividuals  fro m  seeki ng 
am nesty for some he inous cri m es not  d i rectly related to pol i t i ca l  cr imes .  
The Reconc i l iat ion Act does not  roral ly  bar  vict ims from redress .  In  cases 
where amnesty i s  denied , standard cr i m i nal or c iv i l  cases may ensue . 1 29  I f  
am nesty i s  granted , both cri m inal  and c ivi l l iabi l i ty of  r b e  perpetrator and 
rbe  s tare are exringuished . 1 30 Vict ims  may s r i l l  apply, however, to  the  Com­
m i ttee on Reparat ion and Rehab i l i tat ion for rel ief. The goal  of  s uc h  rel ief  i s  
ne i ther  to  i mpose cr iminal sanct ions  o n  rhe  persecutors nor to  p rovide eco­
nomic compensati o n  to the v ict im ,  but rather to " restore the human and 
c iv i l  d ign i ty of [the} v icri m . " 1 ·" 1  Such rel i ef may come in a var iety  of forms ,  
inc lud i ng non-pecuniary alternat ives t o  reparat ions ,  bur bas rarely  been 
avai lable i n  any form . 1 " 2 
A second example of  Local ly  Leg i t i m ized , Partial I mmunity  i s  rhe  am­
nesty enacted i n  F i j i  dur ing the summer of 2000 .  After gai n i ng i ndepend­
ence in 1 98 7 ,  a government domi nated by F i j i ans of I ndian descent assumed 
power. The new government was topp led two weeks later by the ethn ic­
F i j ian army. E nactment of a new consr i ru r i o n  in  1 997 , \vh ich "granted equal 
r ights to the large m i nority of F i j ian ci t izens who are of eth n i c  I n d ian de­
sce n r , '' 1 " ' i ncreased ethn ic rens ions . 1 ·"-'i E lect ions  in 1 999 brough t  to power a 
mul r i - rac ial  government under Mahendra Chaudhry, 1 ' 5  bur tens ions  be­
tween I ndo-Fi j ians and eth n i c  F i j i ans i n c reased . George Spe ight ,  a " fa i led " 
busi nessman , became well known for p rotests i n  favor of an e t h n i c - F i j ian 
dominated government .  1 y, 
1 .:2 6 .  Tru r h  and R econc i l 1a r ion  i\c c ,  JlljJra nmt 1 1 5 ,  ar c h .  :\ , arc 20(c ) .  
I 2 7  . lei. a r c h.  4 , a r r .  2 (}(  1 )(c) .  
l 2 S .  Srr TE UTH .-\ .'! D R I:CO'i CI LIATIO� (0,\ 1 ,\ r ' N  OF SouTH A F IU C\ R t: Po rn, .itt}'ra n o r e  1 1 3 ( rwvid­
l ll,l; a corn preh e n s i ve rcpon of rhc work of rhe  Commiss i o n ) See M r NOW . .>11/'W nore .q . ar 60 (arg u i n g  
r ll,H o n e  of r h e  goal s  nf rrmh com m i ss ions i s  r o  . .  wri re r h c  h 1srur1· o f  w h a t  happened . .  and w tsrab l is h  an 
au rhm i rar ive accoum of rht evems ) .  C/ HAYi\ I : R ,  J lljir<� norc -d, ar  6-7 ( n m i ng rhar  rhere m ay be no 
ddi n i r i ve r r m h ) .  
1 29.  Trmh and R cconc i l iar ion r\c r ,  _itt}'r<� nme 1 1 5 , ,ll ch . -\ .  arr . .:2 l ( .2 )(a ) .  
I �0 .  id ar c h . -\ ,  ,m . 2 0 1 7 ) .  
1 .� I .  ld ar c h .  -L arr .  2 ()( .) ) .  For a d isc ussion or· rcsror,H i ,·t· J llsr icc- ,  set  Kiss ,  .rttf'ra nme '\ 5 ,  ar  7 ':) .  
I .'\ 2 .  See H.-\Y.'! F i\ . . w}'r:� nme -1 .3 . a r  -\ 5 .  1 7 1 .  
1 .1 .) .  G w y n ne Dyer, S}'oght iii )(//!. l311t H11 l clu!l Stl!! 1 11 Pr, .. r-CI)II}' F1p , SOUTH I.,\ N i l  Tl.\l l c ,.; 
( N . L: . ) ,  ,\ u!-! 1 7 . 2000.  at () . 
I :; '!,  See A. m v  L C h u,l . Thf P,traJJ.\ o( !'u:c 1\ Lnlu Dt�l/t)l i c'/<]': P.,rhi!i�i!l:.; Du c/r,piiiml PrJin, i I H .-\ 1\V. 
h · r · r . . L.l 2 8 7 .  ) (i') i :::' l l i H I )  
I Y i  Dvcr, .rttjll·c� nnrc I .'> .) . 
1 ', (, .  Sc·e E l 1 zahc: r h  Fci zkhah,  l'i;i T.:!.l.:u 11  Sh<11 1 11  P,<�<r. T! ,\ f L  (Suu r h  Pac· i tic ) ,  r\u ,!.! .  7 ,  201 10 .  ar 5 ') .  
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On May 1 9 , 2000,  Speight and mem bers of h i s  Counter-Revolur ionary 
Warfare Movement s tormed che parl iament i n  Suva, cak i ng Pri me M in i s ter 
Chaudhry and h i s  cab i net hostage and abrogati ng the F i j ian Consc i cuc ion . 1 37 
Demanding that "a  new government be i ns ta l led in which all powers are 
reserved for ethnic  F i j ian(s } , "  Speight held twen ty-seven mem bers of the 
government hostage in the parl iament for fifty-s ix days , UR in violat ion of the 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages . 1 39 Whi le Speight 's 
acts d i ffered from chose of the South African apartheid regime or the terror 
i n  P inochec 's Chi le ,  h i s  detent ion of government personnel  was , nonetheless , 
an i nternational cr ime.  A fter nearl y  two months of negotiations ,  d uri ng 
which the Chaudhry government  was d i sm issed , Speight released h i s  hos­
tages o n  July 1 3 , 2 000 as part of an overa l l  pol i t i ca l  sett lement . 1 40 The cor­
respond i ng settlement agreement cal ls  for the release of hostages , 1 4 1  the " res­
toration of law and order, " 1 !\ 2  and a return of arms to the m i l i tary, i n  ex­
change for an amnesty to Speight  and his accompl ices . 1 4 3  
Specifical ly, the  Speight amnesty "grant(ed} i m muni ty to a l l  persons who 
al legedly com m i t(ted}  the offence of treason in connection w i t h  the act ions 
of the GSG (George Speight  Group} . " 1 4·1 The Muani kau Accord cal led upon 
the government to extend i mmun i ty to "other persons who al legedly com­
m i t ted offences covered by the meani ng of 'pol i t i ca l  offences . "' 1 1 5 The actual 
amnesty decree , which came after the release of  the hostages on July  1 3 , 
2000 ,  granted broad c iv i l  and cri m i nal immuni ty to Speight and h i s  fol low­
ers for a wide range of pol i t ical and common crimes connected with  " the 
unlawful  seizure of govern ment powers . "  1 ! () 
1 _) 7 .  S<e F i J i  Cons c i c u c i o n  Revocat ion Dc:cree 2000,  I nt e r im M i l i rcuy G overn menc Decree No. l 
( :' 0 0 0 )  ( F i j i ) , rejn i!ltecl i!l F I J I  Govu\N,\lENT GAZETT E ,  vo l .  l ,  no.  2 6 ,  May 29,  2001 )  C revo k 1 ng c h e  Con­
sr i r m ion i\me nd mem Acr 1 997)  (on filt wich Harvard f nr ernar iunal  Law Journal);  Cons r i r u c i o n  Abroga­
r ion-lme r i m  iv[ i l i rary Governmem and Fi nance Decree 2000 , l nr e r i m  M i l i rary Governmenc Decrc:e N o .  
) ( 2 0 0 0 )  ( f- i j i ) , rcpr111ted i!l f- IJI GovE R N ,\ !  l eNT G.AZETT L ,  vol .  I ,  no.  2 6 ,  J u l y  I ) , 2 0 0 0 ,  Jllj>r{/ (gra n c i n!,: 
power w rhe m d i Ca ry governmem) (on h i t  w 1 c h  H arvard l nc crna[ lonal  Law J o u rn a l ) .  
I :\ S .  r\ 111m.rty Tbmzc11 011t tiJ Speigbt a11d 1-iw<'hlllw Cbmged ll 'itb hem r!ll , i\( ; E '-i C t·: FH .  P IUcSS I ' .  Aug .  l l ,  
2 00 0 ,  m tti!aMe at LEX IS,  News Library, i\gtnce Fr. Pre:;sc: F i le [here i nafctr ;'. llllll'JIJ Tbmzm 0111].  
l .'\9 .  J mernar iona l Convemion i\gai nsc rht Taking o f  H osrages, Dtc . I :-:> , 1 979,  arc.  1 ,  1 .) I (i U .N.TS. 
2 0 5 .  A r r i c l e  1 c r � m i na l i zes,  i11ter alia, rht dercm i o n  of ·anoc htr person tn order co compel c t  c h i rd 
parry . . . co do or abscain from d o i ng any ace as an txp l i c i r  or 1 m p l 1 c i r concl i r i on for rh e  rel eJ.se of rht  
hosrage . . . !d. 
1 4 0 .  Set A ill!/f.l )' Tbrou·11 011t, Jllpr<� noct 1 ) :)  
1 4 1 .  h,i :r Ntll' Pmc'e r\ (nmi Ginr Collj! Plot!tn 'f i,ta! A ll/l!t'.IIJ, i\ ( ; J o i' C E  rl\.  PIUcSS l c ,  J u ly 9. 2000, 
< � zm/,tl;/e "' L E X  IS ,  News L i b rary, i\gencc f-r. Presse F i !t:  [h cre i nafrc r Ftji �' Sezc Pe.:t<'e 1\ ((tnd}. 
l -'1 2 . !d. Th t s is furrhu bc i l i rarecl by rhe appo i nr rne: n r  of an 1 nr n 1 m  c i v d 1an govern mem, led bv a n  
1 nr e r i m  prt's i dem and v i et prtsi denr , who a r e  nom 1 tuced ctnd c l cued by r i l e  G rea r Cou nc i l  of C h i e fs  rc 1 r  a 
rwtm1· - fo u r- m o n r h  cerm . 
1 -'1.1 . Set l m m u n irv  Dec ree lOOO. Dente No. I S  of 2000 ( 2000) ( F q i ) , rcjn illtcd i11 r i.J I Cov r 1� "' ' 1 1 ::-.:T 
C.V.ET T I ' .  vol .  l .  no . 26,  .J u l y  U. 2000 (on fi l e  wirh  H a rvard l me rna r i n n a l  Law Jou rna l ) ; l'l1i:r !Yt'll' Pra<'c 
; \ c ·, ,,, .J, -''��/'�'·' no rt 1 -\  l .  
l j . j  The {\ l u a n 1 kau r\ ccord Fm rhe R e l t·ase of H osr c1pes f-k lc l  ell r h t  Par l i a m e nc Com l' l t >:  Ve 1 u w, ,J u l 1· 
9 . .2001 1 ,  < t rr  . . 'i [hert 1 11afrer M ua n 1 kau r\cco rd )  (on  ti l e  \\' i c h  Har vard lmcr n a r i onal  La"' Jou rncd ) .  
1 -1 5  ld 
] .J {i .  I m m u n i l\· Decree 2000, -'"/"'' nore ! .:\ _-\ . sen ion ·" reads in pan 
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S i n ce the F i j ian  governmenc was i ncapaci tated at the time of the am nesty 
and the amnesty was demanded as a ransom for the rel ease of the  hostages , 
there is strong evidence that the F i j ian amnesty l acks local leg i t i m acy. 1 1 7 
The w i l l  of the people does not appear to have been the  basi s  for the  author­
i ty  of governmenc  at the t i me  the laws were enacted . Nor has the  w i l l  of  the 
i n ternationa l  com muni ty been used as a source of authority ;  in fac t ,  the  am­
nesty has been widely condemned . 1 ·1:-: Yet ,  the F i j ian amnesty theoret i cal ly  
fi ts wi th in  th i s  category because of the s ign ificanc restr ict ions on  the  scope of  
the amnesty. 
The scope of the F i j ian amnesty i s  l i m i ted ro a narrow subset of p o l i t i cal 
crimes . The Muanikau Accord grants amnesty to "a l l persons who al legedly 
com m i t[ted} the offence o f  treason in connection with  the act ions  of  the 
GSG (George Speight Group) o n  1 9th May 2000 [ro} [s ic} 1 3 th  July 2000 
(both dates i nclusive) and a l so  to cover other persons who al leged l y  comm i t­
ted offences wh i ch are covered w i th in  the mean i ng of 'po l i t ica l  o ffences . "' 1 '19 
This  clause fi rst grants amnesty only for acts of treason com m i t ted by mem­
bers of Speigh t 's group. I t  then broadens the scope to i nclude al l pol i t ical  
offences . Sign i fican t l y, i t  excl udes common cri mes and any serious cri mes 
agai nst  h uman l i fe t hat are not pol i t ically motivated or connected to the  acts 
of the Speight group. As s uc h ,  the tak i ng of hostages by Spe i g h t  and h is 
fol l owers is i nc l uded i n  the i m m u n i ty, but numerous other offences are ex­
cludeci . 1 5 1 J In add i t ion  to these standard l i mi ts on scope, the  amnesty also 
contains a contractual l i m i t  o n  i ts app l i cat ion .  Two spec i fi c  condi t ions  m ust 
G eo rt:t Speight ,  thc Leaclcr of rhe  C i v i l i a n  Group,  a n d  m e m bers o f  h 1 s  Group "· ho rook parr i n  rhe 
u n la11·fu l rakcuvt r  o f  r hc C l >�'"trnmem clemocra t i ca l l v  e l ecrcd under the I ')')-:" C:ons r i ru t i on on rhe  
l ')t h  of l\hv,  .2 () ( ) ( )  and rht s ubseq u em h u ld i nt: of rhc hos tages u m i l  t h e  l .) r h  d ay of J u l y ,2 ( )() ( )  sha l l  
be 1 111\ll u ne !·rom cri m 1 1u l  prosec u t i o n  under  the P ena l Coclt or the bre,Kh of a n y  l a w  of F i j i  and 
c i v i l  l i ,1b i l i t1· of anv da mage ur i n j u ry ro p roperty or person conneuecl  w i th rhe u n lawfu l  sei zure of 
Gove rn me n t  powe1·s .  t h e  u n Ltw fu l dtttmion of ct:rLt i n  mem bers of t he House uf Represt n ra t i ves 
and any other person and no court  s !M l l  e mer ra i n  c1m· a n i o n  make am· d ec i s i o n  o r  ord er . or 
g ra n r  an1· re medy or rel i e -f 1 11 anv p roceedint:s i ns t i t u ted aga i nst G eorge Spt:i,>! IH or anr mc:mber  of 
i l l s  G ro u p  . . . The decree doc:s nor enend m a ny other  person who com m i t t ed a n  offe nce u n der  any 
law . 
ld � ) .  
1 4 7 .  Thou.':!h F reedom H ouse, i n  i rs 1 9')9-2000 swdy. rated r i 1 i  a .2 . .  '> (a  free state ,  though bare l v ), 
t h 1 s  score is nut rdkc r i v c  of t he ac t u a l  l eve l  of freed om i n  F i j i  du r i n!,: the  sum me r oi "  .2 1 ) ( \0 because i t  wets 
generared before the  c o u p. The a m ncsry a� ree rnent  was s i� ned d u ri ng t h i s  coup b1· t h e  Cu m rn ancle r  and 
Head ol t he l mer i m  .\-f d 1 tary Govern m en t  of F i j i ,  Com modore .J . Voreqc Ba in 1 mara ma . who had assumed 
exec u r l l·c author ! (\" on ,\fay .2 ') .  2000 ,  alter President  Raru S i r  Kamisese i\Ltra c lccLHtd a State or eme r ­
genC\: a nd d i s m i Ssed t h e  C:h aud h ,·y govcm m c m .  Sec ;\ ;;mc.�ty Tbmm1 011t ,  u;jlr.; nme 1 .) :-i .  
l 4 S .  /3ritalil "Di! llhl \ l'ir < If  ; \ ii/1/i'!t) j;,r ri;i Ho.� tage-Faken . Ac; " C!Cl r l( .  I)IU:��I · . J u l y  I ) . ,2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,  { 1 / '( 1 /1-
,t/;/e r!l L E X  I S .  Ne11·s L i brarr. AgenLC Fr. Prtsse F i l e  ( q u m i ng a t( lrt i g n  office sta teme-n t  rhat  13 r i ra i n  wets 
"c l i s lll,l\·cd .. r h ct r r h e  hos rctgt: takcrs appt·arecl tu have been .� ranred 1 m m u n \ [ \· ) ; Sc u Zc,tlili!il \l"'i,;t/d 0!/er 
Fl.c/llgc !u l'i;i Coli/' \ "i,'!iiil Ch.111dbrr.  D ITT�C : H L  Piu; � s i ; - ;\ C t: :--! T U I( ,  j u l 1· I I ,  .J I ) ( J i l  . . ! l . ?dtl;/c 111 L E X I S .  
News I.tbran·. ;'(ews C ru u p  F i le ( nl H l ng t hat A us t ra l i a , New Zealand.  a n d  t he L; n i ttd States had con· 
c lemm·d the s i r u c1r i o n  1 11 F i j i l . \'{.'h d e  r htsc count r ies comkm m·d the Cllll l KS t\· ct l td  the C:rHn monwc,t l t h  
t e m pora r i i l· s u spcndnl F t p ·s m c· m hns h 1 p .  t here w a s  n u  d 1 ren ' n r cr , u r ' " n ' t l  i ll \·uln· n w i H  1 n  r i l L· �llll l l CStl ·  
I i ' ) .  l'iji :O ·\·u1 fJidi'L . \ (('IIJ .'11(1 '".! note 1 4 1 .  
I '10 .  Tc: kj•honc ( \l (l"("\' i nv 1\' i t h  J R .  J<o n ror,· .  Pcrnuncnt Secre ta!"\ or" !-l i Jml: ;\ lLi rs,  R L·p u h i ! L  ol Fi j i  
(Sc p r .  2 ' ,  .' ( ) ( ) ( ) )  
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be mer for amnesty to attach : first ,  the hostages muse  be released on J uly  1 3 , 
2 000 and , second,  Speight and his  fol lowers m use  d i sarm . 1 5 1 The narrow 
scope of t he F i j ian am nesty, which is restricted only to cover pol i t i cal  crimes 
and i s  i nappl i cable co serious i n ternational cr i mes,  p laces the F i j ian amnesty 
in the Locally  Leg i t i m i zed , Parti al I m muni ty category. 
The Sourh A frican and F i j ian Am nesties map as local ly  legi t i m i zed , Par­
c ia l  Immunity. The South A frican amnesty bas greater domestic leg i t imacy, 
bm leaves questions of scope open for ex-pose determi nac ion by cbe Com­
mi ttee on Anwes ty. The F i j ian am nesty has only  the most l i m i ted forms of  
domestic leg i t imacy bur has a s ignificant ly  restricted scope i nherent i n  the  
cext of the amnesty decree . 
C. Internationally Legitimized. Partial Immunity 
International ly  legi t im i zed,  Partial  Immun i ty is charac teri zed by en­
hanced legi t imacy conferred th rough i nternational involvement ,  as  wel l  as  
further restrict ions on che scope of i m m u n i ty. O n  cbe axi s  of leg i t i macy, I n ­
cernacionally legit im i zed , Part i al I mmunity usually, buc n o t  always ,  e m ­
bodies t h e  ki nds o f  local legi t i macy d iscussed p revi ously and ,  i n  add i t ion ,  
carries t he  support of a pol i t ical l y  s ign i ficant coal i t i on of s tates , regional 
powe rs , 1 5 ]  and/or the i nternati onal communi ty. 1 5 1  On the ax i s  of scope, such 
immuni ty is  e i ther l i m i ted to  "pol i t i cal " cr imes adjud icated by a quas i ­
j ud ic ial organ (as i n  the case o f  Locally Leg i t i mi zed,  Parcial I m m u n i ty)  o r  
resuicted co  certai n defi ned c r i mes ,  often t hro ugh reterence to in ternational 
t reat i es and/or cuscomary hl\v. 
An example of I nternat ional ly  leg i t imized , Parc ial  Imm u n i ty i s  the am­
nesty afford ed to the Hait ian m i l i tary as  pare of the re t u rn  co power of  
P res i d e nt Jean-Bertrand Arisc icle i n  1994. The pol i t i cal background of the 
H a i t ian amnesty demons trates st rong i nternational s upport and,  ac leas e ,  
q uas i -d omestic leg i t i macy for the measure . In  December 1 990 , Jean-
I 5 I fiJI .-' i'\w Pec�(e ;\ ((r)rd. mjrr11 n o c t  1 -i  l .  
1 5 2 .  The po t tm 1 e1 l for the  s upporc of rtc� i on a l  powers w confer  l tg l t i mc\C\. o n  an am nc:s cy �ranc  should 
r 1 u r  be l mcrp rnc:cl as a revcrs iun  ru rca l 1 s c power po l 1 c i cs . The s u pport uf  a re� ] ()rul power s h o u l d  mere l y  
he ,· i c·wcd 1 11 a l i be ra l ;,c:nse.  <IS rhe  exp ress i on of r h e  prtcftrences of  t h e c r t i zl" ns 1 11 c hat SLICe t(Jr co l l t·c r 1 v e l y  
for m u Lned 1 me rn a t 1 o n a l  n o r m s .  Dul" w r h l" l r  prux l ll l l tV, re,;; i ona l  powers a rt ofcc·n m or e  l d..:e i l· w cn�agc: 
1 1  cluc: r m l l l cl C i lli1 S of c h t· lc,� i r i macv of C�ll a rn n t:scy �ram.  
[ ) .) .  Such l lwoh·em e n t  of th t: 1 11 Ct: rncn l oncd corn m u n 1 C I' Cl \1 comt: 1 11 lll < l f l \. form s .  1 11C i u d 1 ng n o n ­
h i n d l ll� UN rr:sol m i on s .  i nvoln·mtllt  of s 1 g n d i c a n c  re� i onc1l or,;;an izac 1ons such < b  r h c· Organ i zat ion o f  
Sc:c ur i C\· a n d  Cooperat i o n  1 11 E u ropt (0.S.C . E . ) . chc Or,;;an i zac ion of r\mtr ica n  Scares ( () . r\ . S . ) .  or c h t:  
A ssoc i a r i un of Suu c h  E a s e  As 1 a n  !\:a[ l o ns ( A .S . E . r\ .N . l . H!li\"C:Yl:l". 1 f  a b 1 11eh n �  LH\ St·nm c l· Cou n c i l  rtso­
l u c i on u nd e r  a C:hcl p c cr V I I  manda [(: is 1 1wnl·:t:d . r l 1 L· <lmnesc)· wo u l d l d..:c h· m m·c 1 11 ro  the cact:,t:Orl· of 
l n cnnC�C i l > !U l Cuns t l t ll l l u n a l  l m nH I ! l i C \·. l r  is 1 m purccun ru note char  cht· ,.,l r l o u s  [( 1 1·ms of l nt nn a r i u n a l  
S l l ['l'l >r l  L O i l r.n m a rked I I· d 1 lfcrun c i L-,c.c rLTS o f  k,t: l f l lllal\'. r \  LN Sc·nm r 1· Cuu n u l  rt:S< l l u r l r > n .  l:o r tc:;am p l t: .  
carr i c·s ' '  ci l t't trerl l wr: l ,t: h r  from c h ·,lt of r i l e· SLl lUllUll of l J ! l c  u r  e1 ·t· n  a s nu l l  c.: rou p  ol i .ort: l ," ll s c cl t t:s . F o r  r i l e  
J-' l ". l '"sc:s of c !1 1 s i\ r t 1 c l t: .  Cor l ll tc m a c l l l llC� i  S LI [-' l 'Orc  C l J  be s i g n i l·i ca n r , a q u cd l c C� c lvc  J ud g mcm \l· i l l  l 1 c  made 
hc!Sccl on ( I )  chc:  Co r m  ol . l rH c:r l l C� l l l l ll cd 1 11 \ 'U lvt: m c n c :  ( .:! )  r h L· n u m bc·r of s r C�cc·s S l l [ ' l'"r c i n ," r i l e: a\1 1 1 \ L"S CI' , < l i ld 
( .) )  ,.,· i d e m t  ch cl [ c host· SL!rc·s rcprcscm che p rcfcrc iH. c·s ol. r i l c  i n t c- rn cr C I I > I l cd c u m m l l l l l t\·. 
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Bercrand Aristide became Hait i 's firs t  democratical l y  e lec ted p res ident . 1 5 4  
H i s  overw helming popularity i nd i cates chat , desp i te che i nadequacies of  the  
Hai tian pol i t i cal syste m ,  Arist ide was a " man of  the  people . " 1 5 5  I n  A ugust 
1 99 1 ,  h owever, he was deposed in a m i l i tary coup,  which was fol lowed by 
massi ve human rights violat ions ,  i nc luding the m urder of at least 3 00 0  c i ­
v i l ians 1 5 6  a n d  extensive deportat ions ,  arrests , and d isappearances . 1 5 7 Whi le  
President Arist ide remained i n  exi l e ,  the m i l i tary j un ta of Lieutenant Gen­
eral Rao u l  Cedras consolidated power and extended the reig n  of  terror. The 
i nternational comm u n i ty, u nder  the leadership o f  the U n i ted Nations  and 
the Organi zation of American S tates (O .A . S . ) ,  responded by appl y i ng 
s ign ificant pressure on the de facto Hait ian government , inc lud i ng a freeze on  
al l  assets a n d  an embargo o n  o i l  a nd  arm s . 1 5� After nearly two years in  exi l e ,  
from J u n e  2 7 ,  1 99 1  t o  J u l y  3 ,  1 99 3 ,  Arist ide ,  w i t h  t h e  ass i s tance of  t h e  
U n i ted Nations ,  forced t h e  j unta t o  negotiate on Governors I s land , New 
York.  The negotiation led to a proposed power cransfer based o n  a U . S .  
agreement cal l i ng ,  inter alia , for a n  "am nesty granted b y  the Presi dent  of  the 
1 5 4 .  A fter temporary r u l e  by a trans i t iona l  gover n m e n t ,  t h e  H a i t i an Coun c i l  of State s e t  pres i d e n t i a l  
a n d  parl iamentary e lections for December I 6 ,  1 990.  See A I . E :\: D u P U Y, H A I T I  IN T H E  Nrw \'(/ORLD O R ­
D E le  TH E  LI�I ITS O F  T H E  DEl\lOC RATIC REVOI .LTION (iS ( 1 997) .  i\risr ide"s popular ity w a s  evidenced b y  
the marked 1 ncrease Ill voter reg is trat ion from 2 5 '/i tO 9 0 '/i  o f  e l ig i ble voters i n  t h e  days after he had 
declared h is cand i d acy. A s  o ne commcnrawr 1 n d icarcs,  " " there is  no doubt that t h i s  [ i nc re<lSe] was caused 
by Arist ide enteri ng rhc race for the pres idency· . . . /d. a t  8 5 .  t\ r is r i c le , who cast h i mself as a prophet and h is 
cand idacy as d i v i nely ordained,  Jee id. at SS-89, wo n  the  popu lar  \'Ote w i th G7 . 5 '/f .  See Robert Pasror, A 
Poji11lar Dell/1!(/"alic RnolllliiJ!l i11 rl Predc:;;m,Tatit' Sooi!ly: The Ca.'r: o( Uaiti, Iii H A I T I  R E N I � W ED : POLITICAL 
M · iD EcoNO� I IC P ROS P ECTS 1 1 8 ,  1 2 1  ( Robert 1 .  R otberg eel . ,  1 997 ) [ herei nafter H A IT I R E N EWED] .  The 
e l ection marked a moment when " " the popular w i l l  t r i u mphed-momentar i l y-w i t h  l i t t le vio lence or 
repres s i o n . "  K i m  l vcs,  The Laualc�.r A ll�clll(e Pmpd.r A riJticlt lo Pou er, in H.·'.!TI D,-\1'-iGEROuS C R OSS ROADS 
4 1 ,  4 5 (Dei rdre McFayden & Pierre LaRamee eel s . ,  I 99 5 )  
! 5 5 .  See J . P. Slavi n ,  A ristide: t\fa!l u/ the People, 111 H A ITI  O .. INGFI\OUS C ROSSRO,-\ DS , Slljira narc ! 5 4 ,  at  
47,  : 1 7-49.  This A r t icle does not seek w e n�age i n  the  debate o f  whether A ri s r ide  was a " "good " or even 
" "ben i g n "  leader. E v i dence to the comrary abou nck See G reg Chamberlai n ,  f-!aiti 'J "Set'o;id flldepuulmce ": 
A ri.uicle'J Stl 'el/ 1\ l ollth.r i!l Oj}ia, i11 HAI T I D,-\N(; E I\OuS C IWSSRO.-I DS, Slljlra note ! 5 4 ,  ctt 5 I ,  5 2 .  Nor docs i t  
c la i m that  H a i t i  was a n  ideal model  o f  d em oc rat ic  govern menr . Rather, t h i s  A r t i c l e  c l a i m s  o n l y  that 
t\r i s t i cle  ach ieved s ign i tlcam popular support and a suffic i en r l y  robust  elt:croral v 1 c to ry ro be c o ns i dered 
l eg i t i mate an d  capable o f  enacr ing leg i t i mate leg i s l a t i o n .  ]-l i s ctb i l i ty to t:ngage the Hai t i cm people 1 s  
I nd i ca t i ve t he1·eof: " Ar is t ide's e lec t i o n  a s  pres 1dem gave most Hai rians a rare a n d  exh d a rat i ng sense of 
part ic i pat i on in  their  savagely d iv i ded cou m r y 's pol i t i ca l  l i fe . . . Chamber l a i n ,  Jitf'ra, at 5 1 . I n  a speech 
before the U n i ted Nations o n  Septe mber 2 5 ,  1 99 I ,  A r i s t i d e  o u t l i ned " "t::-n democrat i c  command m e m s , "  
wh ich suggest a bas is  for leg t t i mate ru l e .  Sec D U P U Y  . .fltjlrlt n ot e  1 5 · i ,  at 9·1 ;  see ai.lo Robert huron J r. ,  The 
Rise. ! 'all. al!{/ /?wmwtiUII of Prrmlmt 1\ riJtuk, i11 H.-\ITI R E N E\XTD,  .r11pra note ! Sci , ;H 1 3 6, 1 42 (arg u i ng 
t hat " A r i st i cle 's brief fi rs t pres idency marked che freest cllld rn osr hopeful  per i od of 1:-l a l t i 's pol i r i ca l  h i s ­
wry " ) .  
1 5 6 .  J oh n Shar tud.: ,  i\ss istanr Secrt rarv t ( J r  De moc racy. I I u man R 1g hts . and Labor, t\ddress at a State 
Dep.ur mtn r P ress B r iefing (Sepr . ! _) ,  1 99·4 ) .  i11  Federal News Serv 1ct ,  Sept I .'> , 1 994. m ·,ni<�Mt "' LEXlS, 
N ews Li brarv, i'\tws Group F i l e . See <�IJII D U P U Y  . .> llf'rrl note 1 5 '1.  at 1 .1 9  ( mcl ica t i ng  rhat between October 
1 99 1  and Septe mber 1 99 4 ,  " " [ :l ]n eSt i mated i( )( ) ( J  ptOJl l t  were k i l l ed,  cuound .1 00,00( )  became 1 nr c: r n a l  
rctugees , . . .  and mo1·e r han (,0 ,0()0 [soug h r ]  asy l u m  1 11 rhe U n 1 recl Scares " " ) .  
1 5 7 .  Sci .�.:1/,'l"itl!y The: C r i s i s  i n  H a i t i ,  U.S Depa rtrncm o i Sra re  D i spa rch (Sept .  1 9 , 1 994 ) ,  , n ·.tildU! 111 
L E X  I S .  News L i b raf\·. News GruuJl h ie ;  J . P. S l av t n ,  n,, [/i�c·, f(e z ·cll �r: Ibe , \ l i/;trny Cr,;;p u/ / l) LJ J ,  i11 
H .. \ IT I  D,-\ \:C I : I\OLS CJ(USS I(U.-\ DS. iil/'l"d norc I 5 ·1 .  ar 5 '7 -.() I (c i :l l m i ng char  as m:u1 \· as 5 0 0  c i v i l un s  ,,.CIT 
k i l led h1· the m d l taf\· in the week ful lo w i ng rhc coup) .  
I SS. See Sch:trf. !lt/IJ"t� IWte l ,  at 7;  D L: P U Y ,  .ittf'r.t norc· I 5 ·' 1 , ct r I .i S .  
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Repub l ic . " 1 59 I n  addi t ion  to rece 1 vmg d i rect U . S .  support , the agreement ,  
inc luding the amnesty c lause,  was endorsed by the UN Securi ty Counc i l . 1 60 
Despi te the Governors Is land Agreement ,  the Hait ian j un ta refused the 
Arisr ide/UN proposal ro a l low the peacekeep i ng force to land and President 
Arist ide ro  return .  Then the Security Counc i l  authorized a mult i lateral i nva­
s ion of Hai t i  on Ju ly  3 1 ,  1 994 . 1 6 1 O n  September 1 8 , 1 994 , the  day before 
the planned i nvas ion ,  a del egat ion ,  l ed by President Carter162 and authorized 
by President C l inton,  met with the Hait ian m i l i tary j unta for d i scussions .  
These d i scussions  culmi oared i n  the Carter-] onassaint  Agreement ,  which 
confi rmed the p lans for a "general amnes ty" and averted the i nvasi o n . 1 63 The 
in i t ial language of the amnesty clause,  therefore, m i rrored that contai ned i n  
the Carter-Jonassaint Agreement and i nvoked t h e  language of Security 
Counc i l  Resolut ion 940 . 1 6 1 U . S .  Secretary of State Warren Chri stopher pro­
vided an i n terpretation of this  c lause at a Septem ber 1 9 , 1 994 n ews briefing,  
prai s i ng i t  as  "a broad am nesty for a l l  the members of the m i l i tary. " 1 65  Even 
before the Hait ian am nesty law was i ssued , it had received U . S .  and UN 
supporr . 1 66 W h i l e  such support does nor alone rel ieve Hai t i  of  any i n terna­
ti onal obl igations it may have faced,  it d i f erent iates the Hai t ian experience 
from that of the other examples . D i rect i nvolvement in the amnesty process 
by the Uni ted Stares and support by the U n i ted Nat ions sugges t that the  
am nesty reflects the wi l l  of a s ign ificant portion of the i n ternat ional  com­
muni ty as the basi c  source of i n ternational authori ty. Assistance provided by 
1 5 ';) .  See Fbe SJtllatiOII of Do!Jocrac; dlld f-!tt!IIC/11 Rigbts i11 Hc�iti: l?eporr o/ tbe  Seoda!J Ge11eral, U . N .  
C A O R ,  lt 7 r h  Sess . ,  Agencl c\ ! rem 2 2 ,  U . N .  Do c .  A/47/97 5 -S/?. 606_) ( 1 '-) l) ) )  ( i n c l ud mg rht: rexr o f  rhe 
Covernors Is land r\greern e n r ) .  ror a rhorou,c: h  d i sc uss ion of rhe bcickground ro rhe Governors Is land 
Agreement , see  D,wm J\1,\ I .O N E ,  D FU S I 0 2' -MM: . I :--:c;  IN  T H I ·: U N  S F C U I\ ITY CouNCI L :  TH E CASE O F 
l-1.-\ I T I ,  1 990- 1 99 7 ,  o cJ-')7 ( 1 998) .  
1 60 .  See S C  R es .  o 6 1 ,  U . N .  S C O R ,  4 :-i rh  Sess . ,  ."> 2 7 1 sr m rg . ,  U.N.  Doc .  S IR ES/H 6 l ( 1 99_'\ ) . I n  a 
number of resolut i ons i mmediately fol lmving  the Governors I sL!nd Ag reement , rhe UN Secur i rv Counc i l  
S igna led 1 ts support for r h t  agrctmenr , i nc l ud ing rhe suspension of sanct ions against Hai t i .  See id: .rte 
gmerally £--1.-\LO N E ,  Jilf'ra nott:: 1 5 9,  at 89-9 2 .  
1 6 1 .  See S . C .  Res. 940, U . N .  SCO R ,  i9 rh  Sess . ,  )-1 ! .3 r h  mtg  . .  U i\: .  Doc. S/RES/9-10 ( 1 994) W h i l e  
t h i s  resolut ion d id i nvoke a Chapter V J I  r h rear ro i nt e rnational  ptace and secur i ty  ro a u t honze an i nva­
s ion ,  i r  did nor ment ion che i nc l us ion of ct n am nescy in rht pe-ace <l,l! rtemenr for rhe pol i t i ca l  background 
ro che adopt i on of Resol u t ion 940, seoe i'vL\ LO :--J L ,  JiljJrct n orc· 1 5 9 ,  ar I 07-1  U .  
1 62 Carter's ntgor � e1 t i n ,l! ream i nc luded , among  och ers , rhe  former Chairnun of  rhe Jo inr C h i efs of 
Scaff and prc:sem Secretary of Scare,  Co l i n Powe l L  as wtl l as Senaror Sam N u n n .  See D u PUY,  Jitf!r,t note 
1 5 4 , ac 1 5 9 .  
1 63 .  Cirter-Joncissa i n r  t\greemenr .  Sep t .  1 o ,  1 99-\ , U . S . - H cu c i ,  a r r  . .3 , rejlrJll!ed 111 C r : i': T I' R  FO I\ LI\V 
:\ 'i D  :\I I I . IT.-\1\Y 0l' I RAI!Ui':S,  TH I: _} U DG I :  r\ LWOC XIT G I: N L IL·\ L, �  SCHOOL,  U N I T U) STA! t:S Ali i\ IY, Ll\\' 
:I N D  f- ( I I TL-\ RY OPr R.-ITIONS I N  l-L-\ I T I .  1 99- i- 1 ')9 5 :  lx�sn:--::; LEAI\ N J ', I) FOI\ _) LDCI r\DVOCATES 1 82-S .'> 
( 1 995 ). See .;!J,, i\L1 LOi': E. i!tf"·" nore 1 5 9 ,  at 1 1 2 .  
I o-1. Sec .\Li l .ON E ,  J!l/lld noce 1 59 ,  at 1 1 2 .  
1 0 5 .  Secrerar\· nf Start \Varrcn Chr i swpher, \Vhire [ - l ouse P re-ss  B r i c h ri,!,: o n  l Lt i t i  (Sept . 1 9 , 1 99-1) ,  
L . S . Ne\\.S\\'IiT, Sep r .  ! ') , l';)l)- 1 ,  cmn/,;/;/e 111 LEXIS ,  N e w s  l . dxary. 'N e- w s  C ro u p  F i l e ,  orcd i11 Schcu-f, JJt,tn . t  
Jl ( J ( C  1 ,  clt I 
1 (J (j_ A n u mber of tct r l l c r  JK·act a,t; rn·mc: n rs : t ! su l llC i udcd a1 1  c l lll n t: s C \· g rclnt .  for cxamplt .  La w r e n c e  
Pezszu l lo ,  C l i n ton 's Spcc u l  E n\·r > \  w 1-l a i r i ,  uffned c i  d ea l ro r h c· j u n ra 1 11 M el\ 1 99 o ,  w h i c h l i t c l uded . .  rhc 
rc·s rgnatwn of  rht . n m \· h i g h com mcind af l ( ]  : 1  broad cim ncs r \· t 'or  rht· m i l i tary. . . D u PtjY,  .iitj>r<� no te­
I S  L ar 1 4-1 . 
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the United States to the fl ee i ng Cedras reg i m e  is  further evidence of U . S .  
support for t h e  amnes ty. 167 Likewise ,  t h e  i nvolvement of t h e  U n i ted Nat ions 
i n  resolv ing the cri s i s ,  albeit  not d i rectly i n  the amnesty process , 1 60 confers 
further i n ternat ional leg i t i macy. 
The Haitian amnesty leg i s lation also evidences domestic leg i t i m acy. I n  i ts 
1 994- 1 995 benchmarki ng ,  F reedom House rated Hai t i  a 5 ,  5 (partial ly 
free) .  W h i le ch is  n um ber does not suggest the same kind of  domes tic  le­
g i t imacy seen in South Africa,  it  i s  a dramatic i mprovement from Hai t i 's 7 ,  
7 (not free) score i n  1 99 3-94 during the Cedras j un ta . 1 69 The Hai tian law 
was passed by the Hait ian Parl iament on October 6, 1 994 , after the  i nsur­
gents were deposed . 1 70  Its  orig i ns can be t raced back to a democratical ly 
e lected body, the newly res tored parl iament . 1 7 1 The text of the am nesty leg­
i s lation was drafted by Pres ident Arist ide ,  Hai t i 's fi rst democratical ly  elected 
pres ident .  Whi le  there i s  evidence that the legis latOrs may not have ful l y  
understood o r  analyzed t h e  text of t h e  law, 1 7 2  t h e  fact c hat the  law came 
from these two bodi es-the office of the democratical ly  elected President  
and the leg islature-rather than from the outgoi ng reg i me ,  c o n fers a deg ree 
of domestic legit imacy on the leg i s lat ion .  The am nesty legis lat ion also dem­
onstrates adherence,  one of Franck's prerequis i tes for leg i t i macy. 1 7 '  I t  was 
wri tten to comply w i th  Article  1 4 7  of rhe 1 98 7  Hai tian Const i mtion ,  
which l i mi ts amnesty ro pol i t ical cr imes . 1 7 1 
The scope of the Hait ian amnesty law is restr icted such char the  grant of 
i mmunity appl ies only tO certain pol i t i cal cri mes and associated aces . Stay­
i ng with in  const i tu tional bounds,  the law l i m i ts any am nesty co " c r imes and 
mi sdemeanors agai nst the s tate , internal and external securi ty, c ri m es and 
mi sdemeanors affec t i ng publ ic  order, and accessory cri mes and m isde mean-
1 (,7 . Pres i de m Cl i nc o n  and the O . A .S . soug h t  ass iswnce from Panaman J cl11 Prts J d t nc E m e s co Perccz 
G,t ! l ad ares co g ram asy l u m  ro Cecl ras , and a U . S .  m i l  i ra n· <t i rcrafr prov i d ed rranspo r r a r i u n  t{JI· the Form er 
reg 1 111e ro Panama. See MALO:-.J J ·: ,  Jltj>ra nor e 1 5 9,  at 1 1 5 . The concessions rhe C l 1 n con cld m i n •s crat ion was 
w i l l i n g  co m,tl..:c 1 11 order to secure r he l ll ll ta"s d eparcurc from H a i r i ,  beyond mne ,·erh<ll su pport for rhe 
am nesr1·. J n c l udtd c t  s t i pend and u n r"rtc:z • r\s of over S79 m d l i un i n  assets  h e l d Lw r hc· m i l 1 ra rv. See D u P U Y .  
J!tf>ra nmc 1 5 ·1 , <H 1 60 .  
1 (,S . T h e  Carrer-Jon<tssa i m  A g reemem pro1·ecl conrrovers ia l  i n  pare because i r  '''<lS en ac red he1·ond r h e  
aUS)) iccs  of U n l [cd N a r i o 1 1 s  and l e d  w c h e  rt"Sl!-' nar ion of D<liHe Capu r:J ,  rhc U l'·� Speu a l  E nvm· r( l r  H a 1 r i  
Sec M.\ 1 .01" 1 :  . .1ttjlrtt nort ! 5 9 ,  a r  I I � .  T h e  a�recmtm may ,,·e l l  have c i rc u nwemcd r h e LJ n i ccd Nat ions  
because rhe Hairian j u nr a  rrusrecl " \\ic1sh i n!-' ron m o re chan rhe  U . N .  ( w h i ch r hu· lx- l i n·ed was m ort: 
su pporuvc of A r i s r ide)  . . . D u pu·,  .' l!f'ri! nmt: 1 5 -:i .  a r  l ·i 2 .  
l (,SJ Sec F JUT I X J ,\ l  H o u s t : .  Jttj>ra no te � (, .  
1 ' 0 .  T h e  Cha m be r o f  Depu ties Wlrcd 5 0-.2 I ll L1vul· of rhe l eg i s l a t i o n  c h a r  lud bt:en d •·afr u l  by P rcs l ­
d c n r  A ri s r i ck Sec Scha rf, .lttj>u I H J f C  1 .  a c  1 )  
I i I  The C h a m hc·r u t· Dc')lll t i ts l'·tssccl r i H: L1w 0 1 1  Oc cobcr (, , 1 99· 1  ctnd r h c - Stn<t rc  on  Onolll'r 7 .  S"· 
(\LI ! Jl0. 1 : • .'itjll'i! llOtt 1 5 '). ar ) ] .i_ 
] 7  2 .  Sec Sc har·f. .lltj>r:r nore I .  ar 1 (, ( no r i l l ,l! rhe l t-� i s larors ·  a m b i l·,dcnct <111d n·u1 con fuSJon ctbom rile 
r c·xr  of r i l e· a m nesr1· ) . 
1 - .i . F r <J n c k ,  mjn·<� nur. t· I S. ,J t -I I 
l ' - 1 .  i\ r r i c lc 1 - 1 - u!" dlt: 1 9�: - C o n s r J t ll t l on . . S l l )'ll l ct r t:s c h a r  a m n e s r y  t<lll o n l 1· be 1-'rct !llt:cl · , n  r h t: I)O l l t J ­
cd tic 1d <� nd i n  h·cpl ll!-' w ! r h  rhc law ·· ·  Su- �·I.\ 1 .0:-.J F , .lttj>r,, nor<: 1 5 9 .  a r  I 1 - ! Tht: alll l lL"Sll ,,·as S)'c·c i ticd h· 
d rclh eel  en ll1L'C'r r hcsc· fL'LJ ll l re m t· m s .  
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ors . " 1 7 5 The firs t  three clauses provide for a narrow, c i rcumscribed grant of 
im m uni ty. A mnesty i s  conferred upon pol i t i cal crimes "against  the s tate , "  
s uch  as treason,  of which t h e  former j unta was l i kely gu i l ty. 1 76 As these 
crimes were commi tted "agai nst  the s tate , "  rather than parti c u lar i ndiv idu­
als ,  the state appears co have appropriate s tand i ng co grant amnesty for them 
wi thout i n fr inging on che rights of i nd iv iduals or breach i ng i n ternational  
ob l igat ions .  
Whi le  these first  clauses were drafted co  avoid  a grant of amnesty for 
cri mes com m i tted agai nst th i rd parties ,  as opposed co  the s tate,  the fi nal  
c lause ,  l eaves more room for i n terpretation and potent ia l ly  expands the  
scope of im mun i ty, as  i t  extends amnesty co "accessory cr imes  and m i sde­
meanors , "  wi thout providing speci fic  guidance as to which crimes should be 
deemed "accessory. " The quest ion  for a court in such a case i s  "whether the 
nexus between the crime and the pol i t ical ace  is  sufficient ly  c lose for che 
crime co be deemed pol i t ical . " 1 77 Ic  seems l i kely chat most non-pol i t ica l  
crim inal acts ,  such as  serious cri mes against  human l i fe ( rape , corcure ,  and 
murder) , would not have suffici en t  nexus to a pol i t ical ace .  Whi le  chis nexus 
rest may inc lude certa in  serious  crimes against  human l i fe ,  it  does provide 
the j udic i ary a marg i n  of appreciation to determ i ne which crimes are pol i t i ­
cal . 
The Hait ian amnesty law seeks co balance the im mediate need of pol it ical 
trans i t ion with the goal of provid ing for che accountabi l i ty of chose who 
cotTl m i ned non-pol i ti cal cri mes . 1 7� The end-result of che final  c lause i s  co 
l eave co the j ud iciary, and co remove from the pol i t i cal debate,  the future 
determ i nac ion  of l iabi l i ty for q uas i-po l i t ical and accessory cr imes .  Given the 
dearth of case-law re lated co the amn esty, the j u dici ary's i ndependence and 
effectiveness is  s t i l l  quescionable . 1 '9 Nonetheless , even w i th the widest pos­
s ib le  j ud i c ial i n terprecac ion ,  i ts scope remains l i m i ted . Such l i m i ted scope,  
together 1.v i th the law's i nc ernat ional  support and reasonable leve l  of domes-
1 7 5 Law Rclar ivc ro r\ rn ntsry ( 1 ')').:\) (Haic i ) ,  jl!lb/i.rhu/ i11 T!Jt· , \ l ollitr;J: 0(/iual fr;!m!al of r!x l?ef'"(;/" of 
H<�iri, Ocr .  1 0 , 1 99- t  
1 7 6 .  l r  i s  s i.s n d ictm ro n orc here r h e  l an gu <tgt uf  " ctg a J n s r  rhe  s care . . .  \'V'htrtas n umt:rou s  a m nts r i cs .  
such a s  rh ct r 1 n  Sou r h  r\fr i cct, h ave rtq u t rtcl c r i m ts co be l i n ktcl co po l i r ica l o b J t C C J I'C'S. r h e  H a J C I<lll a m ­
n e s r y  rc-q ll l rcs c h ar pn! J c i ca l  c r i m es be com m J cced aga i n s c  rhc swre .  Cri mes ag ct i ns c  c h J rcl parr ies. cvu1 1 f  
p o l H i ca l ,  art' cxc l u clecl . 
l 7 7 .  Scharf. Slljlrc l  norec  l ,  ar l 6 .  
l 7 S .  Thee m osr ,l,;rin·ous orft n clcrs w e re J nsula red from p rostcc u r i on a s  r hn· were g 1 v e n  cts1· l u m  1 11 Pcm­
a m a. N o n n h c l css .  1 mcrprer i n.s rht Ja,,· 1n l i ,c: l n  o f  s rartm c nr s b1· A r i s r i clt .  s u c h  as, " Yes ro rtconc i l ia r J o n ,  
1\o ru ,· iolt-nct·. i':o w v�.:ngt·anct. N o  r o  i m p u n 1 r y, Yes w J usr ice . . .  su.sgesrs a n  J mt m i on ro [�\ \ ·or prostc u ­
r i o n .  DLPl 'Y  . . wj>u n m t  1 5 - 1 .  <\C J .. j.j 
[ 7 ')_ There h<ll'l' hten rc: lar i vc l v  rl-11· prosecur ions  ar rc m p red a i'rcr c h i:' amncs r 1· was c::nacrcd and r he ex­
an scopL· o f  rhc a l l l Jll' S t l· has. rhtJ·efurc . n: r ru he dcrc· r m J ncd . For e x a m p l e .  P1·cs i d t nr A ri s r 1 Lk d c·c la rL·d 
rhar  h L· h,td no " pLtns  co pro.sccuct: m e m hus of r h e  stc u r i r 1· f mces a n d  rhc 1 r  a l l J L · s"  w ho m 1 g h r  have (O lll­
lll l r tnl < lUS l i l i [ S l tl t  r . i ' r h L· A m lll' S l l ' rl. r J S ll r k  d 1 d .  h u 11·L. , ·L·r. p rl JSt'C L I Ct  '1 few m c m bns of par< tm J I J rclr\· 
g rl J u p s  fo r r !l t'  Jll l l l'clns < 1 f h 1 s  s u p p o rc e 1·s . Sc,' Schc Jrf, .Citj•r<� ll < J Ct' I .  a r  1 7 :  , ,., < f;_,n jl!d,-,. Su;tcl/:', .1' 1 -+ l l<iill. lil.< 
111 ! .�;;. , Fl r hT< h C IC l \ 1 1 : .  St: J l C  . . ! "' ,  1 9 9 5 .  ar -1 ( d i s c u s s i n,c; r h c  l'tlll i' J U J < Jn of l\! J c he l F r<lllC:l J J S ,  C h i e f  "f 
fJl J ! J c· c  i l f Porr - a u - P r 1 ne<::, and I _) o r i H.:rs c·hctr,c:cd \\' J [h :lSSctss i n ct r l l l,l: ;\ n [ ( ) J JW l z m c: r1·. a fnvcm S \ 1 [ 1 JlOrrcr ot'  
A r i s t J d c )  
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r ic  leg i t i macy, p laces the Haitian amnesty leg isl at ion  in the category of  I n ­
ternational ly  leg i t i mi zed , Parti al I m m u n i ty. 
The provis ion of alternative means of recourse for vict ims also typi fies 
amnesties categori zed as I nternat i onal ly  leg i t i mized , Partial I m mu n i t i e s .  I n  
Hai t i , ch is  al ternate recourse rook two forms.  F i rs t ,  Pres ident Arist ide  es­
tabl ished the Nati onal  Tnuh and J us r ice Commiss ion ,  whose mandate was 
EO " i nves tigate and document"  cri mes comm itted dur ing his  ex i l e . 1 80 The 
Com miss ion is  empowered to gather evidence in relation EO all eged cr i mes 
and to i ssue reports , i nd icati ng partic ular perpetrators and violari ons . 1 8 1  The 
Commiss ion ,  whi le  nor as i n fl uential  as i t s  South African c o u nterpart , 
helped ensure that , alth o ugh many poli t ical  cri m i nals were pardoned,  l i m ­
i red i mm un i ty would not become B lanker Amnesty. I n  add i t i o n ,  Ar ist ide  
created a fund for the compensation of v ict ims . 1 82 Though lacking adequate 
resources and poorly coord i nated ,  this fund  prov i ded civil  redress for some 
vict ims . 1 8 '  
A second exampl e  o f  a country enact ing a n  I nternationally  leg i t i m ized,  
Partial Immunity i s  Guatemala.  The Guatemalan amnesty law ( " the  Guate­
malan law")  evidences all three characteristics of chis type of  i m m u n i ty. 
F irst ,  i t  has some domestic  leg i t imacy. Second , the  Guatemalan peace proc­
ess received s ignificant i nrernat ional s upporr .  T h i rd ,  the Guatemalan law 
i tself provides for a s ignificanr- ly  restric ted scope of immuni ty. 
O n  December 2 9, 1 996 ,  the Guatemalan government , led by Presi denr  
Alvaro Arzu and the Guatemalan National Revolmionary Union (U . R . N . G. ) ,  
s igned a peace accord , end i ng th i rty-six years of violem civi l  war. Th i s  ex­
tended period of violent confl ict  took a severe roll on Guatemalan soci ety. 
One report d iscusses over 5 2 ,000 h u n1an rights and human i tar ian law v iola­
t ions ,  i nc luding over 2 5 ,000 m urders , 4000 v i c t i ms of tort ure , and an equal 
n umber of forced cl i sappearances . 1 8·i 
The domes tic leg i t imacy of the Guatemalan law rests in  part on the 1 99 6  
elecc ion o f  Alvaro Arzu as president of Guat emala and the v ictory of h i s  
Parry for Nat ional  Achievement [PAN} in  congress ional  e lect ions ,  mark i ng 
the beg i n n i ng of recon c i l iat i o n .  \V h i le Arzu only narrowl y  prevai led i n  the 
runoff elec c ion agamsr Rios Momt,  with  5 1 . 2 %  of the voce, he  in fac e  re-
l i->0 .  Scharf, Jil/lr<l nO((o l ,  :tr l S . I n December I ':J'Yi . r\ r i sr idt  i n i r urecl a n  · · J IWts r tsar ion i n ro rhc m u r ­
d e rs of rhousancls of H a i r i a n s  com m 1 r red d u r i ng rht m d t ran· rctg n . "  I RW l :--< P. S I'O'IZKY, S I I. E l' C J '-I G  T H L  
G c :--<s 1 :--< H .� I T I :  TH t: P R O \ I l S E  OF D u. J H ER.HIVE D t::-JOCIL-ICY 50 ( I  ')') 7 ) .  Thtrt;lfrtr. he appoinr c:cl rht  
Nar ional Tru rh  and J usr ice Com m is s i o n  and en·n sou,c:h r  t n runarional  ass i srclnct in  rhc prosecurion of  
s u m e  pa ra m d i ra ry leaders. !d. 
I S  I .  C la u d i o  I� Sanroru m  & A n r on i o l\b ldotudo. Pdit�c·,;/ l?n·ou,·i!MiiotJ "�' f,,;;�il '<il,_i.i jl11 · :l i !lrdu·--
r\ 11/ih'.'l) 1111d iii ;\jlf!ltt'atirm iii Selct'!t'd Cnt.i, 2 H L: .\ 1 .  l� T.� .  l:l iU I F  1 5 , I S  ( I  :J') ) ) . 
I S 2 .  See Sci la t{ .i!tjli'li n o r e  I .  c\r I ::: . 
I S 1  . .\n· Sclll W r u m  �"- iVla l clanad o,  .tlljl l 'd n ort· I S  I .  <ll I 5 . 
I S - \ . Su· R E M  H I .  C uarcnuLl i'\ n e r  At'a i n ! : The: Ofli c � <d Rt·purr  of r i l e: H u m;lll R i g h rs O Hict .  A rc i l ­
d t octst of G uaremaLt �89-91 J  ( l SJC)') ) :  sec ,�tllfi'itlly G L .ITDLI L. I :  i\ [ H I O I( Y  I l l' S l l . lc N < T ,  R L PO IZT O F  T i l l: 
C0,\ 1 .\ I I SS I U :--; 1 0 1( H ! q'l)I( I C.\ 1 .  Ct . .  -\ I( I I ' IC\1' 1 ( ) :--; ( :! ( 1 () ( 1 )  
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ceived a maJ oncy o f  che voces i n  the eleccion . 1 85 These elecc ions have been 
descri bed as free and fai r, 1 80 though voter curnom was relatively low, wi th 
only 4 7 %  of regi stered voters cast ing bal lots . 1 8 7  
In  a s t r i c t  sense,  ch is  election i nd icates the existence of  a procedural de­
mocracy. There were free and fai r  elect ions contes ted by at lease seven d i ffer­
em parties . 1 88 However, g iven the extraord i nari ly  c lose resul cs  of che elec­
tion, the low vocer turnout , and che l ack of an overwhelm i ng popular man­
dace for che Arzu government,  closer scruci ny of che scace of  Guatemalan 
democracy along l i nes d ictated by che pos i tive l i beral  i nternational relac ions 
theory is  warranted . The 1 995 elections represented an i mportant sh ift i n  
che dynamics o f  government-civi l sociecy relat ions ,  s ignal i ng che  open i ng of 
new popular d iscourse and grow i ng i nteraction between che government and 
the people .  For example,  th is  election was the first d ur ing which non­
governmental  organizations "carried out civic education and s upervi s ion of 
the pol l ing" and local organizations mobi l ized . 1 89 This  new c iv ic  engage­
ment was accompani ed by c he creac1on of " new spaces for c i t i zen­
government d ialogue empoweri ng civil  sociecy. 1 9° " [T}he expans ion of po­
l i t ical partic ipation and a democratic pol i t ical cu l cure in  Guatemala" d ur ing 
the m id- 1 990s , gave r ise co opportuni t ies for a boccom - up consol idat ion of 
clemocracy. 1 'J 1  This expansion has , in wrn , "broade n[ed} pol i t i cal  parci c ipa-
1 0 5 .  On November 1 2 , 1 99 5 ,  rht fi rs t  round of r h e: c l e u i o n  d i d  nm _l! ivt an abso l u rt maJority w any 
cctncltclart. ltad J !lg w a run-ofT on J an u ary 7 ,  1. 996, in w h i c h  A rz u  prevai l ed w i r h  5 1 . 2')i of rhe  voce .  I n  
r h t  )\;ovem hc r 1 2  bal lot ing ,  A rzu 's Parry of Nar i onal  Ach ien:menr ( PA N )  w o k  an ,1bso l u re major ity o f  
se,l (S  1 11 Congress (-i,=J of � 0 ) .  Mon r r 's Guatem a l a n  R e p u b l tcan From w o n  o n l y  rwemy-ont sears . A n u m ­
b e r  of smal ler pa rr i es wok rhe rema i n l n,t: stars.  Sec Clt<lhilltila: Delllll<hi<J a11J Hm11a11 l?!jltJ I 0 .  h rrp:!/ 
ll·ww. u n tge . c h /h u manrrs/ i nsiguaremala_democ h u m rrs_9 7 . h r m l  ( v i s i ted Ftb. :.' 0 ,  2 l J( )  I ) . I c  tS worrh 
no r i ng char  A rzu owed his v icrory pr i m a n l y  ro a s wtep o f  rhe  c1p i r a l ,  w i n n i ng only 4 of r he 2 2  voung 
clt:parr mems acmss rht: coumry. TA <'i L� E�L E " C: I ,� Pll A I.lO & D,\Vll) H O L I DAY, TO\\'.� I(DS ,, N L\\ ' Rou: FOil 
C I V I L  SOC : I loTY I'-i TH E D t:,\IOCIL\TIZATIO:" 01' G L'.IT I :�L� L·I -- \U ( Ptrer l:'e ldsre in  t ran s . ,  l ')96). 
I 06. See G'llateli!CIIa: Dri!IIJ<hl<) {!)ld E-illlllt/11 N igbiJ, > !tpr" nore I 0 5 .  a r  1 0 .  
I 0 7 .  ! d. (desc r i b i ng rile tlecrwn as " c lean " ) . 
1 00 .  See P l l ,I DO & H OI.I D.W, i!!pra nort I ::> 5 ,  ar i O  ( rwr i ng the seven pol r r ic a l  parr i es w i n ni ng SC:<HS r n  
rht: 1 9') 5  congress ional  e lect ion) .  
l S') See id. at  ) ') .  \'V h t le a 5.'/)r vorer  abstenrron rare: 'lppt:,lrs h ig h ,  t t  was acrua l l y  " ltss t h a n  tx­
pc:c rt:d , "  cl ue in pan co a new c i v i c  engagtm enr . T h i s  new tn,l!agtmenr was further  suggested by an on-r 
60','( i nc rease tn the n u m ber of reg istered c r v i c  com m i t rt:es w 1 60 bcrwet:n [ ')') _) and 1 9') 6 .  !d. ar .'l o .  
C:om n1t'nr ,t rors have descri bed c h i s  new c i v i c  e ngagemtnr a s  " o n e:  o f  t h e  most pos i r i ve devtlopmtnrs  1 11 
l il t S  e knoral process . l r  gave c i v i c  orga n i n r tons an oppr m u n 1 r1· ro rt,lssen t h e i r  r i g h r  w 1 n tl uenct p u b l t c  
dec i s i ons . . . ! d .  at _) ') . 
1 ')0 .  See Sus.1 " N E  jO:-.JAS, OF ( E NT.o\ lJ I(S .� :-.J D  Dov1:s :  Gu.n i : ,\ 1 :\ U · s  P t: .. ICE P ROCESS 4- -i ,  ! 0 _) ( 2000) .  
J unas  r wres char  
t h e  peace process . . retlecrtcl rhc t mt:rac r ions  berween rhe ne,l! O t i a r i o ns ptr se <tnd r ile  ope- n i ng of  
ckmocrar ic  spaces 1 n  G uatemalan soc i er 1· as '\ whole: .  L l l l marelr, the pt;\Ct process beca me rhe  po­
l r r l ctl rnr·,t i n  on w h t c h  compcr ing '1gendas ,tbuu r  t h e  c o u n r ry' s tm urt: were b e r n .� p Ltred o u r  
T h t:  lxg t n n r ng o r· c h e  peace negot iar rons  o p e n e d  up new spaCl'S c >uts i dc: rht e- ltcrur,tl arena ,  and even­
c tu l h· 'l !I ii guzcrrr i rw:: r,tu i c . .  n dnTioped bcrwet:r1 c l t c r i n ns ;tnd  llc!,!or 1 1H lO ilS rhar  dtmocrat lztd pu­
l t r tCt l r rctns i t iu n .  
! d. : ·' ' "  c�f.,,; i\ l a rcu Funsc:ct. Pc �udigill.t 1)/ . r 11rl /),..: ;,;r;(r.!/ i_� .;tio;f 111 (ilt. r!utu!: � ,  iii . JC>li l\ i'o: l oY) U F  
l- ' 1 '  .. 1 1 { ,  '5 7 ,  G :-;  ( L i tsa L. North &. r\Ltn B .  Si mmor t s  e e l s  . . I ')')') ) .  
1 ') 1 .  ju i': .·l� . . •llf'r" nor<: I ')U,  at 1 0')- 1 0  ( noung t hat b1 1 99 7 .  ' :-;';: o f  respondenrs pa rr ic rpa tcd r n  ar  
k;tsr  u 1 1 •: mga n t z,t t io n  of c i ,· i l  soc i cry kduect t i o na l .  r.: l 1 ,� r uu s .  and com m u n r ty dc,Tiop m c l \ l  g ro u ps ) ) .  
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t w n  i n  the coun try. " 1 92 These p rocesses o f  expand i ng c i v i l  soci e t y  and con­
sol i dati ng proto-democrati c  i ns t i t ut i o ns bolster  the leg i t im ac y  of t h e  1 996 
e lection and suggest an ongo i ng seam of c i v i l -governmental i nterac t i o n .  
T h i s  seam of i nteract i o n  i s  further reflected i n  F reedom H ouse's score o n  
Guatemala for 1 996-97 o f  3 ,  4 , fin d i ng i t  part ial ly  free a n d  n o t i ng a mean­
i ngful  i ncrease in freedo m  from the previ o us year's score o f  4 , 5 (part i a l ly 
free) . W h i l e  Guatemalan democ racy is far from i d eal , i t  d e m o n s t rates the 
leg i t imacy characterist ic  of procedural democracy and suggests t hat prefer­
e nces of the c i t ize ns were , i n  fac t ,  determ i n i ng government p o l i cy. 
The legi slative h istory of t h e  Guatemalan law i ndicates that  t h e  law's en­
act m e n t  respects the w i l l  of the  people  as  the source o f  gove r n m en tal 
authori ty. The Guatemalan law was the fi nal act in a series of accords s ig ned 
between the government  and the rebel  forces . Each of these accords , beg i n ­
n i ng w i t h  t h e  Comprehe ns i ve H um an Rights Accord of March 1 994 and 
i n c l ud i ng t he 1 996 Accord on Strengthe n i ng of C i v i l  Power and the Func­
t i o n  of the Army in  a Democrati c  Society, m oved Guatemala back i nt o  the 
com m u n i ty of democrat ic  nati o n s ,  l i m i t i ng the role  of  the armed forces and 
crea t i ng room for c ivi l d ialogue . 1 9 >  These accords " la id the bas i s  for 
ful fi l l ment of the basic  r ights that had existed on paper s i nce t h e  1 98 5  Con­
s t i t u tion and, i n  this  sense,  were t h e  necessary counterpart to  t h e  Consr i tu­
t ion . " I 'J-! O nce these r ights were  i n s t i tu ted anc.l reforms undertak e n ,  the le­
g i t i macy of the Guatemalan governm e n t ,  and speci fical ly i ts congress , to 
enacc an am nesty was en hanced . 1 Y5  
After the sign i ng of the final  accords between the Arzu govern m e n t  and 
the U. R.N.G.,  the congress passed the Nat ional Recon c i l i a t i o n  law o n  De­
cember 1 8 ,  1 99 6 .  Though m e m bers of the New Guatemala  Democrat ic  
Front  walked out  of the debate before the vote ,  1 ')C.� the Nat ional  Reconci l i a­
t ion  Law passed by s ixty-five to e ight ,  w i th seven abstemions . 1 'J7 Despi te i ts 
l ') 2 .  R .\ C H F I . M .  McCJ.L\ 1( \', DIC'!AI I !" ( ;  DD!CJC ILICY: G i. i .Y J ' I : ,s J .\ 1.;1 ci:--: D TH J: [ !" D  OF YI O I . L � T  
R EVOI .UTI C l �  1 ')-\ ( 1 99'1) 
l SJ ) .  See H ug h Byrne,  'f'/Je Gl!atell!t!lall Pwce ;\ ((1!/i/.r: A.r .<cJ!'Jih l/1 , / 1/d fil!jl/i(dtiiJI!l jfn · tbe Pl!tl/ l'e. \VOLi\ 
B I( ! J ' J' .  March 2- ) ,  l ')')7 . \\! h i lt i r i s  nut char  r h tst accords wt:rc: i n  r h t  l lll lll l'cl iar<:: rtrm "morL· a pro m ­
I S e  r h a n  a rC",d l r)·," r h t y  comai ned " i m po rr a m  a n d  m·ccssar1· p rov i s 1o n s  ro m ovt ww;trd a d emocr<u i c , law ­
b,lscd soc i e r y  . . .  !d. ar .'\ . 
l SJ i . .J o�,\� . .  r;tjlra norc I ')0,  < l [  �-\.  l mponam rc·forms 1 nc l ud t:d s r reng r h e n i ng r h e  J U s r i ce syste m ,  p ro­
ii.:ss i O n <l h z l ng r h e  c i v i l  scrv i n: ,  and i m p rovi ng r h e  " ltg , r i nucy" :llld " r Llllspan:ncy" of c o n g ress . !d. 
I ') 5 !J <H S') ( no t i ng c h a r  r h t  con s r l [ ll [ l una l  ,·efcm11s . . 1 11\'(J I \'l:d [XI J t( , u n d  c h <l l\t.:t:s 1 n  t h e  s rc1 rt: app<tra­
t u s  and 1rs rc·L1 r 1on ro G uaremalan suci n v " ) .  
I ')() .  Sec Lun· Roh rer, Cll,t/('}!J,ti.lll i\ llmntr i.1 r\pjm!/'ed Oi'tl (Jf!!"'""'Jt.r ' 06;u tiotJ.r. N . Y. TI \J J :S ,  Dec. I ') . 
l 'J ')(,. ar J\ l :; , I .  
I l)7 Sec r.l(/1 Iii/ rile . \'\10!\ I . D  N F\\'� ]) [ ( ; . Dtc ,:; I '  I ')l) h ,  ill ') ()') ,  J\ I The l a w  \\'CIS s u pp t > ITl'd Lw 
r\ rzus Ntw C uarunala Dtmucr a r i c  From, r h t  C uarcm<i l <l ll l� C jl u h l 1can F ro m .  a n d  r h c· (]msr ian Dcmu­
n a r s .  C:L· I 1 na /.u hltts; t ,  (,,,,grc.'.l ,·\i'fil·o z ·.t! o/ r\ onh·.<i l (;rn rul ll 'i!b )t'CI'J , J:..: Tu; P1u:s� S J : I\V I < T .  Dt·c .  I ') ,  
I ')')(, .  T h e· lc ,c; l s l ,r r i o n ,  r h ou,c; h  u J n r rovns l a i .  rtcel v,·d su pp1 1 r· r  from " b ru.rd sptu r u m  uf C u·, l t l' ll1 i !L1 1 1  
S U L I U \', i nc l u c l 1 1 1g r hr.: C u .u t m ; i \ a n  ,\ rmtd Forcc·s and r h<: C um L· ll1<1 Lu ; N a t i Uili l i R n· o l u r i o 1 L t 1·1· l · n , r \· 
i\ l mTnlC' !l l .  s,., Cli.tfell!, llc/11 ;\ .<.lt'lltMr ;\j>jll 'ol 'c.< fl il!ll!·.rt r 1.<� 1 1 ' ,  FT. \Vo1c1 1 1 ST,·I J( TF I . J : C I U ,\ 1 .  Dec. l l) .  l l)')h, 
i l[  5 
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detractors, l 9S the law demonstrates adherence, as i t  was passed through l egal 
processes and in conformi ty wi th  the Guatemalan Const i tuti on . 1 99 
The Guatemalan Law also demonstrates s ignificant i n ternational leg i t i ­
macy. Throughout t h e  1 9 90s,  t h e  so-cal led "Group of Friends "-Mexico,  
Norway, Spain ,  the U n i ted States, Venezue la ,  and Colombia-faci l i tated the 
peace process , i nc lud i ng the eventual  amnesty granc . �00 The U n i ted Nat ions 
also played an i mportant role  i n  the process . � 0 1  By che beg i n n i ng of 1 994 , 
" both parties [the Guatemalan government and the U . R . N . G . }  . . .  had be­
come convinced chat a high level U . N .  role was essential , "  a role which the 
organ ization accepted i n  part . 202 The parties themselves agreed that the 
peace process and the amnesty woul d  not have been poss i b l e  w i thout i n ter­
nat ional s upport . 20l The Acuerdo Marco (Framework Accords) granted the 
U n i ced N acions the offic ial  role of "moderator" and formali zed the fac i l i  ca­
tion role of the Group of Friends . :w i  Eventual l y, the peace treaty, which in­
corporated t he  g rant of  am nesty, was signed in  Os lo  and  w i t nessed by UN 
Secretary General Boucros Boutros-Ghal i and vis i  r ing pres idents  of several 
states , conferring on the e n c i re process international support and en hanced 
legit i macy. 2 1 1 5 
On the axi s  of scope , the act contains important l i m i tations c hat place the 
law with in  the category of I n ternat iona l l y  Legit im ized , Parcial Immunity. 
A rt i c le  2 of the law "ext inguishes penal respons i b i l i ty for pol i t ica l  cn rnes 
com m i tt ed i n  the i n ternal  armed confl i c t" 206 and i n structs the j ust ice  m i nis-
1 98 .  Set. e.g . '  F ran C I SCO Gold mcl n ,  Ill Gttci!CIIId!a A ll i .. r,!/g()//e/1, i'� '( TL \[ [ oS ,  D e c .  2 .) ,  1 996 , at  A 1 5  
( a rg u i ng that th e l aw ·· , s  esse m i a l l y  a po l i t i ca l ace seakd by a kw i nd 1 v i d ua ls concerned w i t h t he i r own 
rep u tat i ons and perq u is i tes,  not ro m e m i o n  their  poss ible  l egal  v u l nerabi l i ty " ) .  
1 99 .  See G uate ma l an Law o f  Nat ion a l  Reco nc i l i a[ I O !l of  December I Ci ,  1 996 ( E r i ka Alxahamsson 
t rans . ,  on ti l e w1th  Harvard l nr ernat i onal Law J ou rna l ) [htrt i na i'ter Gua tema l a n  Law} (" [ ! ] n  conform 1 ty 
w i t h  t he Po l i t i ca l  Const i t m i on of the Repu b l i c of GuatemaLl ,  i t  IS w i th i n  t h e  power of the Congress of 
t h e  Repu b l ic .  when ckmandecl by pu b l i c  conven i ence,  w tXtll1j)t po l i t i ca l and related cr i mes fmm pena l 
responsibi l i t �·. " ) . fd art .  I .  
200 . See Jo:--; .�s.  JlljJJ'd ncHe 1 90,  4 .) .  6 .) n . 8  (discuss i ng the, role of each comry i n  rhe process ) .  Mexico, 
ror exa m p lt,  convened nu merous meet i ngs . Norway servtd as an " honesr broker .. and hosrecl rhe  1 994 
accords .  Spa i n sen·ed as a " l ia ison ro \V/es tern Europe . . . The U n irtd S rarc:s acrecl as a " heavy -weight  . . . 
p u s h i ng t h e army ro ctccepr c i v i l ia n  conrro l .  !d. ar 6.'\-Ci-'1 , n . S .  
20 1 .  O n  Seprem ber 1. 9 ,  1 994 ,  r h ro u g h  U . N .  Genera l Assc m b il· R eso l u r 1 on -'! S /2Ci7 , M I N UG U A  was 
escabl l shed and the f irsr ream or UN oHici ,liS, l ed by Leonardo Frclnco,  began opt:ra t ions i ll G u ate ma la . 
Over rht  n e x t  rwo 1·cars mu rc rh,ln U . S . S .'\ 5  m d l ior t  was l ll Vesred in operat i C J llS 1 11 G uaremala . Sec S rephen 
Baran\' ! ,  :\ ! < 1.\illli�iilg rbr Bmcjit.r u/ U1\- [1/ l di 'tl!ltlll 111 tbe Clt<lit'llici!t l ll Pwa f'p,(c'J .I . i11 ]OLI<N I-:Y� OF F hl l< 
7 oi,  78 ( L i isa L. N ort h & r\ l an Jj .  S i m mo ns eel s .  1 99 9 ) . 
2 0 .2 .  Joc.;.�s .  wjwc� nn re 1 90 ,  at 5 7  ( i nd , car i ng that rhc: U n i ted i\i a ( l ons too " became con v i nced chat H 
shou ld become nwre seriously i rwoh·ed 1 11 Guarc:mala" ) .  
20.'> The leadn of rhc· U . R . N . G  has com mtmed that  "[11 k cou l d n ·c h a v e  kt·pr i r  a l i Ve illl10ilg Gua­
ttmaLln s . . . .  \\fi rhuur the pers is renct:: ol .  t h e  U n i red l'-.ia r i on s the· pe:lU: p wcess would have been i m poss i ­
h l t- . . .  J u l "t P rc:s r o n ,  ; \  U. 1\'. Sll<"<'c.\.1· Sron . Gll<i!ctltalc!ll i\ /;;rc,,, 1-'.d/, N Y. T! :\ 1 1 ' � .  i\ i ar. 2 � ,  1 9')0 .  a t ,\ S .  ·'" 
"/.''' _ jo!' ,IC'. 'llf>ra n o t t  I ')0, at 'i S .  
_' l l · i S,·r J o '  . .  \ � .  ,;;j>ra nute I C) l l .  a t  7 1 .  
_' 1 1 5  IJ 
_' Oil . The· J 'Crt l ll t ll t  parr ,  <h arncnckc l , rc:a d s :  
Pc· l t :d rc:sporl S l h i l l f l. w i l l  be w r ; d h· e :-.: r i ng ll ! s l wd 1-m !'c : l i r i c,d lr l l l l L '  c n m rr1 1 r rcd 1 1 1  t h e  I IH n n ,d 
, t r med cunrl , n  ,,· h ich  ( ) r i .� 1 na rcd ·' h  1·c,1rs cl,t.: u .  u m d  thc:  c: Hc·cr i ··:c dare ot. r ! J , ., Ia\\', a n d  1 r  w i l l  he: u n -
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c ries ro abstai n from action in these cases . Li kewise ,  Artic le  5 exti nguishes 
penal  responsi b i l i ty for any potent ia l l y  crim inal  act s  by government authori­
t ies  commi tted ro s uppress the  cri mes amnest ied in Art i c les  2 and 4 . 207 
A m nesty i s  thereby granted ro  borh c i t i zens and government  officia ls  for 
pol i t i cal and related crimes ,  mee t i ng the test of coherence prev i ous ly  ar­
t icul ated . Whi le  Art ic les 2 and 5 may appear to g ive broad i mm u n i ty, the 
scope of this amnesty i s  nonetheless curtai led ; crimes m use  be p o l i t ical  and 
comm itted in the i nternal armed confl i c t .  
Article 4 of the Guatemalan Law provides amnesty for certai n related 
cr imes . 208 Whi l e  th i s  grant expands the scope of the amnesty, two i mportant 
l i m i tations are i nc l uded . F i rst ,  related cri m i nal  acts must correspond co a 
series of crimes i n  the  Guatemalan penal code ,  primar i ly com m o n  and petty 
crimes . �09 Second ,  the text of the l aw i tself provides a strict defin i c io n  of the 
related crimes as " those acts  comm i tted in the i n ternal con fl i c t ,  which d i ­
rect ly, object ively, i n tent ional l y  o r  coi ncidenta l l y  have a n y  relat i o n  ro  the 
commiss ion of pol i t ical cri mes and in  respect ro  matters for w h i c h  personal 
motive can not be demons crated . " 2 1 0 Article 3 p laces the burden of provi ng 
personal motives on the prosecmion .  The mere exis tence of superior orders 
de rscoocl c hat  the au thors ,  acco m p l ices,  or conspi rators, of t h e  cr i mes aga i n s t  t h e  secu r i ty of the  
State, aga inst  the  I ns t i tu t ional order ,  and against  the publ i c  adm i n istrat ion,  referred ro 1 11 Articles 
_) 5 9 ,  3 60, 367,  .)6� . .  )7 5 ,  5� 1 ,  .'1 8 5 -399 , 108- i i O, 4 1 -'i-4 1 6, o f  the Penal  Code 'He i n c l ud ed . .  I n  
these cases the P u b l i c  M i n ister  w d l  absta i n  fro m exerc i s i ng the  pena l  an i on and t he j ud i c i a l  
authority w i l l  decree r h e  proced u re t o  be fol lowed. 
G r1atemalan Law, .wpra note 1 99 ,  arc . .:>  
.:207 .  A rt i cl e  5 reads i n  i ts ent i rety :  
Penal  respons i b i l i t v  w i l l  b e  tota l l y  ext i ng u i shed fo r cr i mes motivated b y  t h e  i nt e rn a l  armed conf1 1 c t  
w h i c h ,  p r i o r  to the effecr ivc d a c e  of c h i s  bw , authors,  acco m p l i ces or  conspi m cors,  the  autho r i ( les o f  
the S care, members of 1 ts  i n s t i tu t ions,  or any o c h e r  i nvolvement by the M i n i st ry o f  J us t ice wou ld 
have been comm i t ted co prevent , i m pede , p ursue or reprc·ss rhe pol i t ica l  c r i m es and related cr i mes 
co w h ich A r t i c l es .:2 and - 1 of t h i s  Law refc.r .  The n i m c:s for w h i c h  penal respo ns 1 b i l i ry is ex[ l n ­
g u i sh ed b y  t h e  current 'm ic l e also are cons idered o f  a pol i t ical nawrc.  l n  these cases t h e  j u d i c i a l  
authority w i l l  declare the  d e fi n i te proced u re ro be fol l owed , w i t h i n  t h e  proced u re establ i shed i n  A r ­
t ic le  1 1  of t h i s  law , u n l ess 1 t  c a n  be estab l i s hed c lue t h e  pol i t i cal nexus between t h e  supposed d legal  
act and the referrul ends docs nor ex is t  or t hat the act fol l owed a personal mot ive .  
/d. art .  5 .  This  art i c l e  i s  S 1gn d'1culr because 1 t  g rants a wide  am nesty ro governme n t  oHi c 1 a l s  w ho com­
m i t te d  t·ven common cri mes 1n a n  attempt ro s u p p ress the rebe l movemem.  The rext of t h e  l aw s uggests 
th<lt chis am nesty to govcrnmell t  offi C J a l s  is broade r  than the amnesty g ra n ted the rebe l s .  
2 0 8 .  A r t i c l e  4 reads :  
Penal  respons i b i l i ty w i l l  he rou l h· exri n,� ui shed of the re l a ted cr i mes,  vv· h i c h  in  confo r m 1 t v  w i t h  
t h i s  law a r e  re l ated to pol 1 r i c a l  m o t i ons 1 n  the second an· i c l t  com m l ttecl p r i o r  to t h e  effec r i vt: cbre o f  
c h i s  l a w  and w h i c h  correspond co t hose c r i mes t)' p 1 ficd by t\m cl es 2 1 ·�-2 1 6 . 2 7 S ,  2 7 ') ,  2 N .:2-2 S 5 ,  
.:287-.2:-\') .  29.:?-2 9 5 .  1 2 1 . . '> 2 5 ,  ) ) () ,  _:),) ), _) )7-.1 .1 9 ,  .'!00-10 2 ,  .'!0-i , - i Oo--'1 07 o f r h e  P e n a l  Code: 
lei art . .'! . 
209 .  5,< .�o:lltm!ly C() J J I ( ;O P L i':.·I L [C: P. ]  ( Gu,lt) . 
.:2 1 0. G uatemalan Law, A r t i c l e  3 .  rea, ls  1 n  1 ts e nt i ru v :  
Related cri mes w i l l  b e  cl tti ned for the  cJfecrs of th is  L a w  a s  c hose acts com m i ( (td 1 1 1 the Hl ternal 
cunrh n .  wh i ch d i rc·nh· .  ub jccr in· h . i mc n r i on,d l 1· or coi nc i ck nr a l h· have anv re l a t i o n  ru rhc: com m i ,; ­
S 1 o n of pol 1 r i ct l  C f l rll l'S and 1 1 1 rl'S J•tct w m a r cus for w h i ch pcrso ncll mur 1ve er n r w t  be· demon ­
s r rartd . The con11ect i o n  w i l l nor be 'l i'l' l i cab l t:: 1 f  thl'  nontxistenct uf rht  1 ncl 1crred 1-eLu i o n  i s  clemon­
srra rtd . 
C uaremalan Law. ,11/'l'<i note 1 9S ,  a n .  _) . 
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or a pol i tical  connection to the  crime i s  i nsuffic ient  to remove l i ab i l i ty. As 
long as the prosecution shows some personal motive,  even as a secondary 
mot ive, amnesty w i l l  not be granted .  
The Guatemalan Law goes beyond the procedural l i m i ts o n  am nesty i nd i ­
cated above and dictates s trict substantive l i m i ts based on  the  country 's i n­
ternational  l egal obl igat ions .  The first  vers ion of the law d rafted i n  congress 
had a broader  scope, espec ial ly  in relat ion to cri mes com m itted by arm y 
officers . However, s ignificant pressure from h uman rights organizations led 
to s ubstant ive restrict ions on  amnesty i ncorporated in  Art ic le  8.  2 1 1  The 
ori g i nal vers ion of Artic le  8 denies amnesty for those crimes " for which the 
extinction or  exemp tion of penal respons ibi l i ty is  not permi tted by internal 
law or i nternational treaties  approved or rati fied by Guatemala. " 2 1 2  This  
would have precluded amnesty for war crimes,2 1 1  genocide ,n�  and torture . 2 1 5  
The Guatemalan legis lature amended the law at the t ime of i ts i n i t ial pass­
i ng to further restrict the grant of  amnesty for i n ternational  crimes . The 
revised vers ion of Article 8,  amended u nder pressure from i nternational civi l 
soci ety, adds spec i fic language i n d icati ng that the amnesty i s  not "applicable 
to the crimes of genocide,  torture, and forced d isappearance . " 2 1 6  The resul­
tant  art icle makes expl ic i t  that  amnesty wi l l  not apply where Guatemala i s  
under an  i n ternational obl igati on  to prosecute the  cr ime .  Nor wi l l  amnesty 
attach co the cr imes of genoci de ,  torture, and forced d isappearances . By i n­
vok i ng international law and i n ternational treaties general ly, the Guacema-
2 1 1 .  See id. 
2 1 2 . !d. an . . 3 (before amencl me:nr) .  
2 1 _) .  See. e. g. ,  Ge neva Coiwtmion  IV R c Lt r i ve co che Protc:c c i on of C iv i l ian Persons 1 11 Ti me of \Var, 
A ug . 1 2 , 1 949 ,  75 U . N .T.S . .2 S 7 .  G uate ma l a  rar i fied the Geneva Convenc ions on Aug us c _) , 1 9 5 4 .  G i ven 
char  r h e  Geneva Convemions req u i re che p rosecuc ion or exrrad i c ion of  those who com m i e  g rave breaches, 
see, for examp l e , id. arr .  50, A rc ic le H of che  G uacemalan Llw m use be read not co g ra nt amnescy for 
grave breaches of rhe Geneva Convemions . See. cg. , Geneva P rorocol I I  Add i r ional  to rhe Geneva Conve:n­
r ions of Aug.  1 2 , 1 9-19 ,  and Relar i ng co c he: Prorecr ion of VIcr ims of Non-Imernarional A rmed Con f-l ie rs ,  
Dec. 7 ,  1 987, 1 1 .2 5  U . N .T.S .  609 .  Guarem ala rari fied borh adcl i c ional protocol s  on Apr i l  1 2 , 1 91-l9 For 
an a rgumem char che Add i t i onal  Prowcol s  and rhe Geneva Convemions req u i re p rosecuc ion ot' cri mes 
even 1 11 non-Imernarional  armtd cont-l i c r ,  see:, for exam ple: , \XI! ' L L EI\ & B u R K E - \VH ITE,  .i!tf'i"tl noce -\..\ , ac 
ch.  2. See <i/.(t; Subm iss ion of  r h e  Governmem of rhc U n i rtd Scares Concem 1 ng Cert<u n A rg u mems i\hcl e 
by Cou nc i l  for t he  Accused i n  chc Case of The Prosecuro r of the  Tr i bu na l v. Dusan l'ld ic , J u l y 1 7 , 1 99 5 ;  
P rostcu ror v. Dusku Tacl i c ,  1 CJ9') JCTY N o .  1T-94 - 1 ,  ar 80 (_Ju l y  1 5 ) .  
2 1 -i . Conn·nc ion t(J r  r h t  P revtnr 1on  and Pun i shmtiH of· rhe Cr ime of Genocide ,  J an . 1 .2 , 1 9 5 1 ,  7S 
U . N .  TS.  277.  G uatema l a accedtd w che Genoc ide Conven e ion on January 7,  1 9 5 2.  G u<ntmala h as I m ­
p leme n ted th i s  convcnc ion i n  I t S  domes r i c  bw. See C(JOIGO P I : Nri L,  .wj!rcl noce 2 0 9 ,  ar c . .  7 7 6  ( i m p l e m c: n c­
l l l_t; port ions or the Genocide Conve n t ion I ll [() the G ua renuLln C r i m i na l  Law). 
2 1 5 . Convencion ,\gainsr  Tort u re <Ind Othe- r  Crue l ,  I n h u m a n ,  ot Degracl 1 ng Trea rm t nc ur Pu i l i sh menc  
[ iH:ru iufre:r Torrure Con,·emion] ,  J un . .20.  1 98 7 ,  I \65  U.N.T.S .  8 5 .  Guatemala rar i tied t ht: Tortu re 
Con1·emion on Apr i l  1 5 , I ';) 8 7 .  i\ r r ic le  5 of rhe Torrurc Convent ion Imposes a prosecuce: or cxrr;Id l rc 
C<.:Cj U i rcmc:nt and bars : Im nesC\· . 
.2 1 6. Guatema lan L1w. A r r 1 c lt: i-3, as a m e n d ccl . reads 1 11 1 ts t n r 1rny:  
The ex(lncrion of pt n;tl I-c-spun s l b i i i t \' t" ,,- h i c h  r h 1 s law re: r'c rs w i ll nor be app l i ca h k  cu rht: c r i mts of 
Ccnoc idt, Torture:, and l_.urced D i s;l [>pe:Ir;mce ,  JUSt  :IS i r  w i l l  nor  apph· ro rhusl' cri m c:s w h 1 ch arc I Il ­
;l l ienable o r  for w h i ch r h e  e:-;tinc c 1 on o r  exe m p c 10 n  o f  pc·n ,l l res pons i b i l i tY I S  nor pc:r m i r recl 1 11 cun ­
t(J rll1 1 C )' w ith rhe I nr t riul l:1w or i nr c m a r i o n a l  r rt:H i tS approved or ra( l iied b1· G u a r e m :l i a .  
(;uartmalan Law, ' llf'ra n ore l 'J 9 .  arr . S .  
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lan law ensures that the most serious violat ions of h uman r ights  and i nter­
nati onal h umanitarian law can s t i l l  be prosecuted i n  Guatemala ,  an i nterna­
t ional forum ,  or a th i rd state. l i kewise,  the general reference to i nternati o nal 
law leaves room for future development and expansion of i nternational 
crim i nal law norms .  
Taken col leccively, the l i m i tations contained i n  Articles 3 ,  4 ,  a n d  8 of  the 
Guatemalan Law ensure that ,  while am nesty i s  granted for pol i t i cal  cr imes 
commi tted d uring the armed confl i c t ,  the amnesty w i l l  be construed ex­
tremely narrowly. Amnesty only  appl ies to related crimes i f  they are com­
mon cri mes and no personal motives can be demonstrated .  A per se rule,  
forbidd ing amnesty for torture,  genocide ,  and forced d isappearance,  ensures 
chat the most serious i nternat ional cr imes w i l l  not be am nesti e d .  I n  case of 
further doubt,  the Guatemalan law concludes w i t h  an i nstruct ion  t hat those 
cri mes to which amnesty does not apply  " w i l l  be prosecuted . "1 1 7  Despi te 
potential for j ud ic ial i nterpretations that broaden the amnesty, the  law ap­
pears to have been narrowly i nterpreted . 2 1 K  
In  both Hait i  and Guatemala,  t h e  i nvolvement  o f  the i nternati o nal  com ­
mun i ty i n  the am nesty processes bas accorded those processes i n ternational 
leg i t imacy. l i kewise ,  both countries '  laws have a s ignificant l y  restricted 
scope , complying w i t h  most i nternational  obl igations .  
D. International Con.1 tit!ttioncri lmmmzity 
Internaci onal Const i tu t ional I m m un i ty is the  most  narrowly ta i lored fo rm 
of amnesty and has the greatest legi t i m acy, bath domest ic  and i nternat i onal . 
Three defi n i ng elem en ts of Internati onal ly  Cons c i cur i onal I m m u n i ty are : 
Ji rst ,  that the legis lat ion conforms w i th a state's s tatus as an i nternat ional 
const i tu rional  emity ( i . e .  that it is  enacted th rough l eg i t i mate govern mental 
processes representi ng the voice of the peop le ) ;  second,  that the  leg is lat ion 
compl ies with the scope l i m i tations imposed by the internat i onal  const i tu­
t ion ( i . e .  chat i t  appl i es only  to those crimes wh ich  a s tate does not  have an  
i nternational d uty to p rosecute) ;  and  th i rd ,  that  the  legislat i o n  be approved 
by the i nt ernational com m u n i ty, e i ther  through a UN Secu r i ty Counc i l  
reso l ut ion or a wi dely s ubscri bed mult i - lateral  c reaty. This  most  restr ict ive 
c lass of am nesty is  an extremely recent development , and to elate ,  no s tates 
have fu l ly conformed to t h is model . The am nesty laws enacted in Bosnia & 
2 1  I C ucl l t lll<i l ctn LI\\'. a r [ l c l t  I I sr cirts : 
The Ui llltS w h 1 c h  ted I oms idc  r h e scope ot' rhe c:u r renr bw r > r  r hosc· char arc l ll<I l i c· n ctble or rhar  f(n 
w h i c h  rht  t x r 1 n cr ion  of pen<l l  rcspo ns i bi i i r l· i s  n o r  pe:rm i r rccl 1n c o n Cm m i rl· w i t h  rhc- I n t e r n a l  fa \\' u r  
I n rt m a r l o n a l  ( l"ta r i cs <lf'provtd I l l. rcn i ticcl bv C ua r c nu l a  \\' i l l  he· )HIJsecurccl 1 n  l l > n t'm m i t )'  w 1 rh r h c  
mtrhud L·s r cth i i sht•.l Ln- r h e  Code ot' Pcn,, l  Procedure .  
!d a rc .  I I 
2 1  S l)rc·s i d C ll l ol r h c  C uarcmaLm Con� rc:ss .  1\ l va ro r\ r w .  Lkscr 1 bc·d rhL· I a \\' as " nor ccd l [ I n� }  t( , r  <l 
,t:c·nera l  am nc.' l l. < l ild . .  nor p rov icl [ i i\t: }  prorec r i o n  fur c·l \ lll ll l O I I  n i nll:s. · ·  Ech,·arcl H t:)� S r rom.  C;ulclll. d.i 
fJlm <11'/�<! 11' l"rn.1 , H < > lSI'C lC.:  C t l l\ l l:"< . . Dl'l . . i S . I ')')h.  a t ,·\ I 
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Herzegovina and Croatia  do,  h owever, approxi mate the reg u 1 remenrs of I n­
ternational Cons t i tut ional Immunity. 
To place the B osnian amnesty l aws i n  context ,  i t  is i mportant co note 
chat, s ince the Dayton Peace Accords of 1 995 ( herei nafter Daycon Accords} , 
the stare of Bosnia & Herzegovi na has been comprised of two consti tuent 
ent i t ies-The Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovi na and che Republ ika 
Srpska. Each of these enc i t ies has a separate leg i s lative proces s .  Therefore, 
the Bosnian amnesty legislation consists of two separate laws ,  the Am nesty 
Law of the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Amnesty Law of the 
Republi ka Srpska . 2 1 9  ( Pre-existenc am nesty laws , each legal ly i nval id ,  i nap­
pl icable ,  and d iscussed herein only in the foomotes , further complicate the 
contextual background to these two laws . )22 1 1 The Federat ion and Srpska 
Laws only gram immunity for a narrow subset of crimes l i nked to speci fic 
provis ions i n  the penal code,  namely crimes against the m i l i tary forces , 
propagation of false information,  and possession of  weapons . :>:' t T h us ,  i n  ef-
2 1 9 .  Amnesty Law, 1 996, rejlri11ted 111 Ojli<'ial Gazette u./ Bn.r11ia & Her::;egom/{1 ( 8os & Herz . ,  federa t ion  
of Bosn ia & Herzegovi na) (on ti l e  w i t h  H a rvard J merncH i on cl l  Law Journal )  [here i nafte r  Federat ion  Law} ;  
Am nest\ Law, 1 996,  rejirillted i11 Ojfioal Gtizet!e of l?ej)ff/ilika s,p.�ka ( J3os .  &. H e u  , Repu b l i ka  Srpska) (on  
li le  w i th Harvard I nternat ional Law Journal )  [here i nafter  Srps ka Law} .  For  a d i scuss i o n  of the cons t i tu ­
t i onal s tarus o f  the  cons t i t uent ent i t i es o f  Bosn ia  & Herzegovina ,  see genera l l v  T H E  Yt:GOSI .AV C R IS I S  I '.'  
l 0T J : RNAliONAI. LA\\. ( Dan ie l  Buhlehem &. Marc \ve lkr  eds . ,  1 99 7 ) .  
2.20.  The  fi rst i nval i d ,  pre-ex i s t i ng l aw, the Decree w i th tht Power uf Law on A.m nesty, was passtd by  
t h e  ctu thor i t i es of the Croat ian Republ ic  of Herzeg-Bosn ia .  However, Art i c l e  I C) ) of the Cons t i t u t ion o f  
Bosn i a &. Herzegovi na does no c  1·ecogn i ze the  "Croat ian Repub l i c  of  Herzc-g- Bosn ia"  and  " therefore the  
l a ,,·s adopted by 1 ts organs are  n u l l  a n d  voi d . "  U . N . H . C. R .  Sara J evo, ;\ Ji/1/t.ll\' Lni'J i11 BIJJ I!Jd dl!d f-!tr::fgo­
, ;ll. t .  h t cp :/iwww. refugees .nu/i.·n/doc/amnesty. h c m l  ( v i s i ted .l\ !ar 2 2 ,  ] ( I ( J l ) . Th i s  law l'llSts p ro b k m s  for 
rwo .� roups :  I . " ( l ) n cl !v i d uals  l i v i ng  In Croat adm i n is cered ctrc:as hue  am nest ied u ndt:r the Federat ion 
Law . . and .2 . J nd i v i d u cl l s  am nest ied under rhe Croat i an Repu b l i c  uf H e rzeg - llos n i cl " b u t stayi ng 1 n  ocher 
pares  of  the Federat i on . "  !d .  TheorttJcll ly, l llcl i v l cl uals t�d l i ng i n  che f·(Jrmer clccgorv shou ld be i m m une 
from prosec u u o n  c ts tht Federa t ion Law hc1s va l i d i tv i n  CrocH-conc ro l l cd areas. bur 1 nd i ,· i d ua l s  1 11 cht 
second Cctttgory would he suh j ecr  co prosecut ion  as t he Croat ian R e p ub l i c of 1-f nze.� - Bos n i a  had no law 
mak i ng power at  the t i me the leg is la t ion was passed . !d.  See a/.f!; The Dayron Peace Accords ,  Annex lli 
(Cons r i cm ion of Hosn i a &. 1 -lerzt·.�o,· ina)  arc .  [( .))  ( l i sung the cons t i r uem enu r i es of Bosn1a  and H erzego­
,· i na) .  http://www.stare.godwwwi reg i ons/euribosnia/bosc1g ree. h c m l  ( v i s i ced J\hr. .2 .2 ,  2 00 I ) .  The· second 
i m·a l  icl ,  pre-exis t i ng l aw IS rhe Republ ic  of  Bos n i a  and J-1 trzego,· l n<l Law on i\ m nesty [he re i na(cer F.t­
pub l i c  Law) .  It was passed by rhe ,\ssem bh· of the R epub l ic of Bosn1a & Herze,!,;0\' 1 11 <1 on February 1 .2 , 
1 9 S}il,  and wets l ll i t ia l lv t mended ro appl y  thmughout c ht rerr i wry of Bosn 1 a  & Herze.sovina .  However, 
rhe r<:xr was adopred afrer tht s ign in,s  of che Daywn A ccords o n  December 1 -i .  I S}')5 <It che Par i s  Confcr­
UlCC Thar agretmem m ade chc 1\c:publ i c  of Bosn 1 a  & .Herzegov i net a legct l  mt i l i ty. As rht UN H tgh  
C o m m i S S i oner 's oftice e x p l a i ns :  "Thl' l aw ador)[ed I ll  February 1 9')6 b)· the  Par l t <lfllt'IH or c hc: R B H  [ R l'­
l ' l l h l i c  of Bos n i a  & Herztgov i na] is u ncons c l c u t i o ru l  s 1 ncc I t  wc1s aclop ctd lw a ltgl s l a t i ve body nor co m ­
pttc n t  to pass such kg is la r ion  . . . !J See ai.>IJ The Dayron Peace r\ ccurds ,  .'11,/' ; -c � ,  <lt I\ nncx l l J ,  arc .  I l l ( I ) , 
( .) )( a ) .  ( rc:strv l l1g w the  cons t i cuenr ent i t i ts a l l  non-tnumc:rclted l c-g l s l at l \ t  powers ) .  \Vh i l t  the Consr i tu �  
c ional  Court of Bosn � <t &. H c:rztp D v i n a  has nor rc:mo,·ed c h i s  ta rl ic:r la w  from rhc srcttmts by deemi ng 1 r  
u ncons r i t m i on a l ,  <l!lllleS(I' Ius been g r<tmed b<tsed on the Fcdt:r< t t ion Let\\' rathl'r thclll rhc· n. e p u h l i C  Law 
s i nce ) u nt l ':.!9CJ . 
.2 2 1  Ft:dnac ion  Law, r\ n ic l e I , rc:ads :  
A m rKSr\· 1 s  <! [>p l i ed c o  al i r'ersons w h o  I ta\(: lw Dt·ct: m ber 2 .! .  I <Jt) ) co m m i tted ni m i iU l  ctcrs <�.t:<l i nsr  
cht fou llC L t t l t > rh "f snc u l  s 1· s tv m and s ecu n c 1· uf l losn t < t  < tncl l·l e rzt·gcJ\· I n <l�Chcl]' t l 'r 1 5 .  <l,l!a i ns t c h e  
r n  i-uru:s�Ch:q>tt'i' .2 1 )  ol. ch c: C : r i !ll l r u l  ;\u cctkc:n O\'l'J' fru m 5 F IZ) , ccr l l on re " S c<t nCl' as  l 't'f Ar­
l i C l t  _) ( ) I .  prop<�,l!ar i oll of  L1 l sc: t n t< Jrma t l un as per Arr i c l t  2 1 h .  d l c,>.!<d pussr·s s 1 t > l l  of weapons ·,1nd ex­
I ' I < I S I \'t'S cts pn r\i·c r c l c  2 1 . .' f ( > resccn 1 1 1 r he  correspond I n.� C:1· i m 1 na l  r\u "I'J' I Iccl 1 1 1  rhc  r c r r i r on· of t i l l' 
l 't·du:I C i tl ll ol .  B os n i a  a n d  1-k rzt·,'-'u'· l n :l [ htrt l nafcer " c he  l 'ederat ion " ) .  as we l l  as th e· c r i lll l na l  acr  of 
5 1 2 Hctrvctrd International Law} ournal I Vol. 42 
feet ,  the Federation and Srpska laws reverse the exclus ionary word i ng of a l l  
am nesty laws previously considered in  th i s  Art ic le .  Previous amnesty laws 
granted general  i mm u n i ty and then prov ided a l i s t  of excep t i o n  cri mes to 
which am nesty does not appl y. The Federation and Srpska laws never grant 
a general  amnes ty, i ns tead enumerati ng an excl usive l ist  of cr i mes i n  relat ion 
to  which amnesty does apply. 
The two laws i mpose an add i t i onal substant i ve l i mi tat i o n .  A mnesty i s  
only granted to "cr imi nal acts against  the foundations of  the  soc ia l  sys­
tem . " 222  The crime must have been com m itted agai nst the s tate,  encom­
passi ng both the social system and the m i l i tary. n-l Am nesty i s  not granted to 
cr imes aga i nst  i n div iduals and thus ,  serious violat ions of i n ternati o nal  lm­
manitarian law d i rected at particular persons are excluded . W h i le these seri­
ous i n ternational crimes are not exp li c i t ly  excluded from the two amnesty 
laws (as they are in the case of the Guatemalan law) ,  the fact  that the Fed­
eration and Srpska l aws grant amnesty only in relat ion to an exclus ive ,  enu­
merated l ist  of cri mes excludes i nternat ional crimes from i m m u nity. These 
laws thus comply with Bosnia  & H erzegovi na's i n ternati onal obl igations  and 
demonstrate legi t i m i z i ng coherence. 224  
The 1 99 6  Croatian amnesty law ( " the Croatian law")  provi d es a second 
example of an I nternati onal  Cons t i tut ional I m m u n i ty. The Croat ian law 
ach ieves s i m i lar scope restr ic t ions to that of i ts B osn ian  counterparts , 
though through a d i fferent textual mechani s m .  The Croatian law beg ins  
with  a "general amnesty . . .  to the perpetrators of cri m i nal acts comm itted 
d ur i ng . . .  armed confl i cts . . .  in the Repub l i c  of Croatia .  2 2 'S  Artic le  3 of the 
nor respond ing co a m i l i cary ced i and avo i d i ng o f  m i l i rarv serv1ce b1· mak i ng l1 1 mse l f i ncapab le o r  b y  
1 m pos r u re and vu l u n cary l eav i n g  and escape from armed forces fo resee n 1 11 A n i c l e 8 o f  A pp l i car i un 
An of Cr i m 1 m l An of the R e p u b l ic of Bosnw and H e rzegov i na and C r i m i nal An ( ' 'Oftic 1 a l  Gaze r te 
of R B H ,  No 6/9 2 ,  l l / 9 2 ,  and 2 1  / C) 2 ) ,  i f  t he p u b l i s h m e n c  [s i c }  of r hese persons i s  foreseen bv ch is 
An or or her A pp l i car i o n  A c t  app l ied on rhe terr i tory of rhe Fed era t io n . 
Federar i o n  Law, wpra note 2 1 9 , arr .  I .  Srpska Law, Art ic le  I ,  rtad s :  
T h i s  L a w  shal l g ranc  t h e  i m m u n 1 ry from a prosec u t i o n ,  (Jt w ho l l y or parr i a l l y acq u i r ca l  o f  a scnrence 
[ s i c ]  o r  a non -e n forced pan of sen cence [here i n afrer the a m n es ty} ,  w al l  person s  who helve, berween 
Jan uary 1 ,  1 99 1  and December l · ' L  1 99 5 com m i t ttd c r i m i na l ac es aga i nsr rhe t(JLmdar ions of soc i a l  
system o f  R epu b l i ka Srpska u n d e r  C haprer XV, or c r i m m a l  ac rs agai nst rht m i l 1 tary [()rces o f  R e ­
pub l ! ka Srpska foreseen 1 n  rhe C n m i n a l Code of R ep u b l i ka Srpska,  and c r i m i n a l  aces of propaga t r ng 
of Ldse I n fiJfma t i on as pe r t\ r r i c l e  2 0 3  and I l l ega l possess ion of -.veapons and exp l os 1ves as per i\rr ic lc  
2 1 3  of the  C r r m l ll a l  Code of R tpu b l i ka Srps ka�spec ia l parr . 
Srps ka Law. wpra note 2 1  C), arc . 1 
.2 2 2 .  Federar i o n  Law, .111/Jra note 2 1  () , a r c .  l .  The S rpska Law IS s r m da r  co rhc- Fcdcra r r o n  Law i n  r h i s  
rcspec r .  Srpska Law, r11prt� n n r c  2 1  ') , arc . l .  
.2 2 .'\ .  U . N . H . C R .  Sara J evo, Cr,;;;;;lf};!di).' 
neritn/cluc/elmncsry. h r m l  ( v i s i rccl J'vLtr 2 2 ,  2 ( )( )  l ) .  
Lmn 111 l3rn 11ic1 c111d . h r r p :/ lwww. rcr'ugce s .  
_:> .24 . The S r p s k a  La,,· h a s  b e e n  1ncons is ren r h· ap j 'Led .  The pu b l 1 c pro s e c u ro r  of Ban k;r L u k 11 ,  r i t e· cap i ­
r a l  of t h e  Repu b l i ka Srps ka . has norcd c h a r  cases n o r  covered b1· t he l aw. t h o u g h  repu r· recl . a rc often nor  
proscc med . a pos 1 r i on scconclccl hy rhc p rosec u tor of Vi sc-.�rad Sec !Jill ! 111 f lu_, llid t!l!d 
,ppra Il O t t  .2 2 0 .  The S rps k;t Law d ots , however. I nc l ude an exp l r c i r exe-mpt ion  t( ; r  " u r m r n .d aces rhar  
re s u l t ed 1 11 prtmec! I ra ttcl m u rder. " S rpsk a Law, .!11/Jm I lore ::! l :J . ;liT 2 
2 ::! 5  Law on C e n e rcd 1\ mncsry 1 ';!')6 ( C: merr i a ) . 0/fi,MI C:cd!c {)( :In ';( C. n'< I!U Jlil. 8U (on  ti l e  
w I l h  H a rvard I mnnauon,; l  Ln\· J o u m a l ) I n· pog rapl t i cal  corrccuons  from u n o i'tiu a l  u·;mslar  i o n  nor  i 1 1 d  I ­
cMcd ) [ h nt· l n <Iftn C roar 1an L1w] .  The opcreH IVt r\ r [ l c l ts I and 1 o f  t h e  law r·eacl : 
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law chen provides an extensive l i s t  of exemptions from amnesty, which i n­
c ludes " the most flagrant v iolations of i nternational humani tarian law" and 
"war cr imes . " 2 26 These except ions are each t i ed ro articles of  the Croatian 
Penal Code227 and range from genocide ro s lavery, and discri m i nation ro  ter­
rori sm.  This extensive l i s t  of  except ions brings the Croatian Law i nto com­
p l i ance w i th most i n ternati onal obl igations .  Nonetheless ,  a general  amnesty 
fol l owed by a l i s e  of exceptions it  is  nor as effective a scope l i m i tat ion as an 
exp l i c i t ,  en umerated l i s t  of cr imes ro which amnesty attaches , such as chat i n  
the B osnian Law. For example ,  emerg i ng i n ternational cr imes ,  such as rape 
as a war cr ime and as a crime against  h umani ty,228  are notabl y  m i ss i ng from 
rhe l i s t  of exceptions in the Croati an Law. \Xlhi le Croatia m ay not bear 
spec i fic obl igat ions to prosecute t hese crimes , a true I n ternational Consri  m-
By t h i s Law a general am nesty i s  g ranred w tht  ptrperrarors of cr i m i nal  acrs co m m t rttd d u r i ng the 
aggress ion ,  armed rebe l l i o n  or arm ed contliccs ,  or  in  rela t ion  co che aggress ion ,  cumed contiicrs ,  or 
armed rebe l l ion i n  che Republ ic  of Croat i a .  
T h e  am nescy shal l  also app l y ro the execuc ion o f  a valid verd i([  pro nou nced r o  the pe rpe t rators o f  
cr i m i n al aces from paragraph I of ch is  A r c i c l e .  
The A m nest y fro m cr im i na l prosecut i on a n d  proceed i ngs s h a l l  app l y co che aces CDm m i r ttd d ur i ng 
the per i od of A ugust I 7 ,  l SJ90 co Aug usc  2 3 ,  I 996.  
Arr ic le  2 :  No c r i m i na l prosecut ion s h a l l  be u ndertaken and n o  cri m i na l  proceed i ngs shal l be i nst i ­
Cll ttd against the peqxtrarors of cn m i na l aces referred ro i n  A r t ic l e I of th is  Law. 
Cr i m i n a l  prosecu c i on al read y  u ndercaken shal l  be cancelled and cri m i nal  proceed t ngs a l  readv u n ­
clc-rway sha l l be termi nated ex n(/ioo by  r h e  courc ·s ru l i ng . 
An arrested person ro whom r h e  a m nes ty  u nder paragraph I of t i l l s  Arc i c lc  appl t es s h a l l  be re leased 
free bv rhe courc ·s  ru l t ng . 
!d. arcs .  1 -2 .  
2 2 o .  r\ rc i c le _) of rhe  C roarian Law reads :  
E xe mp ted fwm che  am ncsr 1· referred c o  t n  A rt i c l e 1 of c h i s  Llw s ha l l h e  ptrpcrmttns of thc mosr  
rlat: ranc v i o l a t i on s of h u man i tar i an Ll\v hav i ng cht charanet· of war cr i m e s .  S]Kc i ficdh·;  Acts of 
Genoc ide ( A rt i c l e 1 1  ') ) , \'Var C r i mes Ag,1 i ns r rhe C i v i l  �an P opu l a t i o n < A rr i c k· 1 .2 0 ; 1 )  \'Var C r i m o:s 
1\� a i nsc t he \'Vounded and Sick ( A mc l e 1 2 1  ; I )  \'Var Cri mes Aga i ns t Prisoners of  \'Var  ( A rt i c le  1 2 2) ;  
Organ i zat i on and I nst igat ion of Genocide and \'Var C n mes ( A rr ick 1 .2 .) ) ,  U n l aw fu l  K i l l i ng and 
\'Vou n d i ng of rhe  Enemy ( A rt i c le 1 2,1 ) ,  I l lega l Seizu re of P ossess ions from K i l l ed and \'Vou ncled on 
rhe B a t c l e fi e l d  ( Arr i c l c 1 .2 5 ) ; Use of P ro h i bi ted Combat Mecms ( A rm le 1 2 6 ) ;  V i o lat i on of E n voys 
( Art i c l e 1 .2 7 ) ;  Crue l  Treac m en r  of the  \'Vou ncled , S ick and Prisoners of \Va r  ( A rt i c l e 1 2 :-i ) ,  U n ­
J US t i fied Deby i n  R ep,H r i ar i on of the  P r i soners of \�'ar ( A r r i c l e  1 .29) ;  Dts cruc t wn of C u l r u rcd and 
H tsrortc Her i tage (Art icle 1 .'10) ,  l nsr i .�<Hion of the \'Var of Agg ress ion ( A r t i c le  1 .'\ 1  ) ; i\busc of I nt er­
nat i ona l S igns ( Art ic le  1 1 .2 ) ;  Jbc ial  and orher Discri m i nat ion ( 1\ rt ide 1 .1 3 ) ;  I m pos i t i on of S lavery 
<lncl Tr,lnsporr of E ns laved Persons ( A rt i c l e  1 .'14) ;  Tnrerna r i ona l  Termr t s m ( A rt i c l e  1 .'\ S J : E nda nge r­
mcnr of Pe rsons U nder I n r unar iona l  P rotect i on (Article  I �) o) ;  Tak t n�; 1-Ios t<l,!.;es ( r\ m c l e  1 .'\ 7); of rhe 
Bas t e  Penal  Code of tht Repu b l t c  of  Cruat i <l (Officia l  Gazer rt· No . .; l! 9 .o-rcv i sed rtx t ,  .1 5 /9 .1 ,  
I ON/9 5 .  a mi 1 6/ )!6 )  and c r i m ina l  acts o f  terro r i sm pu rs uan t  ro the pro1· i s i o n s  o f  i n ternat iona l  law .  
r>erperrarors of ocher cr im i nal acts  de ti ned in  the Bas ic Cri m i na l  Law ot rht R e p u b l i c  of Croa t ia 
( Offic ia l  G ,tzercc No. :; 1 !9 ')-I"L"V ised text  . . ) 5 / 9 .1 .  I ON/9 5 .  and I o/96) .  nor com m t t tcd d u ri ng r h t  
at:,s rtss ion .  cl rm td rebt l i Jo J l  or  arm e:cl cun R icrs  or i n  rt lar t O n  ro rht a,c;,c; rcss i o n ,  a rm ed re be l l i on ur 
armed cc m H i crs i n rht rr:pu b l t c tlf' C:ro,H i a  s ha l l be exe mp ted from am nest1· .  
! d .  a rt .  5 
� � 7 .  Sc�· Penal Code of [ he R cpu b i 1 L  of Crotu ia , (/tt:d i11 \VE L L E f\ 0.: B L JU ...:. r -\\;/l i i T F ,  .1/tf'rt� norc . j .l_ ar 
ch 2 .  
2 2 :-i .  r\ rcct· n r  d t·c i s i u n  o f  rhc· l n t trnat i nna l C r i m i n a l  Tr t bu n a l  !·or Yut: oslav t a  h cl S f< Jund rcli)C: a 11·a r  
c r t m c  ami a c r i mt· clt: a i n s t  l w m c1 n t r 1·. Sec Prosc·cu tor v .  D ra,t:o l j u h  K u n ct rac . et a l .  � ( ) ( I I  I CTY \! o .  I T-90-
� .:; .  c t r  -'i .) (,--'1 ()�1 ( Fch .  � .2 ) .  I t  i s  u nc lea r. h 1 m cn:r. w h t r hn r<lpt W< J u l d  q ua l t f1· c l S  c t  11·ar c r i m c ct,c;ct t n s r  r h c· 
( l \· i l t c t n  pnl'll la r i n t l  u ndtr /\ r t i c l t  1 20 ui'  the  C : rncu i ,ln Penal  c, ,cJe <llld r herd)\' he l'X<:Jl1[)[ from t h e  a m ­
nest \·. 
5 1 4 Harvard Intenwtional Lmc}o!!rnal I Vol 42 
tional Amnesty would not allow i m munity for such universal l y  condem ned 
and internationall y  prosecuted cr imes .  Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the C roa­
tian Law is  also noteworthy. I t  exempts crimes not comm i ned " d ur i ng the 
aggress ion ,  armed rebe l l i o n ,  or armed confl icts or in relat ion  co  the  aggres­
s i on . "  The use of the "or" conj unction al lows amnesty to app l y  i f  even the 
least restrict ive contemporanei ty test is met ,  rather than requ i ri ng the more 
res tricti ve relat ion rest to be met. Therefore, whi le  the Croatian Law in­
cludes s ignificant restrict ions on the  scope of i m m unity, i t  i s  too  i nc lus ive ro  
q ual i fy perfectly as an I nternati onal Consti tutional Am nesty. Nonetheless , 
on  its  face the l aw demonstrates coherence as i t  appl i es equal ly ro  everyone 
wi th i n  i ts j ur i sd ict ion _nc;  
The domestic l eg it imacy of the B osn ian and Croatian Laws approac h ,  but  
do nor meet ,  the require m en ts of I nternat i onal Const itut ional I m mu n i ty. 
Freedom House gave Bosnia  a score of 5 ,  5 (partizJly free) for 1 996-97 . 
While  th is  represents an i mprovement  from previous scores of 6,  6 (not  
free) , i t  suggests that  Bosnia & Herzegovina lacked the k i nd of  free d i scourse 
and pol i t i cal expression that characterizes I nt ernat ional Const i tut ional I m ­
m un i ty. 1 1 ( )  Nonetheless , a t  least proced ural democracy exi s ted i n  Bosnia 
when the amnesty laws were passed . The Federation Law was passed by the 
Federation of Bosn ia & Herzegov i na on J une 30 ,  1 996 pursuant co  the Con­
sti tution of the Federati o n  o f  Bosnia & Herzegovina,  and the S rpska Law was 
passed by the Srpska parl iament p ursuant co the Republ i ka Srpska Consri tu­
t ion . 1 1 1  The parl iament of the Federat ion ,  which prom ulgated the Federa­
t ion Law, " i ncluded representat i ves e lected i n  the 1 990 elect ions  for the 
Parl iament of Republic  of  Bosnia  and Herzegovi na from the terri cory of the 
Federat i o n . " 2 12 On Septe m ber 1 4 ,  1 996 ,  after the passage of the two laws , 
new electi ons were held p ursuant to the Dayton Accords ,  further i n d i cat ing 
a successful  democrat ic trans i t i o n . -' ' '  Furthermore ,  at the t i m e  the laws were 
2 2 9 .  lr  musr be noreJ , however, r h cH rhe Lnv I S  nor a lwa)'S appl ied 1 11 a cohet·em manner a n d  "Serbs 
kn·c: complai ned rhar some of rhem have been a r resrc·d u nder char�es whtch should be: amn tsr ied 
under rh e law . . .  \\ie.rtem Oj]it'ial.r Vi.ril V11ku/ '[ /r ro !Jz er.ret Purt'e Agrw11m1, Ac;t-: :-- : < : E  F ie Pla';;SI' ,  i\by 2 0 ,  
l 99S,  m ·ililable c�! L E X I S ,  Nexi s  L ib rary, A ,;.:ence France P resst f i le . T h e  l aw hcts, however, been appl ied 
successfu l l y  w some Serbs, such as Dragan Lapcc:,· i e ,  who was released pursuanr  ro che a m n esry afrcr 
b e t ng raken i n w  cusrocl y o n  war cr i mes charges.  CJSCE (,· it •eJ Ne•,;J'I 'd \VeleoJJN lo Za.�re/ /, F(,)i<�te Plai!J, 
Al; L N CI' F i t .  P i(ESS F ,  t\pr. l .  1 99S , d l 'r Ji!aiJ/e dl LEX l S .  Nnis  L i b rary. Agence F t- P resse f i l t: .  Acco t-d t ng 
w che Republ ic  of Croar i cl, by Sepctm ber  1 5 , l 99o.  ll l il trl ·- fnur Serbs had be:cn re lcas<:d p u rsuam :u cht 
law. l-'!!ri/Jer l?ej�<!l't ()JI Sil!!alii!JI o( f-llll!!t!ll 1\ig/Jt.i 1.11 C>ua!irl Pl!l'.i l!d!ll /1! !?e�rJ!Ifir,;t I() I ') ( 1 99 5  ) .  M 2  PR b:;­
\\'lln: . Dec . 1 0 , 1 996.  rrrailrrble a! L E X J S .  Nexis  Ltbra rl , Nt:w:> F i le .  
2 .1 l l .  See Fiu: t : D0,\1 I-!OL:SE,  J llj!J'rl noce 26.  
� :) l .  This  seu i o n  focuses prcd u m t nclceh· on r h c: donws r i l· l t:)2 J r i rnac\' ut '  l a,,·s t l l clcrl·d by r i l e· Fecl na­
r J on . \'\lh i l e  prog ress rended ru be s l ower in r h <:  R c:p u b l i kc1 Sq,ska.  rhc elentons and c: leu ion ccrr i tic a r i on 
d escr i bt:cl mji·<� app ly  ru burh C< l llS C I C U e n r  c nr i r i t:s ol - Flus tl l cl & H c rztgu v i ncl .  
� .1 2 .  l'ulera!ioJI o( !3rnl!id <111d f-! c r:;ugon;u. hr rp : -' 1 \\·ww.busn tanemhc!Ss\·.mg ,.. rb i h  h r m l  ( v t s t rt·d ,\!a r. 2 2 .  
200 I ) . \Vh d e  rhest t: lt:cr ions  han· hec:n c< > n s i dcrl'd cl .. L1i l u rc· o f  d<:mocra,:1· . . 1 1 1 rhar  ncH I <H l ;d i s r  pa rr ies 
l' 'l-v-.t i kcl , che 1· were " r i lL· on ly  Cree c- l u: c i "ns 1 1 1  l'1 o sn J ;J . .  lxfort· Dct\·wn .  [).·\\' I l l  C1 ! .� -...: l l l . l ' " ·  f\C l:; :--J l .-1 : 
F.-I KIN(; D E\ I < 'CI( .IC :Y  r\ FT I ; (  D.WT( ) _-..; 29 ( 1 ')9')) .  
2 _) _1 .  s,, C1 1Z0 1 L  R r ;C E I ,  TH I [l iU' . I k l' F  < H . Y1 co:; I . .-IV I.\ .1 :---: D n-1 1 -: \'\'- I I( I P.:  Bo_, '- il .·l - I  ( I ') ') S ) .  \'\f h i l e  
c h c;L· c leniuns  occurr<:d afce r  r h c  i'''iSScJ_L;L' t >f  r h c  la\\·s 1 11 l J lll'S l l l > l l . r h c-1· d u  serve ciS c\· t , !l'fllt' , ,r c h c  
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passed,  the OSCE cen i fied t hat "cond i t ions  existed for che  effecc ive hold i ng 
of elecc ions . " 2Y1 This finding i nd i cates char chere existed i n  B os nia  & Herze­
govina a pol i t i cal c l imate " i n  which  i deas could be open l y  come s eed and i n  
which i ndependenc oppos i t i o n  groups were encouraged . " 2 -1 5  Th i s  i s  not co 
say chat democracy in Bosnia & H erzegovina was ideal  or ful ly encrencbed i n  
1 996,  o r  even coday. The poi n c  i s  merely that by mid- 1 996,  Bosnia  & Her­
zegovi na was moving toward the k ind of represencacive democracy which 
respeccs the w i l l of the people as the u l c i mace source of  governmental 
auchority. 
The Croatian Law carries a s i m i lar level of domes t ic  leg i t i m acy. Freedom 
House gave Croat ia a score of  4, 4 (partial ly  free) in i ts 1 996-97 survey.2'0 
L i ke Bosnia & Herzegovi na ,  ch i s  score does noc suggest chat open and free 
d iscourse exisced . B u t  again ,  C roatia  was at l ease a procedural democracy. 
Ins tead of s i mply being d i ctated by a presidential  decree, che  Croatian am­
nesty law was passed by both houses of the Croatian Parl iament on Septem­
ber 2 0 ,  1 9 96. 2 ·) 7  Though Tud j man's governmenc has been cr i t i c i zed for i cs 
"authoritarian style of rule, ".:>3:> the parl iament that: promulgated the Croa­
t ian Law was elecced i n  open elections i n  October 1 99 5 . D ur i n g  those elec­
t ions ,  cbe opposi t ion cooperated and was able to pm forward a meani ngfu l  
agenda. 2 1'J The q ual i ty o f  these elections confirm the existence of procedural 
democracy ac  the time the C roatian Law was passed . 
sc rtngc hc:n i ng of democrat ic  i ns c i w c i ons and governmencal  resp<H1S i vc:ness w t h e  p u b l i c  w i l l .  I t  m us t  be 
n o ted c h a r ,  d ue w the frag i l e peace, loca l eleuions h ad w be pos tponed and vm i ng I rreg u lar i t ies,  s uch as 
b,d l nc box swfli ng , we-re reponed . /d. at 7 1 -7 :2  Nonecheltss .  chest· e l ect ions s rancl as ev 1denct that " the 
con rou rs of  an I ns r i r m i onal  framework for B os n i a and H e rzegov i na [ wt·re} e mt rg 1 ng . . . Eco:-�o,\ I I ST l i" ­
T I C LI . I <., ! : V. I  U i" rT ,  TH � e  Eco:--;o.,r rsT 1 :--; T � e L u c r: :--; u; U i': I T  COLl"TJZY R F PI J Jns -h H Q u.A WI TIZ  I ':! 9 0 .  
BOS'< I .-\ - H uzzr;c ;OV I :o-;A.  Cr<O.-\TI.A, SLOV I C '< I A  0 ( 1 996) . The most s i g n i licam of t h e  s i x separate t l ec r i ons 
o( December 1 996.  for our purposes, were the eltc r i n n  of 1 -'10 mem bers to rhc H ouse of Represen car i ves 
nt. the f'cdnar i on of Bosnia  & H erzegov i na and of t ig h ry-rh ree m e m l1l: rs w the N a t i ona l Asse m b l v  1l the  
R e p u h l i ka Srpsb . <lS these are  the  r w u  ent i t ies  w h i c h  passed r h e  am nesty laws . See H,-\NS ScH,\ I L LT:; .-\ '\ U  
) 1 : .-\ " I 'T E X I ' I . ,  TH I :  1 990 BOSi" l .-\ - l-! E!ZZEUJV I:,L-\ E L EC :T I O!':S :  A !':  £\ '<.A I .Y S I S  I J I '  H I ! :  O l lSEIZV.ATI CJ :--. S  1 5  
( 1 ':!9' ) ( not 1 n g  t ht b reakdown of t h e  voce amon).!S t t ht: pan i t s  i n  t htst two elect i o n s )  
� -)-\ .  SCHi\J ITTS A C.: D  E x u., Jlljlrt� note :2 .1 .) ,  at 1 1 ;  Jtt t�IJo T h e  Danon Peace Agreement , N ov. ::' I .  
I ')1)5 ,  Ros n 1 a  &: Herz . -Cro<l t . ,  at  A n nex .'i , h rrp:l/www.srart .gov/wwwhegi( 'ns/eu r.'bos n l a/day<�n n .') . h rm l  
( ,· i s i red .\Ltr. 2 2 ,  2 Ui l l )  (not ing t he rol e  o f  t h e O . S . C . E .  a s  a m o n 1 tu r ) .  
� .) 5 .  C I I .-\ '< D I .L I Z ,  J !ijlra note :2 .) � .  at I I ') .  
:2 .'> 0 .  See F IZ I T I JC.J,\1 Hu Lst : ,  .111jn ,, note :2 6  
� .'> 7 CrrMI Pt�rftc!llltlll /{"! ijin A,·(/Jrtf tcilb !3e(�r,"k. /\nJtJ ;\ 1111/t.\i) f.t �tc, D 1 :  UTSC H t :  P1z LSS I: - A c ;  t: i" T l!Z . 
Sep t .  �U .  1 990 .  Nonetheless,  rht rar i fy i ng a c r  of a [)'l r l iament , i f  nm per(cu. i s  of g rear s i ,c: n i ricanct 
� ) � .  Eeo:o-;o,\I IST h T I : J .L I C I : C.: C I: U N IT, Ecu :--;u.\J i q  h ! T L L I C I : :--; CI :  L i" I T  Cc JL; :o-; nzY P IUJF I J . F S  1 ')9-;-­
'):-l, l lns:o-.; 1 ,1 - H I · !VI:t.;o v l '-i.-\ .-I '< D  ( !{C >XI ' I .-\ .  ') -'\  ( 1 999).  Tud J m,l n ·s gu,·t· m mcn t  W<lS f,H frum a model  de­
l l 1UCLlCI. and tht  p<u l i <lll1CIH In quest ion was nm ntct·ssar i l v  n:pres t n t <l t i n· .  fn  Etc t ,  n u m t rous W<\r c n mts 
were com m 1 r rtd 1 11 Cro,n i a  befo re t h e  A m n est y, somt· q u i rt poss i b l y  11· i r h  Tucl p11 a n ·s knowkd.t:e or acq u i ­
cSll' IKt· . .\[orco,·er, n u mc: rous <ll legauons th rou.� lwur  1 9()6 suggested r ha r  Tud p 11an mav lun: Lx·tn g u i l t 1· 
of "ahusc o( pmver . . t(Jr, lllfu · rt!ld . fo1 i l i ng to con l i rm rhc  ass(·m b l v s c l l ' l'l " m menrs 1>t' m a n l r :> .  Eu J:--; ( J \ I I�T 
l '\ T I : I . I . I ( ; I .' .! U G '< I T . Ti l l :  ECO!': U ,\ I I :;T h T I : I . I . I C; I · C.: ( I  L C.: I T  Cl l l ' .-..: T I (Y  R il'( l l{ ' l .' 1 .:-cT () l ' ,\IZT I : I( I ')') G .  
Hl >.:-c .-..: I :\ - H I !VI l ;u\· 1 !':"1 , ( I( ( L\T I.-\ .  S t .u\T " L\  1 !l ( l ') ')(i J 
..' .) ') S"' Eco".:O ,\ I IST I 0: T U. U l; I : c.: u :  U :--; n ,  TH t: Eu J i" O .\ I IST I !' T I : L I . I c ; l  :--; u L '< I T  Cl > L i :-JTI(Y l\ 1 : -
1'( > I (  I :;  I S T  ()L:\1\ I I:  I( 1 990. 111/'�'" nort 2:) 0 .  at I (> . 
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The central reason  for p lacing the Bosnian and Croat ian laws u nder the 
category of I nternational Consti tutional Immunity is  that  both  demonstrate 
a h igh degree of i n ternational approval and leg i t imacy. Each law traces i ts 
source ro a mu l t i -lateral peace t reaty, the Dayton Accords , t o  end the  war i n  
the B al kans , with  exp l i c i t  U N  Security Cou n c i l  approval .  T h i s  i nternational 
approval serves two purposes : ( 1 )  l i m i t i ng the scope of  i m m un i ty and 
(2) enhanc ing i nternati onal legi t i m acy. As noted , these laws first  took shape 
in the Dayton Accords ,  which called upon the  parties to g rant  amnesty to  
any "returning refugee or d i sp laced person charged with  a cr ime ,  ocher  chan 
a serious violation of i nternati o nal  humanitarian law as d e fi ned i n  the Stat­
ute of the I nternational Tri bunal for the Former Yugoslav ia  s i nce January 1 ,  
1 99 1  or a com mon cri m e  unrelated ro the confl i c c . " 240 S tates-Parties were 
thereby req uired ro i nclude w i t h i n  their  amnesty legis lat io n  most  crimes 
com m i r red by d isplaced persons ,  but ro exc lude t hose violat ions of i nterna­
t ional  h umanitarian law w i t h i n  the j urisdict ion of the I n ternati o nal Cri m i ­
nal Tri bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), namely genocide,  crimes 
against  humani ty, and war cr imes . 2 i 1  The need for carefu l  d raft i ng of am ­
nesty legislat ion was further reinforced by UN Security C o u n c i l  Reso lut ions  
establ i s h i ng the Yugoslav Tri bu nai242 and the  Statute of the  Tri b u nal  i tself, 
which empowered the Tri bu nal  to prosecute "persons respons ib le  for serious 
violations of i n ternat i onal h u man i tarian law comm ir red i n  the terri rory of 
the former Yugoslavia s i nce 1 99 1  in  accordance with the prov i s ions of the 
present Statute . " 2-1 1 Any grant of amnesty t hat inc luded cr i m es wi th in  the 
j ur i sdict ion of the Tribunal would have been in  violation of  the Dayron Ac­
cords and the Security Counc i l  Resolut ions .  
The fact that the Bosnian and Croatian laws origi nated fro m  an interna­
t ional ly  superv ised peace process en hances their  i nt ernati onal  leg i t i macy. 
The Dayron Accords , which i nc l ude amnesty provisi ons of A n nex VII , were 
i ni t ialed by the Pres iclems of  Bosnia & Herzegovina ,  Croat ia ,  and Serbia2 i i  
240.  The D<lywn PeclCC Agreemem, Jltj>ra note 2 3 4 .  at A nnex V I I ,  art .  6 .  A r r i c k  6 reads 1 11 fu l l :  
Any rerurn i ng refugee o r  d i sp laced person charged w n h  a cr i me, mher than a ser ious v io l a t i on o f  I n­
ternational human i ranan l a w  as defined i n  the Stature of the l n rernar ional Tr i buna l for t h e  Former 
Yugos l av ia s i nce Jmuary I ,  1 99 1  or a common c r i m e  u nrelated to the confl i c r ,  s h a l l  upon re t u rn  
Cll J O)' an amnestv .  I n  n o  C<lSe s h a l l  charges t(Jr cr i mes b e  i m posed for po l i t i ca l or mher 1 nappropnare  
reasons or ro c i rcu m ve n t  the clpp l i car ion of rhe amnt:s ty .  
!d. an. 6 .  
24 1 .  Stature of t h e  l mernational Cri m i nal Tribunal for t h e  former Yugosla' i a  ( 1 9').1 ) ,  ref'I!Misbul i11 
B.-\SIC Doc u , I E :-iTS OF T H E  I NT E RNATIO:,L·\ L C IU � I I:--i,-\ 1 .  TJn n u N,\L Fol\ Yu;osi .. W L-\ I ( 1 9')S )  ( here maf-­
rcr fCTY Stature) .  
2 4 2  U . N .  SC:C)R , - I I I S r h  m rg .  at I ,  U . N .  Doc. SiRt·s/SUS ( 1 99 ) ) . (affi r m i ng r lur ' " a l l  parr i es are 
bound ro com p l ,· w i r h  obl igar ions  under  1 nrernar iorwl h u man t ra r i an Ltw . .  ) ;  U . N .  SCO R _'l 2 1 7 rh mrg. ar 
I ,  U . N .  Doc. S .t Res/8 2' ( 1 99 3 ) , (l:srabl i s h i ng rht Tri bu n a l  and rtq u 1 r i n,g rhar s ta res · · fu l l y  CUO]x:rare w 1 r h  
[ i t } . . (b,· rak i ng )  a n y  measures necessarv u nder t he i r domcs r i c  l a w  r o  1 m p l emc n r  the  pmvis tU i l S  o f  r hc­
rresem reso l u t i o n  ·c1wl r h t  Starurl:  .. ) . 
2-i ) f C:TY Sccmm· . .Ill/""  nc >re 2 1 1 .  a r t .  I .  
2 1i :i . The- ctccurcls \\ ere l !l l r ia lc:d by P res icl e m  l zc-rlxgov 1 c .  for rhc R tJ'u b l l c  of Bos n 1 a  ,'\: l l trztgov i ncl.  
P rts i c l c nc Tucl j ll1a n .  for r he Rep u b l i c  of C ro,H i a .  P res 1 d t m  i\[ i losev i c ,  tor rlw f'tc lera l  Rtpu b l ic oC Yu.eo­
s lav� <l and t; , r  the !Zcpub l i b S rpsk<'. and P rcs 1dtm Zubak , t-or chc federat ion  of Bosn ia  & l l c rzcgo' i n a .  
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and w i tnessed by members of the Contact Group : B r i ta in ,  France,  Russia ,  
t he  Un i ted States , Germany, and I taly. The  Accords received exp l i c i t  support  
from the Dayton Conference 's three co-chairmen,  U . S .  Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, EU representative Carl B i l d t ,  and R ussian Deputy For­
e ign M i nister  Igor  Ivanov, as  wel l as  from P residents C l in ton  and Yel ts in . 245 
Soon after the  s ig n i ng of the  Accords , the UN Security  Counc i l ,  acting u n ­
der  Chapter V I I  o f  t h e  U N  C harter, i ssued a reso l ut ion  " (a}ffi rm-(i ng} the  
need for the  i mplemen tat ion  of the Peace Agreement in  i ts ent i rety, " and  
cal l i ng " upon th e  parries to ful fi l , i n  good fai t h ,  the comm i tments entered 
i nto i n  that Agreeme nt . "1 1 6 The Secur i ty Counc i l  s i m i lar ly called upon 
C roati a  to i mplement i ts  amnesty law.247  The extensive i nternational  i n ­
volvement i n  the Dayton peace process and the exp l i c i t  U N  support for the  
peace agreements ,  i nc l ud i ng the amnesty provis ions ,  i m bue  the Bosnian and 
Croatian Laws with i nternational leg i t i macy. I nternati o nal i nvolvement  i s  
s uffici ent  t o  conc l ude that the w i l l  o f  the t ransnat iona l  p o l i ty a s  the u l t i mate 
source of authority has approved the am nest ies i n  these cases . 
The goal of the Bosnian and C roatian Laws appears to h ave been to e nsure 
protecti o n  of m i nor i t ies from arb i t rary prosecut i o n ,  w h i l e  s imul taneously  
fac i li tati ng accountab i l i ty for severe violat ions  of i nternational h uman i tarian 
law. The C roatian and Bosnian  Laws balance the d ua l  d i ctates of the Dayton 
Accords-a guaranteed am nesty for most  cr i mes and l iabi l i ty fo r vio lat ions 
of i nternat ional hu man i tarian l aw. The C roat ian amnesty legislation has 
been i nvoked by a number  of C roatian Serbs suspected of m i nor cr i mes 
during the war in the former Yugoslavia . 2 1x Yet ,  the legis lat ion has not  p re­
vented the ICTY from prosecut i ng the  perpetrators of serious violat ions of 
24 5 .  See R I C H A I{ \) HOUl l(()O K E ,  To E � D  c\ \Xf.\R _) 1 1 - 1 2 (Modern Li brary 1 999)  ( l 9')i:l) :  Rem ar ks a r  
r he l m r ia l i ng of r h e  Balkan P rox i m i ry Peace Talks Ag ree menr : Re marks by U . S .  Sec reL\r}· of Scare \V'ar­
ren Christopher and Presiclenr Mi losev i c  of Serbia,  Pres iclenr Tucl j man of Croa r i a ,  Pres idem fzerbcgovic 
of Bos n i a-Herzegovi na,  Represenrar i ves o f  rhc E u ropean Un ion,  rhe C:onracr G roup and Negor i ar i ng 
Team Members, Nov. 2 1 ,  I 995 , h r r p ://www l . u m n .edu/humanrrs/icry/clayron/dayro n rtmarks . h r m l  (v i s­
i red Mar. 2 2 ,  20ll l )  
2 -1 6 .  U . N .  SCOR _) 607ch m r,L; . ac 1 ,  U . N .  Doc. SIRES/ I ll_', 1 ( 1 99 5 ) . R esolucion 10."> I fu r c her s r ressed 
"che parr ies ' com m 1 r m t nr co c he r igh r of a l l refugees and d i splaced persons free l y  w re r u rn  r o  rhe i r ho mes 
of or ig i n in safecy"  r hrough a l i m l(t:c\ amnesry dec ree co prev e n r  reral iarorv prosec ur ion o( rci'ugecs . 
247 . U . N .  SCO R .) SO l rh mrg.  � 7 ,  U . N .  Doc.  S/Res/ 1 1 2 0  ( 1 997 ) The Reso l u r i on 
[ u)rges che Governmtnr  of r h t  R l'pu b l 1 c  of C roaria w e l 1 m i 1ure arnbigl! l c i ts 1 11 t m p ltmtnr<u i o n  of 
r he am ncsry Ll\v , and ro 1 m p l c me n r 1 r  fa i r l y  and o b j ec r i ve ly  i n  accordance wirh 1 n rc rnac iona l sran­
clard s ,  1 n parr i c u br b y  conclucl 1 ng al l  1 nves r i gar ions of cr i mes cowred bv rhe a m nesrv and u nd e r ­
r ak i ng an i m mediact and comprehens i \'tc review w i r h  U n i recl Nar ions and local Serb pan i c i pa c i on of 
a l l  charges ourscand i ng agai ns r  i ncl i v icl u cds for serious v i o l arions of i mernac ional  h u ma n 1 rarian law 
which are nor co,·ered b1· rhe a m neo> r ]· in order ro end proceed t ngs aga i nsr  a l l  i n d i v 1duals  acl!cl i nsr 
whom rh<::rt 1s 1 ns u i'tic i c n r  cv 1 d c n cc: . 
ld : '"" ,;/_,,, S ccuemenr , , r' rhc U . N .  Sec u r m· Cou n c i l  Prtos i clenr , Sepc .  2 0 ,  l 99G.  <'iter! 111 r11rtber lo!cf>''rt 011 
.\ i i!ttil!rlll o/ fltlli/ . 1 11 1\igh/.1' i11 C' ·"c�ri,; Ptn•;;,u![ ''' J(, , ,JIIIIiull 1 0 / ') , y;;pr{/ nore 2 2 9 .  
2 - I S .  D rag an Lapct·l· i c ,  fo r ex; l lll j> l t - ,  w a s  relt-c\SC:d o n  Aj.• r· i l  I ,  l 9 9 S  afc er 1 nvok i ng r h c  Lt11· ; tnd hav1ng 
h1s  arresr  wa rrct n r  clfl l1 U i lcd . OSCE (;n ,, !(,.,d! 'cd \h·IL"ti ilh' fiJ Zagrcl <r l?e/ll_<cc Plm1.r, .'!ifir,t n o r c  22';!.  In  roc a l ,  
m o re r h a n  I ', ,OU( J Serbs 11·ere pardom·d u nder r h c  l cg i s l a r i o n  b y  l\Ltrch I 9 9 8 .  Crm:nliih'lll ·''' j;n· Pctrd01Jo'd 
Ff>r,Jn t l iidJ r,(Soi;jimll \\':n·-J(,/,;ro:d C�ur�u , ,-\ssoCI XI'E D P R L:ss, i\la r. 1 0 , ! 9 9 S .  
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i n ternational  h uman i tarian l aw . .?49 C roat ia  a n d  Bosnia  & Herzegov i na have 
secured i nternational  s uppore and l egit imacy by fi n d i ng che m i dd l e  g round 
of  amnesty for some and accountab i l i ty for ochers . 
B y  exami n i ng l eg i t imacy and scope, ch is  Art i c l e  has developed a frame­
work for anal yz i ng am nesty leg is lat ion w i t h i n  four  c learly d i s t i ngu ishable 
categories . The boundari es of t hese theoret ica l  categories are p ermeabl e .  
Wh i le n o t  every amnesty l aw firs  perfect l y  i nto a category, t h e  two-axes 
framework high l ights i mporeant systematic d i fferences between the l aws .  
Pa r e  II has essent ia l l y  constructed a framework . Part III  beg i n s  t h e  p rocess of 
operac ional i z i ng the fram ework by s uggest i ng how courts  have i mp l ic i t l y  
appl ied i t  i n  the pas t .  
I I I .  CHALLENGING IMMUN ITY 
The effect of these fou r  categories of am nesty-Blanker A mnest y ;  Loca l l y  
Leg i t im i zed,  Part ia l  I m m un i ty ;  I nternati onall y  Leg i t i mized , Part ia l  I m m u­
n i ty ;  and I nternati onal  Cons t i t ut ional  I m m u n i ty-depends as m uc h  on 
the i r  app l i cation as  on the actua l  text  of the l aws . So far, ch i s  Art ic le  has fo­
cused predom i nant ly  o n  a pure ly  textual  read i ng of amnesty l e g i s l at i o n .  Part 
III  turns to the appl i cat ion  of t hese l aws by exami n i ng recent chal l e nges to 
them in a variety of forum s .  Legal chal l enges to the val i d i ty of am nesty l eg­
i s lat ion genera l l y  have taken two forms :  pet i t ions  to  the I nter-American 
Com m i ss ion on H uman Rights  [here i nafter the I n ter-American Com m is­
s ion} and cases brought  befo re the h igh courts  of che s tates t hat e nacted the 
l eg i s lat ion . Th is  Part supplements the analyt ica l  framework deve l oped i n  
Pare I I  by evaluati ng the j ud i c ia l  i n terpretat ion and app l i cat i ons of  these 
a m nesty laws . 
A considerat ion of the j u ri sp rudence of cour ts enforc i ng am nesty  l aws i s  
of parei cular  s i g n i ficance,  a s  i t  a l l ows us co  te s t  the  analyt ica l  framework 
developed in  Part I I .  W h i l e  avai lab l e  case law is s t i l l  l i m i ted , the res u l ts are 
c lear. B lanket Am nesty is accorded no excracerri corial  val i d i ty and  on ly  some 
recog n i t ion by subseq uent  reg imes in enac t i ng states . Loca l l y  Leg i t i m ized,  
Part ia l  Am nesty l i kewise receives l i t t le  i n ternational  recog n i t i o n ,  though i t  
i s  more often accorded domest i c  authori ty. I nternational l y  Leg i t i m i zed , Par­
r ia l  l nmm ni ty tends to be upheld boch domest i ca l l y  and i n ternat i o na l l y. 
U n foreu narely, the body of case law i n  th i s  area remai ns smal l and i s  ne i ther 
broad nor cons i stent enough to provide precedentia l  value .  I t  does i nd icace , 
however, that courts have , even i f  unknow i ng l y, app l i ed a framework not 
un l i ke chat  devel oped in  c h i s  Art i c l e .  
� I SJ .  s�t  CIJ{ t l"l!lilt'J/1 ·''' fn· P,;)"JIJiitd '{j;fJ/1.\,IJ!d\ ,1-ScJl.i Jj"()i/1 \Ln·-f?t-lt!lt.:J Cb.n;::,LI- . _\ft/'1'.{ ll U(C" � - i ;-)  ( l) ( lf l fl_� 
c h a r  b\· I ') '):-; e l l �  !CTY ILod t nd i ncd r "·cn r y - ti n- C:r(Jac i , in  s u s  peers sr•c·c i ticd l )· t �c m p r td t·rum a m nc s c \  ) .  
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A .  Application of Blanket A llmesties 
B lanket A mnesty h as been th e  sub jec t  of considerab l e  j ud ic i a l  attentwn 
by the  I nter-American Court  and the  I nter-American Com miss ion . B ecause 
many of the B lanket Amnesty l aws promulgated dur i ng the 1 97 0s and 
1 980s were of Lat i n  America n  or igin ,  these two i nter-American i ns t i tut ions 
have been wel l  s i tuated to conduct j ud i c ia l  i n q u i ry. � 50  The maj or i ty of t h i s  
body o f  case-law has n o t  dea l t  w i t h  the  ac tual val i d i ty of am nesty l egis l a­
t i o n ,  but rather  the r ights  of v ict ims to adequate means of redress for grave 
human r ights  violat ions . However, there have been a few except ions . 2 5 1  I n  
each of the  fol lowi ng cases , a n  i n ternational  t r i bunal  found B lanket Am­
nesty  l aws i nval i d  and unenforceable .  The tr ibuna l  condemned the  e nact i ng 
states and found each amnesty to  be a fundamental  v io lat ion of  i n ternational 
l aw. These cases support the p roposi t i on that B lanket  Am nesty l acks val i d i ty 
and should not  be enforced domestica l ly  or ext raterri  tori  a l l y. 
The vast major ity of pet i t ioners before the two In ter-American i nst i tu­
t ions have based the i r  c la ims o n  r ights  enshr i ned in  the I n ter-American 
Convent ion  on H uman Rights ( " t he I n ter-American Convent i o n " ) , 2 5 2  wh ich  
requi res states to upho ld  the  " ri g h ts and  freedoms recogni zed"  i n  the  I nter­
Am erican Convent ion ,  i nc luding the  r ight  to j udic ial persona l i ty, the r ight  
to a fai r  tr ia l , and the r ight  to j ud i c ial protect ion . I n  front  of the I n ter­
American Court and Comm iss ion ,  these t reaty-based rights have given r i se  
to cla ims t hat  B lanket Amnesty laws enacted i n  Lat in  America v iolate s tate 
obl igat ions to v ict ims .  \'Vh i le  the Court 's and the Comm iss ion 's scope of 
i nq u i ry are ad m ittedly l i m i ted ,  t hese cases provide the o n l y  s i g n i ficant and 
systematic cons iderat ion of th ese i ss ues by an i n ternat ional  t r ib unal to elate .  
The Inter-American j ur i sprudence begi ns w i th the Velc!Jqmz Rodrfgmz 
Cm e,  brought against  Hond uras before the Inter- A merican Court i n  1 98 8 .  
Velchqmz Rodr<�mz was not ,  however, a d i rect  chal l enge to a n  amnesty l aw, 
but  rather a complai n t  on behalf of t he  relat ives of Manfredo Vetisquez ,  who 
bad been i l legal l y  detai ned by mem bers of the State I n format ion  Service and 
eventual ly  became one of the " d i sappeared . "  Referring to Artic le  1 ( 1 )  of the 
I nt e r-American Convent ion ,  the  Court found " that [the} pract i ce [of} torture 
and assass inat ion w i t h  impu n i ty i s  i tself  a breach of the  d ut y  to preven t  
v io lat ions o f  the rights t o  l i fe a n d  physical i n tegrity o f  t h e  person . " � 5 1 The 
Court went on co b o l d  that Art ic les 8 and 25 of the Convent ion obl igate 
s tates " to mvest i gate every s i t uat ion i nvolvi ng a v io la t ion  of the r ights pro-
-i . 
.l S U .  See C:harrcr  1 1 !  c h �  Orgcm iz:H tnn of A m e r i c a n  Sc cues, 1\pr. _) I I .  I ') 1 .'-i .  I I ') U l\ .T.S .  1. :rr c h . :) ,  a r c .  
.! 5 1 .  l ' u r  : t  d t S C L I S S t u r t  1 1 f  r ! r c· l mn- I\ m cr i c :tr r  l-I u n u tl l\ cg h r s  s1·s c �m.  sc·c l 1 · J u .  i\ 1 .  P:bq u a l u cc i ,  
Thl \\" /i(J;,, Tri!tli di!d F)!/! r!1t 7}·;;/b: --rr!l!b ci))//JI!/_1-_\-jl))/_\. _ ; ;/{/ l/iL' /;;!er-l\ Ji!Cri(r !l/ f-litli/c!ll 
1 _:  ru ; h 1 1 .  L J  1 � 1 1 I 'J'.! h 
-' 5 -' A rn n r c a n  C : ( l !l \'l'l1 l t o n  un l l u m J n  R 1 ,� h r s ,  J u h .  I S 1 9 7 S ,  I I i i U N.TS .  I "\ ) ,  ac t l r . 2 ,  a r c .  S .  
2 5 1 Vc: Lisq u c z - l\ od r r ,LC tt lZ Casc. J udg m t n r  of _j u l 1  ?. 9 ,  1 9S S ,  l nrn- r\ rn  C l-1 R .  i Sc r C)  N u  \ ( l l) S S ) ,  
9 1  1 ' 5 ;;; .JS l . L \ l  ?. ') I ( l l)S ') J  
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tected " in the Convemion . 25 -'i The Coun concl uded that Honduras had 
breached i ts  obl igations " to carry out an i nvestigation i nto the d isappearance 
of Manfredo Vel asquez,  and . . .  [to} ful fi l  . . .  i t s  dut ies to pay compensati on 
and punish those respons i b l e . " 2 5 5  States-Parr ies  ro  the Convent ion thus have 
an affirmative dmy to thei r c i t i zens to prevent  and punish serious h u man 
rights v i o lations . 2 S6  
The Inter-American system also considered the val i di ty of B lanket A m ­
nesty i n  cases before t h e  I nter-American Com miss ion ,  a " q uas i - j ud ic ia l  
body" with  the authority r o  i s sue recommendations ,  buc  wi thout  enforce­
ment  power. 1 5 7  The cases before the Commiss ion fal l  i nto cwo categories­
the earl y  j ur isprudence of 1 993-94 and the more recent C h i l ean  case of 
1 997 . Development of th i s  j ur isprudence i nd icates a growi ng condemnation 
of B lanket Am nesty. 
The 1 992-93 cases befo re the I nter-American Commiss ion a l l  found chat 
states have a dmy to i nvestigate human rights v io lat ions and to ensure com­
pensation for v ict im s . --' 5 8  In i ts  October 1 99 2  repon in Consuela v. A rgen­
tina , 2 5 9  the Commiss ion confronted an amnesty law,260 which a l lowed for the  
prosecmions of top m i l i tary com manders and created an i nvest i gatory 
m echanism to record past atroc i t ies .  Nonetheless , the Com m iss ion found the 
am nesty l aw i ncompat ib le  with the s tate's obl igations under the  I n ter­
American Convent ion,  i n terpre t i ng the right to a fai r  e ria l  u nder Art i c le 8 . 1 
to apply  to v ict i ms and perpetrators al i ke . 2 r; 1  Wi th  respect to "access co j ud i ­
cial  protect ion"  u nder Artic le  2 5 . 2 of the Inter-American Conve n t i o n ,  the 
C o n1miss ion  noted a duty to "e n s ure that any person c lai m i n g  such remedy 
sha l l  have his  r ights determ i ned by the competen t  authori ty p rovided for by 
the legal system . " --' (,--' F i n a l ly, che Com miss i o n  c i ted the VelrfJq11ez Roddgmz 
j udgme n t :  " s tates m ust  prevent ,  i nvest igate and punish  any v i olat ion of the 
rights recogn i zed by the Conve nt i o n . " 2 (, ;  In a s i m i lar reporc for !vlendoza 1.1. 
Umg!!ay,26 i  the Com m iss ion  reached a nearly iden tical  con c l us i o n ,  fi n d i ng 
.2 5 - t  ld � l 7 G 
.2 5 5 I d. � l 7 8 . 
.2 5 G .  Rekvan r  Swres-Parries ro rhc C:n1wemion :111d r h c i r  respecr i ve d ares of rar i ficarion of rhe Convtn ­
r i o n  are :  A rge n r i n a  ( .2/ .2/84),  C h i le ( 1 1 / .2 .2 /6<) ) .  E l  Salvador ( l l /.2 .2/69),  Guartma l a  ( 1 1 /.2 .2/69), Hair i  
( <)! 1 -i /77 ) , Honduras ( I  I / .2 .2/(-,9),  N icaragua ( l l !  2 .216<) ) ,  Pe ru ( 7  I 2 7  /77 ) ,  and C rug my ( I l l 2.2/69) .  
� 5 7 .  R ubert 0 .  \Vt i nc-r, Tr)ill,� to  ; \ ! ,tkc [;;dr , \ l ed: l�n o;;cilillg the Lcll i · i!lld Prt�mce of f-11111/dil /-(igbt.> ;\ i/1-
IICJ!ieJ, :2 6  ST. M,\ I{Y ·s  LJ 8 5 7 , 8 6 5 0 99 5 )  
.2 5 S .  Stt Doug lass Casse l ,  LeJJ''''·' jiw11 If,, ,-\ 1}/erit<t.>: C11ulelillc.r _1;,r llltenh!fllllhif Re.>jio11.re to ;-\n/1/e.>tieJ ;;,r 
:-1 rmotiu, 5 9  L. & Co:--:n.:,\ I P. P ROilS.  1 9"7 .  � 1 .2  ( 1 99G) 
.2 5 9  Case 1 0 . 1 �17 , l n reu\ m .  C . H . R .  -I I ,  O L\ .\u L: V : I I 8 ) , doc .  1 - i ( l l)9 _) L 
.2 60 .  F i na l Au ( r\r,':' . )  and Dut Obc:cl i c n c c  Ltw . . l ltjl!·a n o r e  9 1 .  
2 6  l .  See Consutlo v. Argtn r i na . Case I ( I  l \ - I nr e r- A rn _ C H . I\ . - i l ,  9[ _:; _:; ( nor  i n .';  " ch c  tffeccs  of c he 
c! J spu red m eas u res \\';!S ru wea ke n rhe v i c r 1 m ·s r i!; h r  w b r i n,<: a n i iTl J na l  an i on 1 11 a c u u rr of· [a,,- - - )  . 
.2 6 2 .  /J 9[ _)S(a) 
:2 6 .1 .  !d. 9i -i O ( q uo[ ) n g  YcLisqutz- R od rlguez Case . .J u d ,<: m c n c  of J u l y  2 <) .  I l) S S .  l nrn-t\ m .  C.l-1 R .  
( Scr  C )  1'\ u  --i ,  91 I 0Ci . )  
� 6 4 .  J\ [e ncluza ' - U r ui..: ua \ .  Case I l l < 1 2 <) .  l nrn- r\ lll . C . H . R . 1 5 - i .  O E r\ i scr L!V/ I I S  ) _ d o c. 1 - \ ( 1 99 1 )  
I n  c h i s  case che C o m m 1ssion acl d resst:cl r h e  Lhugua1·an :t m l i c S r l·. w h 1 c h  Lurr·ccl a l l  c r i m 1 11:rl  prusec u r 1uns  
b u r  lefr c i ,· i l  remechts ! IHac r .  Sec C1,;sel .  r11j>r.t nor<:· 2 5 :--> , :ll � I I .  Four ptr i r i oncrs had denuuncc-d Uru-
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the i nvolved amnesty l eg i s lat ion  to have v iolated the  v ict im 's r ight  to a fai r  
tr ial  and t h e  state's ob l igation  to i nvestigate.  The Commiss ion  d i d  n o t  deem 
all amnesty l aws de facto violat ions of the I nter-American Convent ion ,  but 
rather i nd i cated the need to "weigh the nature and gravi cy of the events  
w i th which the l aw concerns i tse lf. " 2 65 
From these t h ree cases , one can conclude c hat the Commiss ion  was d is­
mayed by the amnesty l aws in  A rgen t i n a  and Uruguay. Yet ,  d ue to both i ts 
non-b i nd i ng authority and i ts awareness of the pol i t i ca l  rea l i t ies of Lati n  
America,266 the Comm iss ion was not  i n  a pos i ti o n  to make a defi n it ive 
s tatement on the i nval i d i ty of  a l l  B lanket Am nesty laws under  the I n ter­
American Convent ion . Rather, the Commiss ion  ident ified certain aspects of 
the l eg is lat ion chat were in breach of the  Convent ion  and p roposed a lternate 
acceptabl e  solut ions .  The Commiss ion 's final  recommendat ions  focused o n  
nei ther the i nherent i llegal i ty o f  amnesty laws nor on the ob l igat i o n  c o  pun­
ish perpetrators , bur  rather on the  r ight of v ict im s  to " j us t  compensati o n  for 
che v iolac ions . " 267 The Comm iss ion was i n  the awkward pos i c i o n  of s imul ta­
neously  condemn i ng am nesty l aws w h i l e  g iv i ng g uidance as to what could 
leg i t i m i ze s uch a law. This  d i fficulty  arises because the Comm iss ion  based 
i ts analys i s  on v ict ims '  r ights to redress rather than on the  leg i t imacy of the 
legis lat i o n .  This may be unders tandable on the grounds that,  s i nce the laws 
had been passed by effective,  recogn i zed governments ,  the Commiss ion 
found i tself unable  d i rectly to quest ion  the laws ' vali d i ty. Had the Comm is­
s ion been wi l l i ng to d i saggregace the  stare and base i ts cons i derat ions d i ­
rect ly  on t h e  l eg i t i macy of t h e  leg i s lat i o n ,  i t  might have reach ed far more 
coherent  and j urisprudent ia l l y  cons i s tem resu l ts .  
The I nter-American Com m iss ion took a seep i n  c h i s  d i rect i o n  i n  a m ore 
recent report of October 1 5 , 1 996 i n  the case of Hermosi!la v. Chi!eY''" This  
report affirms an ob l igat ion  to prosec ute perpetrators of ser ious v i olat ions of 
the Conve nt ion and condemns the C h i lean leg i s lat ion . The Commiss ion 
notes that C h i l e  has " recog nized i ts obl igations to i nves t igate previous v i o la-
g uayan l aw No. 1 5 . ::>..:!:--\ as app l i ed , arg u 1 ng rh ctr 1r v i o L!reJ r ights  enshri ned in rhe l nr t r- A m c r i cm Con­
vcnr ion .  Mendoza, Case 1 0 .029,  l nr c r- A m .  C . H . R .  1 5 ..:! .  
2 6 5 . l ei.  91 .1 8 .  I n  r h e  rh i rd case from r h e  t,tr ly 1 990s,  r h e  Com m i ss wn cons i dered r h t  am ntsry leg t s Lt ­
r i o n  1 n  E l  Sa lvador and aga i n  re.1checl a s i m i Lt r  concl us ion ,  bm n orecl t hat an amnesty nor  preceded by an 
i nd iv1dual  acknowl edgmenr of respons1 b i l J t )' was part icu larly problema t i c .  See Report on rhe S i r uarion of 
H u man R ig h ts in E l  Salvador, l n rtr-1\ m .  C . H . R .  OEA/Esr/L!V/l l . S 6  ( 1 99-1) .  
2 6 6 . See Cass e l ,  Jllj!ra nore 2 5 8 ,  a r  209 
267 .  See Cons ue lo , Case I O . l -i 7  l nr t r- A m .  C . H . l\ 4 1 ,  ar  Recomrnencla r ions .  91 2 ;  M e n d oza, Case 
l lUl29.  l nr er-1\m. C. H. R .  1 5 ·-1 . ar Recom mendations, 91 2. One comnwn raror suggtsrs rhar rht Comm i s ­
s i o n  would l i keh· appro,·c o f  an am nt:srv char  mer r h e  lcl l l ow i ng cond i r i on s :  r lur i r  d tcl . .  nor  p rec l u cl t: 
J il c l i v t cl u,ll i n vcs r igar i o n ,  rhar  i r  cl t d  nut 1-'rt" J ml icc rht n c r i m "s opport u n i t y  ro seek ,t nd obr,t i n rcpar<l­
r ions,  . .  and rhar  ir did . .  n or prc·c l ude publ 1 c  ack n! J\v l edgemtlH or" r he bcrs . . . \Vt i ner, .'ltf'u norc 2 5 ! .  ar 
0' 1 
.:' 6 0 .  Cast I U .S-\.'> ,  l mer- r\ m .  C. H  R .  l ) 6 .  O L \istr.! L V 1 I J . SJ 5 due.  7 re1·. ( l 99 6 ) .  Tim case c u n s , c!cred 
rht p ro b l e m  of t m pu n J t l· 1n C h i l e  tc1 r rhose rt"spons i b k  I�Jr the ,u-res r  '1ncl d tsappecHcli1Ct u f  Stl·tn r l· t n d l ­
' 1duals .  The peu r i oncrs had sought  dumcs r i c  recourse i n  Ch i l e b u r  had r h t i r  cast d i s m issed f'Ursuanr w 
rhe  ,\nHlt::S t \· Decree Law :2 I 9 1 . See cl t sCLb S I O n  of rhe  C h i l ean Lill" . .fltjil "c i ,  rt;;r accu mp<t n i· J n g  nmes i /-6- . 
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t ions of human rights " through a trmh commiss ion .- �69 Nonetheless ,  the 
Com m i ss i on boldly states :  " the app li cati o n  of amnest i es renders i neffect ive 
and worth less the obl igations  that States-Parties have assumed under . . .  the 
Convent ion .  " 270 The Chi l ean government is  nor merely i ns t ructed ro  com­
pensate vict i ms ,  bur i s  also condemned for a "fai l ure to amend or  revoke the 
de facto Decree Law. "27 1 Moreover, Chile i s  i nstructed ro " idenc i fy the  g u i l ty 
parties , estab l i s h  the i r  respo ns i b i l i ti es and . . .  prosecute . . .  and p u n i s h  . . .  
them . "27 �  HermoJilla thus clar i fies the extent of a s tate's dut y  u nder  the  I nter­
American Convenc ion to i nvestigate v io lat ions ,  idenc ify perpetrators , and 
punish the gui l cyY 3 No amnesty law, no matter how carefu l l y  tai l ored , 
could conform to the d i c tates of HermoJilla . 
While  the Com m iss ion considered the actual amnesty legis lat ion i nvolved 
in Hermosilla, i t  wenc coo far by c lai m i ng chat no amnesty law cou l d  be per­
m iss ible .  Accord i ng to t h i s  Art ic le 's analys i s ,  Chi le  may be unable to pass a 
val i d  am nesty law because i ts governmenc  does not reflect the  k i nd of le­
g i t imacy developed in  Part  II ,  n ot because any amnesty, no matter how nar­
rowly tai lored or how l eg i t i mate l y  enacted is per se i nval i d .  By tak i ng a d i f­
ferent starting poi nt-the leg i t imacy of the legislat ion , rather  than v ic t ims '  
r ights-the analyt ical framework developed in  th is  Art ic le  provides concl u­
s ions more subtle and n uanced than those offered by the  !mer-Am erican 
Comm iss ion,  under which am nesty leg i s lat ion is e i ther per se val i d  or  i nva­
l i d .  This  framework accouncs for the varyi ng deg rees of l eg i t i m acy and the  
range of poss i ble scopes of am nesty leg i s lat ion .  Nonetheless ,  the Commis­
s ion 's j ur i sprudence ind i cates that  B l an ket Am nesties ,  such as those  adopted 
i n  Lat in  Am erica, are i nval i d  and wi l l  not  be enforced by i mernac ional  t r i ­
bunals . Whi le  the Con1 m i ss ion  was correct to i nval idate these laws , i ts rea­
son i ng may have been se lf- l i mi t i ng ,  rather t han standard sett i ng .  
B lanket A m nesty bas also been chal lenged i n  domestic forums ,  namely i n  
the h igh courts o f  the vari ous scares i n  which the laws were e nacted . On the 
whole ,  these couns have been t�u more l ike ly  co recogn ize and enforce am­
nesty laws ,  even B lanket Amnesty. The most  recent cases , however, suggest 
that domestic  courts may be m ov i ng toward non-enforcement  of B l an ket 
Am nesty. 
The cases of domesr ic  recog n i t ion and enforcement share a few common 
trends .  F i rst ,  pet i t ioners before the h igh court of a state have general ly  
clai med chat th e  amnesty l aw i n  q ues t ion  v io lates a r ight establ i shed in  the 
const i tu tion of chat s tate ,  rather than i n  a treaty obl igat ion  or customary 
i n rernacional  norm . U n l i ke the I n cer-Amer ican Com miss i o n ,  nat iona l  courts 
do have b i n d i ng au thority and have tended to upho l d  am nesty  laws .  Jud i c i -
.:>(,� H ernws d L1 ,  C1sc· 1 1 ) ,'-) j) , ! mer- A m .  C. l- ! . 1\ .  1 5 6 .  '�1 -i l .  
2 / 1 ) .  JJ 11 5 1 )  
2 7  I .  !d 91 (, I .  
!.. ! 2 .  !d �H R tC\ lll1 n1t·ndac ions ,  '�f ell I l l ,  ' 7  
..:. �  � - 5;:"(' c���sc l .  ,l!!f'rLt 110[( . .' .2 5 :---; , ac _z l r.)- 1 '  0 
200 1 I Reframing Impunity 5 2 3  
aries have often y ielded to l eg islative and execut ive authority, cmng i mpor­
tant policy reasons behi nd the am nesty l aws . As i s  the case i n  the I nter­
American sys tem , domest ic  courts have rarely cons idered l eg i s lat ion  i n  l ight  
of i nternati onal cr imi nal obl igat ions .  Domestic challenges , therefore ,  do not  
resolve q uestions of i nternat ional l egal val i d i ty of amnesty legis lat i o n ,  but 
mere l y  provide gu idance as to the app l ication of amnesty laws by e nact i ng 
s tates . The most s ign ificant domest ic  cha l lenges co B lanker Amnesty have 
occurred i n  Argem i na, 27'� C h i le , 2 7 5  and E l  Salvador, which w i l l  be analyzed 
below.27 6 
I n  1 98 7 ,  the Argent ine Due Obed i ence Law was chall enged i n  the Argen­
tine Supreme Court .  The pet i t ioners claimed that the D ue Obedience Law, 
which  created an i rrefutable presumption chat so ldiers acted pursuant to 
command o rders,  "prevented courts from exami n i ng issues which are of thei r 
exclusive compecence . "277 Wi thout confro n t i ng the q uest ion ,  or  provid i ng 
any meani ngful reason ing ,  the Court determ i ned that the A rgent ine  Con­
gress has the power to enact laws and pol ic ies  that it  deems reasonably nec­
essary. I n  the eyes of the Court,  the D ue Obed ience Law was such a reason­
abl e  meas ure.  In a concurring opi n i o n ,  J ust ice Carlos Faye breaks w i th N ur­
emberg trad i t i ons of command responsi b i l i ty, which he ld  superiors l i able for 
the aces of  the i r  i nferiors whi le s t i l l  ho ld i ng i nferiors l iabl e  for thei r own 
i l legal acts even if fol lowing orders YH J usc  i ce Faye argues char " subord i nate 
officers have the legal capac i ty to verify the extri ns ic  character ist ics  of  che act 
for the purposes of establ i sh i ng whether or nor  i t  i s  an order  . . .  bur  such 
capac i ty to verify does not extend to rhe l egal  or i l legal nawre of the or­
der. "27'J  The Court thereby upheld the Due Obedience Law, affirm i ng i m ­
m un i ty for most m em bers o f  t h e  m i l i tary and s tate services and even ques­
t ion i ng com mand respons i b i l i ty. 
The chal lenge ro i m m u n i ty i n  E l  Salvador sought to i nval idate a B lanker 
Am nesty. The j ud ic ial dec i s ion  i nvoked questi onable legal pr i nci ples co 
2 7  i .  Dec is ion on rhe Law of D u e  OlxJ itnce. Cast N o .  5 -.\7 ,  J u n t  2 2 ,  l 987 ( S uprem e Cou rr of t\r.� e n ­
r i na)  rejn·imu! I!J T!L\NSITI0!-'.·1 1 .  .J u S TJ c : t : ·  How L\I I: I((; J !'(; D E � J OC I\ACI ES R l : t : KO'-: \\TrH FOJC,I ! : I\ R I ­
Cd � I F S  5 0 ')  ( N e d  J K r i rz eel , l 99 5 )  [ h e re maher T!LI �:) IT ION.·I I .  J uSTI C E ) .  
.:!7 5 .  I n  l ') 9 0 ,  rh e C h i  it-an S up reme Court uphe l d rhe  va l i d i cy of cht: l 97 S  ,-\ m nesry  Law. Stc Ed ward 
S. S n y d er, The Oirtr Le.�,;/ ll<n·: l/Jillldll J? ,,�!Jt., d!ld tbc l?!llc 1J/ La11 i11 Cbdc 1 9 73- 1 () ') 5 ,  :2 Tl.J l.:),\ J .  C0\11' 
&:  1'-: r 1 . L. 2 5 :0, . .2 7 5  
2 7 6 .  Dr.:c i s ion o n  rhe A m neSr)· Law , Procetd 1 11gs No. l 0-9 .1 , May 2 0 .  l 99 1 .  ( S u pre me Courr  of ) u s ­
r i ce oF E l  Salvador)  rr{mlltr,/ ill Ti(A :--.i� ITI00cl l. J USTIC: L ,  .IJ!fir" n o c t  2 7 - \ ,  ar _)-'! ':) ,  _)-'! ':) .  
?. 7 7 .  De-c i s  t O n  on r h e  Law o f  Due Obed i ence. Case: N o .  5 -i 7 , } u n t  2 ?. ,  l ':)S 7 ,  � ?. l  . rtjll inrul i n  TR.I C.: S I ­
T I0 '-: .\1. J LSTIC L,  J ltjlld nore ?. 7 -i ,  ar 50') ,  5 1  I . 
.2 7 0 .  S, , ,  "-.� . . Prostc u ro r  v. Ze j n d  Delal ic  (Cdibici  Cbt)  .J udgmem of Nm. [ (i ,  l <Jl) S ,  11 11 ) ) 1- i .'> .  
Case N o  I T-')6-2 1 .  (d iscuss i ng " c h c- [ l ]eg,d [c] lu racrer o F  [c}om mand [ rksp"ns i h i l i tl· and i rs [s}rarus 
[ u } ndt:r [ c ) u sru ma r\· [ i ] n r t rn a r l on;d [ l ]a,-.· . . ) .  Fur  <tn c-xn:l k n r  rt:v i c\\' of comm;;ncl rcs pt i ilS i b i l l r \ ·, :>teo ,c:c- n ­
t: r:d h i\! .-1 1\ K J O� r E J . ,  0 1 < 1 -: Y r �c O rw 1 : 1z s :  ATI( I JUTY, il. [ r r . r T  .. I I(Y D I SCJ P r . r �: t: 0:. T H r :  L., ,, . O F  \V,\ 1\ 
( ] ')')') ) . .  ),, ,;j, ,, \Vi l l i a l1l 1 · 1 . P;trks ,  C.oll!ll!i !i!d 1\c.<f'oit.• d;i/ity f .. r \\-;;r C! 'lll!f.l , 0 2  iv[ r l .  L l Z IY l ( [ <) / _) )  For 
Ctsc Lm cstah l i S h l l l !:!  the r u l e- 1 > t' c u rn nu n cl rL·spur l S i h i l l t ) ', st·e /;; r, Ya nush 1 L1 . . '> 2 7  L i . S .  I ( 1 ')- i (, ) .  S" ,Ji., , ,  
The f-f 1p l 1  C:om m<tnd C 1 s c ,  lJ \: I I T IJ '\ ,n r o�� \VJ.\ Iz ( IU \ I I : s  o- , ,� l ,\ 1 · :--.: . X I I Ll\\ 1\ i i' l l lnc; 0 1 :  TH I .I r .:; O l' 
\\1.\ lz C : l\ i .\ l l '-. . 1 1 .:; I , ; (, ( 1 9-': S J .  
_' '? ') _  Dn· 1 s i o n  011 rht D u t:  Ohtd i e iKl' L1w. • ltjir. ; n o r c:  2 -- i . < I f  5 1 ! 
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deny j ur isdict ion over the cha l lenged l aw. When cons ideri ng  a pennon 
chal l e ng i ng the 1 99 3  Salvadoran Law of Amnesty and Rehab i l i ta t i o n ,  the 
Supreme Court of J ust ice of El  Salvador held that "m atters of  pure l y  pol i t i ­
c a l  nature are n o t  [wi th in)  the  doma i n  of tr ibuna ls . "280 I n  a convol uted d i s ­
cuss ion of soverei g nty, the  Court determined amnesty t o  b e  a r i g h t  of  the 
sovere ig n ,  conferred by " d i v i n e  g race , "  and therefore an  "em i nent ly  p o l i ti ca l  
act . "  I t  concluded that  the power to g rant am nesty had been "const i tut ion­
al ly  conferred o n  the Leg i sl ative Assembly" and that  i t  was not  w i t h i n  the  
Court 's j ur i sd ic t ion to review s uch a pol i t ical  act .  The log i c  of  d i v i n e  g race 
appears outdated . Even if amnesty i s  solely po l i t i ca l ,  it need not be beyond 
j ud i cial  review. As an apparent afterthought ,  the  Court turned to the mer i ts 
of the case, i nvoki ng an often misconstrued passage i n  Art ic le  6(5 )  o f  Add i ­
t ional P rotoco l I I  of the Geneva Conventions [here inafter A d d i t i o na l  P roto­
col  II) to j ust i fy i m m u n ity. 28 1 I n  i t s  cursory treatment ,  the  Court i naccu­
ratel y  i ncerpreted the Geneva Convenc ions .  The Court d i d  not cons ider  the  
fundamencal obl igations  of the Geneva Convenc ions ,  in  l ight  of  which the 
amnesty c lause of Add i t i onal  P ro roco l  I I  must be i n cerp reted , nor did it  
mention the Red Cross Commentaries ,  which l i m i t  the read i ng of Art ic le  
6( 5 ) .  The Court y ie lded to perceived pol i t ica l  necess ity and deni ed i tse lf  
j l:1risd ic c ion .  
Both of these domestic cha l l enges to B lanket Am nesty fai led to cons ider 
the l eg i t i macy of the enac t i ng govern ment and the scope of  the  leg is l at i o n .  
These courts also fai led to g ive a n y  conv i n c i ng reasons  for uphold i ng t h e  
am nesties i n  q uest ion .  These cases do not  undermi ne t h i s  analyt i cal  frame­
work . Rather, the Argen c i n e  and Salvadoran exampl es reveal the  con t i n u i ng 
i l leg i t i macy of the governments enact ing  the overreac h i ng am nesty laws i n  
q uest ion . 
B.  Locally Legitimized. Partial Immmzity in Applicc:ttion 
Two of the Local ly  Leg i t i m i zed , Parc ial Amnest ies  analyzed i n  Part I I  
have been subjeCt c o  cha l lenge i n  domestic courts . Whi le  the chal l e nge to  
the South Afr ican National U n i ty and Reconc i l iat ion  Act  has  been  decided , 
the F i j ian case is st i l l  pendi ng at  the t ime  of publ i cat ion . �:-:2  These two do-
_l � O .  Dec is ion on the  Amnesty Law, Proceed 1 ngs No. W-9 ) ,  i\hy 20 ,  1 9';)_), ( E l  Sal . ) ,  Parr  I ,  rfjlrillltcl 
i11 Tt\.-l"iS ITioxu _j cSTICE ,  .illjJra nore _1 7.:\ , ,tt _).:\ 9  
2 8 1 J\n i c l t  6( 5 )  c1l ls u p o n  srates ro · ' g rctm r h <:  hroadesr poss i b l e: clm nesry ro persons w h o  h ave par­
t i c i pated i n  r he armed con ti l e r ,  or t hose d tpn ved of' rhc 1 r  l 1 btrr1· r(Jr reasons related ro the ,umecl conrl i c r .  
w hether r h e y  are i n terned or deta i ned . . . See Prmocol r\dd i ( ]onal ro  r h e  Geneva Convenrions o f  r\ ugusr  1 2 , 
I 9-19. a n d  Reia t l l\l,: w r h e  l)rorccr ion of V i c r i ms ol· N o n - l nr c rna( l o n a l  Arml'd Con H i ers  [here i n c1fr c r  Pro­
wcol I I } .  I 9 7 7 .  a n . {)( ) ) , 1 1 .2 5  U . N .T S .  _) "The rr,m·< �ft\ of [ A m c l t  6( 5 ) )  i n d i ca t e  r h cu rim 
pro,· ls lOll a 1 ms at encour,tg ln,l! c1m nc:s rv . for t h ose detai ned or p u n i shed lo1· the rnne Ltcr of luv i ng 
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mes t i c  j ud ic iaries,  apparent ly  e n j oy i ng greater i ndependence than their  Ar­
gent ine  and Salvadoran counterparts ,  have app l ied far str icter scrutiny. These 
two am nesty l aws have been uphel d  i n  l arge part because they have greater 
leg i ti m acy and more restricted scope chan do B lanket Am nest ies .  
In  South Afr ica, a law herei n categori zed as  a local ly  leg i t i mi zed , Parti al 
Immun i ty was found consti tut iona l  and therefore enforceabl e  by the Const i­
tut ional  Courr . 28" In th i s  chal l enge to the Nat i o nal U n i ty and Reconci l i a­
t i o n  Act [herei nafter Nat i on a l  Reconci l iati o n  Act} , pet i t i oners , represented 
by the Azanian  Peopl e 's Organisat i o n ,  argued that Sect ion 20(7)  of the Na­
t i o na l  Reconci l i at ion Act ,  accordi ng to which " no person who has been 
granted amnesty in respect of an act ,  omiss ion  or offence shal l be cri m i na ll y  
o r  c ivi l l y  l iab le , "  was i n  vio lat i o n  o f  Sect ion  2 2  o f  the  South A frican Const i ­
tut ion .  Sect ion  22 guarantees every person " the r ight to have j ust ic iable  d is­
putes  sett led by a court of l aw or, where appropriate, another i ndependent or 
i mpart ia l  forum . "28-i The Court found that the I n terim Const i tut ion  of 1 99 3  
i tsel f mandated an amnesty l aw. l i ke t h e  Argenti n e  Court,  the  South A fr i ­
can Court p laces great emphas i s  on the h i s torical background to the am­
nesty, ope n i ng i ts dec i s ion  by not ing " decades [of} deep confl i c t . "285  
The South A fr ican Court , however, did apply  a model s i m i lar to  th is  Arti ­
c le 's analyti ca l  framework. The Court fi rst turns t o  l eg i t imacy, ques t i o n i ng 
the law 's adherence,  or i ts conformity w i th other leg is lat ion and wi th  the 
Cons t i tu t ion in part icular. The Court acknowledges that "an amnesty un­
doubtedl y  i m pacts on fundamenta l  r ights"  protened by the Const i tut ion ,286 
but observes that Sect i o n  3 3(2 )  of the Const i tu t ion  a l lows the Const i tut ion  
i tse lf  to  l i m i t  the  rights i t  guarantees . 2'" Determi n i ng that  the epi log ue of 
the Const i tm i on,::>:-;s which exp l i c i tl y  cal l s  for an am nesty, i s  an eq ual part of 
the Consti mt i o n ,  the Court upholds the val i d i ty of the Nati ona l  Reconc i l ia­
t ion Act .  
The South African Court then tur ns co q uest ions of scope v i s-a-v is  i n ter­
nat ional  law. Whi le  th is  approach conforms to th is  Art ic l e 's recomtTl e ndecl 
framework, the Court's i nternat ional  law arguments are c i rcu lar and i ts con­
c lus ions flawed . Accord i ng to the Court : 
I n ternationa l  l aw and the comems of i n cernacional ueat ies to which 
South A frica m ight or might  n ot be a party are . . .  re levant on ly  i n  the 
i nterpretat ion of the Cons t i tut ion  i tse lf, on the grounds t hat the l aw­
makers of the Const i tut ion should noc l ight ly  be pres umed to authori ze 
2000. dl 't�ilc�!J/c :tl ::' 0 0 1 \VL 2 1 2 2 5 _) 5  
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any law which might  con s c i  cute a breach of the obl igat ions  of the s tate 
i n  terms of i nternat ional law. 2�9 
The Court claim s  that cons t i mt i o nal  l awmakers can i nfri nge upon i nter­
nat ional law, but they should not be eas i ly permi tted to do  so. Yet ,  the 
Court fai l s  co dec ide whether a p resumption agai nst  a breach of i n ternati o nal 
law should appl y  to a domest i c  law mandated by the Const i tut ion .  If the 
terms of the Const i tmion should not be casual ly read co contrad ic t  i nterna­
t ional law, why i s  a domes t i c  law exempt from such a more s t ri ngent  read­
i ng ;;  The Court c i tes the Const i tut ion i tse lf  for the proposi t i o n  t hat courts 
"should have regard to publ ic  i n ternational l aw appl i cable co the protect ion 
of r ights  entrenched in  ch i s  C hapter. "29° Yet ,  the  Court argues that such 
scrutiny i s  not necessary because the Consti tut ion  i tself mandates the  grant 
of  am nesty. 
The Courc fai l s  co acknowledge Souch A frica's t reaty or customary o b l iga­
t ions .  Even a const i tut ional  co urc dec is ion does not  absolve South A frica of 
t hose obligat ions . The Court ignores the Geneva Convent ions  and t he i r ad­
d i t ional protocols , noti ng that the aces  in  South A fr ica were " perpetrated . . .  
w i th i n  the terri tory of a soverei gn  s tate i n  consequence of a s t rugg le between 
the  armed forces of that state and ocher d iss ident  armed forces . " 29 1  The 
Court therefore fi nds there co be "no obl igati o n  . . to ensure the prosecu­
r ion . "292 Ac  the very leas t ,  the Court should have considered whether  Add i­
t ional Protocol I I  obl igates s ra ces to prosecme cri mes in  non- i nternational  
armed con A icts . \X!h i l e  i t  i s  t ru e  t hat aparthe id  South Africa was not party t O  
m ost convent ions i mpos i ng  a prosecute or extrad i te requ i re m e nt ,2 'J' with  
respect to genoci de a nd  cr i m es agai nst humani ty, i t  s t i ll bore custom ary law 
obl igations . 29 1 By E1i l i ng to consider potential  l i m i ts on the r-...Jat ional  R ec­
onc i l iat ion Act,  che Court abrogates i ts internat ional obl igat ions  and fai l s  to 
ful fi l l  i ts d uties  both to the i nt ernational com m un i ty and to the c i t i zens  of 
South Africa.  ·wh i l e  the Court failed co cake ful l  account of the ro le of che 
country 's i nternati onal o b l igations ,  i cs actions demonstrate how che  analy t i ­
cal framework based on l eg i t i macy a n d  scope developed i n  th i s  A n i c l e  could 
have bee n effective and w i l l  be appl i cable as a powerful tool for analys is  i n  
t h e  fuc ure .  
Th e  most recent chal lenge to a tocal ly teg i t i m ized , Parcial  .r\m nescy, 
which i s  s t i l l  o ngoi n g ,  is the j ud i c i al proceed i ngs agai nst Geo rge Speigh t 
and h i s  fo l lowers i n  F i j i .  L i ke the Azan ian People 's Orga n isat ion case i n  
2S;i IJ 11 2(, 
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South Africa, the F i j ian s i t uati o n  s uggests that domestic courts may apply  a 
str ict  s tandard of scru t i ny to local l y  leg i t i m ized,  Partial Im m un i t y  through 
a framework s i m i lar to that suggested in  Part I I .  Whi le  a final  dec i s ion from 
the F i j ian H igh Court i s  s t i l l  months away at the t ime of publ i cat i o n ,  pre­
l i m i nary proceedi ngs have i nvolved heightened j ud icial scrut i ny and i ncl i ­
cate a s trong l ike l ihood o f  i nval idat i ng amnesty. 
O n  July  2 6 ,  2 0 0 0 ,  only  two weeks after releas i ng h i s  hostages and s1g n i ng 
the amnesty agreement ,  Spe ight  and h i s  compatriots were arrested . 295  They 
made an i ni t ial  appearance i n  court i n  Suva on August 5 ,  2 0 0 0 ,  charged 
w i t h ,  inter alicz ,  "consort i ng w i th people carryi ng fire arms and ammunit ion 
between 19 May and 2 7  J ul y. "296 I n  the p roceed i ngs before C h i ef Magistrate 
Salesi  Temo, Assistant Prosecutor Rachel  Olut im ay i m  arg ued t hat the am­
nesty "agreement was null  and void because the weapons  had not  been re­
turned and the agreement i tself  was s igned by [s ic}  m i l i tary u nder du­
ress . " 297 Before the chief  magistrate could render a dec i s i o n ,  the  charges 
against  Speight were amended to i nclude treason29::: ' " for i ntend i ng to levy 
war' against  the pres ident .  " 2 99 After numerous postponements ,  J ust ice Dan­
iel Fatiaki granted habeas corpm, removing from the purv iew of the mag is­
trate's court any consideration of the val i di ty  of the amnesty ag reement ,  and 
ensuring that " the quest ion  of whether the I m m u n i ty Decree stands . . .  w i l l  
b e  dec ided b y  the H igh Cour t .  " ooo 
W hi le  the High Court has yec to rule on Spe ight ,  a test case against  Isoa 
Raceva Karawa , " 1 1 1  one of Spe ight 's assoc iates , bas gone to trial . In the appeal 
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proceedings before the chief magistrate,  Karawa asserted the affirmative de­
fense of the Immunity Decree No . 1 8  of 2000 . 3°2 I n  reply, the S tate argued 
that the defendant 's acts  were not w i t h i n  the scope of the decree and re­
quested more t im e  for cons ideri ng the scope of the decree . 30 1  The m ag istrate 
found that 
ch i s  Court i s  commanded by Sect ion 3 ( 1 )  and 3(2)  of the I m m u n i t y  De­
cree No . 1 8  of 2 000 to  d i scontinue t hese proceed i ngs for thw i t h .  The 
accused in t hese cases was act i ng on the d i reCt ion of George Speig h t .  
Sect ion 3( 1 )  above says  ' no Court s h a l l  entertain a n y  proceedi ngs 
against  h i m . '  On that ground , the accused i s  to  be released forth w it h . 104 
In a subsequent appeal , however, the  H igh Court took a notabl y  d i fferent 
approac h ,  looki ng to the scope of the amnesty l aw i tself  to q uest ion i ts va­
l i d i ty, rather than merely asking whether the acts of the accused fel l  w i t h i n  
t h e  decree's scope .  J usc i ce Serman argued that " I  cannot accept the  propos i ­
t i o n  that t h e  al leged cr imes of Attempted Murder and t h e  Possess ion of  
F i rearms wi thout lawfu l  excuse can be described as  ' Po l i t ical O ffences . '  Th i s  
would be a d istorted a n d  e n t i re ly  i nappropriate descript ion .  n ; os As the  am­
nesty only appl ies to  pol i t i ca l  offences , the Court 's find i ng that  m urder can 
not be a pol i t ical offence narrows the scope of the am nesty. 
The High Court also q uest ions the val i d i t y  of the law i tself  on the  
grounds that the terms of the Muanikau Accord were nor  met and there fore 
che am nesty was never conferred . 3°6 The Court 's i nval idation of  the am nesty 
shows that what this Article categoriL:es as Loca l ly  Leg i t i mized , Partial Im­
m un i ty ma y  n o t  always be uphel d .  
Whi le  the Karawa test  case i s  certai nly  importanc , t h e  more s ign ificant 
decis ion w i l l  be in t he Speight  case i tself. I n  the Speight case,  the prosecmor 
has chal lenged the amnesty on the grounds that Speight fai led to comply 
with the req u i rements for amnesty agreement and that the amnesty was i l ­
leg i t i mate o n  i ts face. 10' T h e  fi rst  argumem of  non-compl iance g i ves the 
H igh Cour t legal foor i ng c o  s tr ike clown a Local ly Leg i t i m i zed , Parc ia l  Am-
n a c i o n a l  Law Journal) .  
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nesty. The second argument ,  that the m i l i tary on ly  s igned the  accord u nder 
duress , goes s traight  co the quest i o n  of domestic legitimacy. '0fi 
The High Court appears to be g iv i ng pr ior i ty to the quest i o n  of leg i t i ­
macy a n d  s hould con t i n ue t o  do  so .  I n  part icular, i t  should cont in ue to ask 
whether the F i j ian  people  would have chosen the amnesty. As  the Speight  
Case proceeds ,  the  Court should a lso  look at the scope of the  l aw, as  Just ice  
Serman d i d , 109 co determ i ne not  j us t  whether the acts of the accused fal l  
w i th i n  the scope of t h e  law, b u t  also whether t h e  scope of t h e  law i tself  
compl ies with F i j i 's i n ternati onal  legal  obligations .  Assum i ng the H igh 
Court s tr ikes down the Speight  amnesty on grounds of scope and leg i t i macy, 
as the test case suggests i t  may, i t  would s ignal  a t rend away from e n forc i ng 
Local ly  Leg i t i m i zed,  Parci al I m m u n i ty i n  domest ic  courts and toward a 
higher threshold of leg i t imacy for the acceptance of am nesty leg i s lati o n .  
Such a precedent could have far reac h i ng consequences for redefi n i ng the 
standards for domest ic  enforcemen t of amnesty legis lat i o n ,  along l i nes p ro­
posed by t h i s  Art ic le .  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Part I created a normati ve l iberal i nternati onal law theory. The powerfu l  
potent ia l  of t h i s  theory as a model w i th which  c o  bui ld  a two-axes frame­
work for analys i s  comprised of l eg i t imacy and scope was then demonstrated . 
, Part II app l i ed th i s  two-axi s  framework to a number of case s tudies to cate­
gorize amnesty leg is lat ion and to determ i ne i ts val i d i ty. Pare I I I ,  w h i le not­
i ng the i ncons istencies in j ud i c i al consi derat i o ns of amnesty leg i s la t ion ,  pre­
sented evi dence of correlat ion between this two-ax i s  framework and recent 
am nesty dec i s ions .  This  conc lus ion br iefly considers research poss i b i l i t i es .  
How d o  state obl igat ions  l i m i t  t h e  scope o f  amnesty l eg is lat i o n !  How can 
j udges apply th i s  Arc icle 's framework to determine the val i d i ty of such leg­
is lat ion;;  What i mpl icat ions do the recent trend s in amnesty leg i s lat ion have 
on state sovere ignty ? 
As noted at the o utset ,  states may face customary law- and treaty law­
based obl igations to prosecute certain cr imes . '  1 1 1 These obl igat ions serve as a 
ce i l i ng for each part icular state,  l i mi t i ng the scope of any am nesty g rant .  
Where such obl igations exist ,  am nes ty laws are fundamental ly  i nappl i cable.  
W h i le certa in  obl igations  to p rosecute ( i n  relat ion to,  at a m i n i m u m ,  geno­
c ide ,  war cr imes ,  cr imes agai nst  humani ty, and corcure)1 1 1 are appl i cable to 
'JUS Jd 
109 .  Scut \·. l s oa R acn a Karawa, C n m i nal Appeal No. l··l AA ( ) () l of .2 ( )01 ) ,  ar l l . 
1 1 0  Sec. e .g. , l �; T · I  LAw Ass· N ,  C:O,\L\1 . 0'-' l en· ' ! .  H t..: ,\ l cl '-' R J c ; HTS Ll\\' .� N D  P l(.ACT J C I : ,  F l '-'>� 1  R E­
i 'OIZ 1 oc; Ti l E  E X l c iZ C I S I ·  OF U N ! V UZScl l  J ldZ I S D I C: T I O N  I:\ R I' S I' I c C: T  01 c ; IZ C lS' H l  ,\ ! A .'\ R I(; HTS 01-
IT:\CLS ( .2 1  lO l l ) .  
:; I I  . .  \ cc \V u_ I . UZ c'X: B U I\ K E - WH ! T i c .  1 /lf'l'd []()[(: - 1 -1 , a t  ch . .2 :  Roman Botcl Fhc I { /  {)r;((/CJ!lc ;-\ 11/-
1/t! ! t )  .'))/ rlrc A /;;/fl)' o( S!rileJ /1; Pm\Hii!c t\ !lcgcd Pcljlc/1'{(/1;1' 1 IJ Su'/li/1.\ /-{;;//!: ()/ N.igbiJ Vid!i!Oi!!, _:;_:; 
C:O IZ 'I F I  1 ] -..;-( [  L.J. .2 97 , _) 1 4-.Z i l ,  _1 2 )  ( 2 () 1 ) ( ) )  n i: r i l cl t  s tarts have obl tg cn i ons tu pms<:C l l t(· 
cr t  nlt's ns r h u m c\ Il t  t\·, gtnoudc,  and r o r r u rt ) . 
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a l l  s tates through customary i nternational  law and are enshr ined  i n  che 
emergent i n ternational cons c i c u c i o n ,  many crimes chat are often c h e  subj ect 
of amnesty grams are not so c learly w i t h i n  the scope of this emergent  i n ter­
nationa l  consc i cuc ional order. 'd 2  Moreover, many obl igat ions co prosecute are 
derived from i n ternational t reat ies ,  as wel l as or i ns tead of, customary i nter­
national  law. I t  i s  beyond the reach of ch i s  Art ic le  co determ i ne che  excem of 
state ob l igations co  prosecute and thus to  determi ne the cei l i ng on am nesty. 
Suc h  research would req u i re a carefu l  cons i derati o n  of che norms of che 
emerg i ng i n ternati onal consc i c m i o n  and a speci fic country-by-country re­
view of t reaty-based obl igat ions  as appl ied to  each state . Even l eav i n g  a case­
by-case determ i nac ion of the compat i b i l i ty of amnesty laws w i t h  s tate ob l i ­
gations  for future s tudy, s ign i ficant conclus ions have a lready emerged as co 
how each category of am nesty legis lat ion m easures up to state o b l igat ions . 
B la nke t  A mnest ies ,  w i t h  the ir  extraord inar i ly  b road scope, deny the  j ud i ­
c iary c b e  potenc ia l  to  prosecute ,  a n d  consequent l y  render actual  pcosecuc ion  
i mpossi ble  for cri mes chat  are genera l ly regarded as  requ i r ing prosecut ion  
under customary i n ternational  law. The  enactmen t of  B lanket A m nesty leg­
i s lat ion in C h i le ,  Argent ina ,  and Peru violated t hese customary i n ternat ional 
legal norms .  Questions of l eg i t i m acy as ide ,  the i n ternational  const i tut ion  
i ntervenes to deny  these a mnesties val i d i ty on s ubstant ive grounds . There­
fore , domestic and extraterri torial  courts al i ke should i nval i d ate any pans of 
these laws exceed i ng the i n ternat ional ly authorized scope.  P ol i ti c ians  in 
s cares cons idering am nest ies and d rafters of new amnesty l aws would be wel l 
advised to exclude from the i r  laws cr i mes chat req u i re prosecut i o n  under 
custom ary i n ternat ional law. 
Whether locally leg i t i m i zed ,  Parcia l  I m m u n i ty and Internationa l l y  le­
g i t i m ized , Part ia l  I m rTmn i ty conform co the chen-prevai l i ng i n ternat ional  
consensus depend on both a scare 's part i c ular ob l igations and an ad j ud i cacory 
body's determ i nac ion of the scope of  the amnesty. I n  order for such am nest ies 
co meet i nt ernational obl igac ions ,  the adj ud icatory body cann o t  inc lude  
genocide,  war cr imes ,  cr i mes agai nst  humani ty, and  torture .  Depend i ng on 
the  s care 's rat ification of part icular treaties ,  am nesty for ocher cri m es ,  such as 
aparthei d ,  cr i m es agai nst  i nt ernational ly procectecl persons ,  and g rave 
breaches in non- i nternat iona l  armed confl i c t s ,  m ay also be prohi b i te d .  Lo­
cal l y  legi t i m i zed , Parc ia l  I m nw n i c ies cl!1d I n ternat ional ly  leg i t i m ized , Par­
t ial I m m u n i t ies w i th more res tr ict ive scope are m ore l i kely co comply  with  
the  enact ing state 's i n ternat i o nal  obl igat ions .  
I nternational Consc i cm ional  Am nest ies ,  by defi n i c i on ,  conform to the  
manc.laces of the i nt ernat iona l  consci cut ional  order. They exempt  fron1 i m ­
m un i ty cr i m es char  r h e  S Gltt i s  obl igated c o  p rosecut e  under i n ternational  
l aw. B y  spec ifica l l y  exc l u d i ng fro rn the am nesc its  cht mosc seri ous c r i mes 
·" 1 .! . Such cr i mes l l l l i u d c .  i t >[  t">:Clll1 p k ,  ,l: l";i\"t" h rc·c [l"hcs or r il e  c;l" l)l'\';1 Coi1\'(; [ J [ i u n s  I ll  f1U i l - 1 1 1 [l "ri1Ci l l l l 1 1 d l  
armed C t l ll l l i cr s .  c r i mes ci,C: ct l lb l  J n rerncH I U I< :d l v  p r"rcncd pnsu ns .  c tnd l:,C:I"l",L: IULIS  U I V i r< l l l ll1 l" I J ca l  cr tmcs .  Sec 
\\'�-:� . 1 . 1 ·: 1 z &: Fl i .' [( K I '. - \V i i i T I :  . . >!tf> ld 1 1orc i · i .  ; �r  c h .  I .  
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req u i r ing p rosecut ion  under customary i nternational law, s tates ensure t hat 
the amnesty l aws,  however app l ied by the j ud ic iary, w i l l  com p l y  w i t h  the  
d ictates of the i nternational consti tut ional order. For  i nstance,  such laws 
cannot grant i mpuni ty for grave b reaches of the Geneva Convent ions ,  cr imes 
against  humani ty, genoci de ,  torture ,  and other addi t i o nal cr imes req u i r i ng 
prosecut ion . Operating w i t h i n  the restr i cted scope and heightened s tandards 
of domestic and i nternational l eg i t imacy of I n ternati onal Const i tut ional  
Immuni ty, states can balance the obl igat ion  to p rosecute the most serious 
cr imes with  the need to grant amnesty to promote reconci l i at i o n  and pol i t i ­
cal trans i t ion . 
Determi nations  of the l eg i t imacy of  a s tate's government h ave been cr i t i ­
c ized as subj ective a n d  beyond t h e  competency o f  t h e  j ud i c iary. Admitted ly, 
the appl icati o n  of th is  Art ic le 's framework depends on the abi l i ty of j udges 
and pol icy-makers to engage i n  such determ i nat ions .  W h i l e  it is t rue t hat 
tests which  look to whether the w i l l  of  the people i s  the ult i m ate source of a 
state's authority are somewhat subj ective,  such an i nq ui ry i s  wel l  w i t h i n  the  
realm of j ud i c ia l  competency. 
Th i s  Art ic le  argues that only  I n ternational Cons t i tu t ional Amnes t i es and 
the i r  c losest equivalents should be given extraterri torial effect . This  Art ic le 's 
framework , h owever, p rovides flex i bi l i ty to the j ud ic iary of the  enforc i ng 
state to determi n e  exactly where the enforcement  l i ne should be d rawn .  
Both domest ic  and i nternational const itut ions place l i m i ts o n  the scope of  
the laws , bu t  an enforci ng j ud i c i ary may  m ake i ts own determi nations of 
what level  of legit i macy i s  needed before an amnesty w i l l  be recog n i zed . 
Adm i ttedly, j udges are rarel y  t ra ined pol i t i cal sc ient ists ,  but they have of­
ten m ade such determi nations of leg i t i macy. For exam ple ,  i n  Bi z ·. Ullion 
Carbide Chemiw!J and Plcr.1tin, the U . S .  Court of Appeals fo r the Second C i r­
cu i t  add ressed the i ssue of whether to "g ive effect to the stat u te of a fore ign 
governm en t  that  p urports to grant  that  government exclusive stan d i ng to 
represen t " mass tort  v ic t im s . 1 1 ' Such a s tatut e ,  which may deny i nd iv iduals 
a r ight of redress , i s  not d iss i m i lar to an amnesty grant . I n  dec l i n i ng the 
v ic t ims '  chal lenge of the settlement ,  the Second C i rcuit  reasoned that " I nd ia  
i s  a democracy. I rs Const i tut ion ,  wh ich  took effect in  1 9 5 0 ,  p rovides for a 
republ i can form of par l iamentary gove rnment  and guarantees the fundamen­
tal  r ights of the  people,  i nclud i ng equal p rotect ion  and proced ural due proc­
ess . " ' 1 1 As I n d i a  "dec ided in an act passed by i ts democrat i c  parl iament to 
reoresem cxc lus ivelv all the vict i m s  in a s u i t , "  that dec is ion should be bon-, ' 
orecl .  ' 1  5 I n  Bi ,  when the court cons idered whether Ind ia  was a democracy, 
whether the act \vas passed by a leg i t i m ate  parl iament , and whether the act 
demonstrated adherence to the scare 's const i tut ion ,  i t  made dete r m i nations 
s i m i lar ro th ose suggested i n chis  A rt i c l e .  N u mero us other  courc s  have en-
; I ;  B r  ' · L n 1 u n  Cr rh rdt: Cht· m , c:r l s  cu1d P L t s c i cs Co . SIS-\ f'. 1d  S S .' .  S S S  U d  C 1 r. I l)'J i )  
; I �  /d. 
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gaged i n  s i m il ar fact-spec i fic determ inations of govemmemal type and le­
g! t imacy, especial !  y in relati o n  co frmmz non COJl1)CJliens determi nati o n s '  1 6  and 
asy lum claims . -1 1 7  Non - U . S .  courts have also e ngaged i n  s i m i lar determi na­
t ions of governmental leg i t i m acy. i i i-: I n  m ak ing such fact-speci fic and pol i t i ­
cal determ i nations ,  j udges may seek ass i stance from the exec utive branc h ,  
non-govemmental organi zat ions ,  a n d  even po l i t i cal sc ient ists ,  t h rough a m i c i  
briefs co t h e  court or  i n t roduct ion 1 nto evidence o f  State Department  docu­
ments and s imi lar reporcs . -1 1 9 
A complete analys is  of the  ways courts engage questions of  l eg i t i m acy of 
foreign govemments ,  the sources o n  which t hey draw, and the  resu ltant j u­
risprudence i s  a topic wel l  worth funher study. For the purpose of  t h i s  Art i ­
c le ,  i t  is  suffic ient  co s how c hat courts can and do make determi nations 
about leg i t imacy, i ndicat i ng chat this Art ic le 's frame·work can be effectively 
m i l i zed . 
The appl ication  of c h i s  Art ic le 's framework also suggests c h e  poss i b i l i ty  of 
a trans- jud icial  d ialogue , lead i ng co a convergence of norms and pract ices i n  
the  enforcement o f  amnesty laws . ' � 1 1  \Y/hen a court decides o n  the  vali d i ty of 
an am nesty law us ing chis  framework , i t  i s  s i m u l taneo usly c o m m u n i cat ing 
w i t h  courts in other staces . ' 2 1  Such com m un i cat ion  s ignals co ocher j ud i c i -
_) 1 6 . Fo rum """ "'"' 'ollw.< cons iderar ions vfren I n \·oln- a dner m 1 nar i on o f  wher her " p la i m i ffs art 
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,t; <l r Y. S urrendr·a 0\·erseas. J.rcl . .  � 2 1 1  F S u pl' ·  l) ) :' .  ')G i l  ( [ D .  jJ,t l 9Sl ) )  (a i 'ti r rn r ng r h c: pror,o s H i o n  u f  "ck­
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th t: Llck of U.S .  d i p l oma t i C rc:lar l l Jns  w i t h  Iran < Inc !  ti nd r ng th<H ] i [ lg•I r i c l l l  1 11 I ran w o u l d  d e p r i ve rhe  
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aries bow quest ions of s i m i lar ly  s i tuated am nesties should be dec i ded i n  the 
fu ture . ' 2 2  There a lso  exist  poss i b i l i t ies of j ud ic ia l- leg i s la t i ve dia log ues ,  
through which t h e  courts o f  e n forci ng states would com m u n i cate w i th l eg­
i s latures i n  states enac t i ng or contern p lat ing am nest i e s .  Through such com­
m un i cat ion ,  d raft i ng leg i s lat ures co uld  develop a n  understand i ng of j ud i c ia l  
reaso n i ng and could  construct  t h e i r  l eg i s lat ion co comply w i t h  develop i ng 
norms .  These trans- j ud ic ia l  and j ud ic ia l- leg is lat ive d i a l ogues m ay eve ntually 
lead co convergence of standards o n  am nesty scope and leg i t i m acy. Theore t i ­
cally, w i ch s uch standards ,  legis latures a n d  executives wou l d  cease c o  e nact 
i nval i d  amnest ies ,  as they woul d  k now a priori chat such l a\vs would not be 
accorded extraterritorial  respect  and would nor,  therefore,  further  their goal 
of i m m u n i ty. 1 2 ; 
This normative l i beral  i n ternat i onal  law theory bas i mportant i mpl i ca­
t ions for the evol ut ion fro m  t rad i ti onal not ions of -westphal i a n  scare sover­
eign ty. :; 2  1 The restr ict ions o n  a mnesty and the l i m i ts on the scope of poten­
tial  i m m u n i ry " e rocl [e} rhe content  of sovere ignty and res tr ict[  } the r ights ,  
deri ved from sovere ignty, chat s tates were free co  exercise  at h o m e . " 12 5  \'Vb i l e  
di lut ion  o f  u n l i m i ted sovere i g n t y  is  w e l l  documen ted , t h i s  A n i c l e  s uggests 
a new i n terpretac i o n .  B ased on th i s  norm m i ve t heory, the exte n t  of a state 's 
soverei g my depends , i n  part , on the legi t i nwcy of i ts gove rn m e n t .  S tates 
that respect the w i l l  of che peopl e  9S the u l t i mate source of govern m e nt al 
amhority have a d i fferent degree of sovere ignty i n  enac t i ng certa i n types of 
l eg i s latio n .  \{!b i l e  the en1 e rg e n r  i n ternat ional  const i tut ion restr icts  the scope 
of t hac sovere ignty eve n for the m o s t  l eg i c i mme gove rn m ems , u nder t h i s  
norm at ive theory, a s tate 's �;overe ign  cll li : h o r i cy i s  d i rect l y  co rrelated t o  Lhe  
leg i t i macy of i ts gover n m e m .  
The i rn p l i cat ions  may go \ve l !  beyond t h e  va l i dat ion o f  am nesty leg i s la­
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norms of l i m i ted s tate pov,;er. I n  rh i s  n e w  \vorL.l of restri c cecl sovc:reignr y, 
d i ctators cannot i m pose r.he i r  ow n i m nw n i tv. Leu i t i rnate democrac ies ,  how-, '-' 
ever, can u t il i ze l i m i ted an1 nt·st:y : ts  a woi  for i'os c-co n H i c t  reco n c i l i m i o n .  
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